It's worth noting that nuclear reactors don't really explode in the way people think of. What they can do is turn into radioactive lava, melt through the floor, and release the highly carcinogenic dust from their system into the environment. They're generally big water heaters without pressure release valves (because the water has the carcinogenic dust in it), so they can burst like any water heater, and they contain zirconium, which reacts with steam at high temperatures to release hydrogen gas, which can make fireballs, but the accident risk is much less about a shock wave destroying the site than airborne radioactive particles getting out. And, even if the reactor design is incapable of producing enough heat to damage itself without first shutting down, you still have to worry about whether the site is safe enough from external damage. The traditional thick concrete walls are as much about keeping runaway trucks out as keeping steam explosions in.

It sounds to me like the input to the algorithm is truly random, but not unbiased, and the algorithm perfectly unbiases output from the particular source they are using. The rest of the article goes into the type of flaw they're addressing, and talks about very slightly unfair dice, which you could correct, but you'd need to know exactly how unfair they are, and you're always going to be very slightly wrong and end up correcting not quite perfectly. The obvious quantum RNG is to generate polarized light and measure it perpendicular to the polarization, but you'd still need to get it perfectly perpendicular. It sounds like they've built something that doesn't rely on precise alignment to give a known distribution, which they can then use to unbias the output perfectly.

It's pretty close to being an MP3 marked as a BMP, actually. It's the result of taking a reversable transformation of the audio signal that separates out the different perceptible components and then discarding the ones that matter least, and keeping the important ones in a convenient form for accessing them. It's the first step you'd take if you wanted a computer to identify speakers or what they were saying. The only part that's image-related is making the diagram, but getting back to the data is just taking the pixel values.

I suspect that they started using spectrograms in reports at a time when getting back the data from the image would have lost too much quality to printing and scanning to hear anything as quiet as voices, but PDFs with lossless images retain all of that.

I suspect part of it is that the mitigation for DirtyFrag covers it, so everyone who blocked all the modules in question when that had only an incomplete patch probably hasn't unblocked them yet. I think this is the 4th patch for these modules, and only got a new name rather than just "there's still a way to get this code to do the wrong thing" because a different outside team found this one.

Yeah, and the person who released the information first was operating in an "if I noticed this, doing only as much as I'm doing, surely attackers would also notice" mode. Possibly some patches these days are sufficiently obvious as to their correctness and also effect that they should first become public as a set of stable releases. This was a kind of special case, as CopyFail was the combination of some code doing something strange with one user not being prepared for it, and fixed the user. If there are other users that also aren't prepared, fixing them isn't going to be subtle.

How shadows and reflections move when you're 10 milies from a mostly flat surface a thousand miles across is legitimately hard to analyze for a visual system that evolved on the ground, especially if you throw in small periodic surface orientation variations. Given how complicated it is to explain rare rainbow-related phenomena like sun dogs, it would be surprising if we'd identified and explained everything that can appear when flying above the ocean.

While you're at it, you also need to block installing esp4, esp6, and rxrpc, for, y'know, reasons.

According to the article, they (by way of their cloud provider) had DR backups, which they were able to get restored. But getting offline backups restored takes longer than the SLAs they give their customers and loses some data that hasn't been copied offline yet, which is why they also have backups that are complete and immediately available, using the API key that the attacker -- sorry, AI -- found in a file it wasn't supposed to have access to.

Verizon's 2 Gbps Fios home service doesn't support IPv6, due apparently to them picking hardware for this particular service that doesn't handle it. Their other service does handle it, including slower home Fios, but not that in particular.

According to a Brian Krebs article, initial access to devices such as routers and TV boxes that are vulnerable on the LAN side of a NATed home internet connection is sometimes via 'free' smartphone games and apps that contain residential proxy software.

Some 'free' smartphone games and apps make money by allowing nefarious people to relay traffic through your home internet connection for things like fake social media accounts and credit card fraud but sometimes they also relay traffic to LAN ip addresses, typically 192.168.0.x, allowing hacking of devices that have default passwords, security holes in the crappy web interface, "Android Debug Bridge" enable and suchlike.

https://krebsonsecurity.com/20...

It uses VRTX, reportedly. Linux wasn't suitable as a real-time OS when the Hubble was designed, or really even when the Hubble got the 486 installed in 2009.

The LitleLLM packages were comprimosed on Tuesday. The packages compromised today were telnyx 4.87.1 and 4.87.2. It's the same root cause: credentials exposed to a compromised version of Trivy earlier were used to make an unauthorized release of a compromised version of a different package.

There is a hidden gotcha for people who avoid using a Microsoft account to log in to a personal Windows machine.

It has become common for a new laptop to be supplied with bitlocker disk encryption enabled, without the user being aware.

If you log on using a Microsoft Account then the bitlocker key gets stored in the account. Microsoft can give the key to police or feds when they seize a laptop. If Windows stops booting for some reason, or the key gets erased from the TPM which is not uncommon, then to take the drive out of the computer and retrieve your files you need the key and you can get it from the Microsoft account.

If someone jumps through the hoops to avoid using a Microsoft account then later they can find they can't take the disk/ssd out and read it by connecting it to another computer. If the computer stops booting, they did not save the bitlocker key because they did not know the drive was encrypted and did not have an up to date backup then, oh no, they have permanently lost their files.

If Windows gets as far as reading the bitlocker key from the TPM chip (which happens before user log in), then sometimes it is possible to solder wires to the I2C bus, record the data with a hardware logic analyzer and spend a week customizing some software from github to extract the bitlocker key. If someone takes their personal windows laptop to a local computer shop or IT department then they almost certainly are not capable of that. Some models of laptop, intended for business, have a BIOS option to erase the TPM if opening of the laptop case is detected.

There is a security choice between:

1) Bitocker encryption and MS account: If my laptop gets lost or stolen then whoever has it will find it very difficult to access my files but Microsoft can prevent me logging in to my own computer, if I don't have access to the email I used for the Microsoft account or the Microsoft account password then I may loose my files later.

2) No disk encryption. Someone who steals or finds my laptop can access my files.

3) Bitlocker and windows login with an MS account. If you don't have backups and you didn't save the bitlocker key then you may be screwed later.

I hate Microsoft trying to force me to use a Microsoft account on a personal Windows laptop and I hate the boobytrap of bitlocker that you did not know was in use even more.

Until recently, you could get the text of national weather service guidance by telnet. It was about the right level of protocol to provide plain text to a terminal with enough information to paginate it and enough input to pick an airport code.

That works at some intersections. At others, buildings and echoes make it pretty much impossible to tell if the siren you hear is an emergency vehicle about to cross the intersection in front of you where you have a green light, or there's some emergency somewhere else, which is often true. They could still go through red lights, but not at full speed. With the new system, they find that the light is green for them at every intersection, and they don't have to slow down.