This is irritating as it upsets my plans for end-to-end Web encryption. By which I mean encryption of the data on the server so that the server has no access to it. The only things that are on the server are encrypted data blobs and a pile of random numbers.
By end-to-end Web I mean that you will be able to set up comment forums like slashdot, read email in a Web browser and everything else you are accustomed to doing on the Web but without any of the plaintext content being accessible to the server.
The technical basis for this scheme was worked out in the 1990s and then patented by a completely unrelated company which merely sat on the patent till it expired last year. It uses meta-cryptography which is a property of the Diffie Hellman schemes that if you add two private keys, the corresponding public key is the product of the public keys, etc. Matt Blaze, Torben Pedersen and others worked out how to apply these effects to achieve an effect they considered interesting but insufficient. My contribution is merely to show that the simple scheme is more than enough to do interesting things.
So now I need to work out how to hook into the browser. One possibility is to present the decryption module as a new compression scheme. It looks like a compression scheme in other respects. It just requires the host to have access to a private key capable of completing the decryption.
Any help would be appreciated: hallam@gmail.com
The project site is mathmesh.com but that is of the previous approach which has been superseded in the reference code but not yet documented.
[Oh and yes, I do know what I am doing sort of, I have probably considered the corner case you have just thought up. This has been in discussion for many years with serious protocol design people.]