Unfortunately nobody's perfect in this... AMD had the rdrand issue this year.

Sure it's clumsy but they've done it in the past, and why would you think it won't in the future? I'm not sure how many times BGP routes that shouldn't have been were mysteriously routed traffic through China so pretty sure they don't care how visible it is.

It's not that they can't do it already, it's that this link if the end point is under direct control of the Chinese government is significantly easier than an end point that terminates in a business not directly controlled by the government. That's whats different about this link, it originally started being controlled by a Chinese real estate mogul, but then after planning, and starting the project sold it off to the Chinese telecom Dr Peng which has a multitude of issues from: executives bribing people, building the fibre network for government surveillance, close ties Huawei is a direct partner, CEO previously was an official for the Communist government. Do those issues make you feel like it's more likely to occur or less likely to occur if this link is directly under Dr Peng company control?

It's always going to be a directed attack, but that's what they do; not sure where you are thinking that I'm saying this is a general attack to record all SSL traffic with China not as an endpoint which would be insane (I've never said or implied that, going to assume you misinterpreted that vs an intentional red-herring tactic). I'm sure they don't give a shit about intercepting your dog picture on facebook, but they give a real big shit about certain people at certain companies, former political dissidents now in other countries, etc. Spearfishing is a real thing, BGB attacks are a real thing, MITM attacks are a real thing, you use those attacks to get certain data that then allows further access. It's not just me, read this security article https://scholarcommons.usf.edu... they note an attack in 2016 when a bank in the US who had a headquarter in Italy, and China Telecom for 9 hours routed the traffic from the US to Italy bank through China. Fortunately the MITM attack didn't work well as they had problems setting up the reconnect to Italy but it happened.

1) CNIC issues bad cert allowing google.com, etc be used by them (found in 2015 by Google) 2) Issue bad BGB route forcing non China traffic over the link (done repeatedly, 2010-this year) 3) Do MITM SSL attack because of your BGB route you control where the traffic flows throw (GitHub attack 2013) Now you have access to the data unencrypted. Prove me that those attacks 1-3 didn't happened, those aren't hypothetical, those are real, actual, events. You are simply wrong, you are shooting nothing down, you are either ignorant and don't know what you are talking about but don't want to admit it or actually know those things are going and are just full on idiot. Which of those is true?

Even though it's pretty obvious you don't have a security background with your encryption statements I'll give more technical historical information as well. China has been caught multiple times, doing bad things with SSL. From CNIC issuing SSL certs that would allow them to act as google.com (full green check included), to attacks trying to force old SSL versions that have been broken, replacing iCloud SSL certificates via a zero-day Apple exploit. Then throw in all the directed attacks by China against former citizens talking against them, attacks against intellectual property, etc to mess with encryption and any reasonable person is going to have lots of concern that traffic (encrypted or not) flowing through China when that link isn't meant as the end point.

Facepalm... I'll try and dumb it down to the simplest level. How many times a week do you see people getting scammed left and right because they thought they were going to their bank when they weren't, lots of other possibilities just got to use one tenth of one percent of your brain and think about it

I'm thinking you don't understand things fundamentally, I guarantee you that they are using datacenters INSIDE of China already. The issue is that data traffic NOT destined to China would also go over this link, this isn't a point to point tunnel it'd be another major Internet trunk line meant to handle any traffic. A Canadian going to Samsung's website in Korea might travel over this link. The US concern isn't that Chinese citizens are going to be spied on by China over this link, the concern is that with Chinese government control over the end telecom, spying/blocking US citizens/officials access to Internet resources; at best case allows the great firewall to not apply to just Chinese citizens but to the internet in general, at worst case with direct access to public internet traffic it is infinitely easier to do directed attacks against individuals/groups in other countries (which given the known repeated directed attacks by Chinese state hackers is fairly likely).

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a...
China requires digital information to be stored in the country and Google has no data centers in the Chinese mainland, so it needs partnerships with local players.

https://www.datacenterknowledg...
The elephant in the room here is China, where since 2017 anybody who operates “critical information infrastructure” must store data collected or produced in China on Chinese territory. In other words, if you want to provide any kind of digital services in China, you must use a data center in China to do it, and you cannot move the data outside the country.

Not a sock puppet, but even if I was you didn't refute a single thing I said.

How the fuck could they do that... how could they??? Maybe the same way the others one did as a start?

All the Facebook, Google, etc traffic between China and the rest of the world is unencrypted to pass through the great firewall, certain businesses can get special exceptions from the Chinese government to allow site to site VPN's but it's not easy. This link is no exception to that, it still has to go through the firewall unencrypted so you aren't getting anything there

Tell that to Tibet, the protesters cutting down the government facial recognition cams, the North Korean defectors talking about Chinese support, locking up Muslims, etc. Perfect example in 2015 human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang was "disappeared" by the Chinese government, he was tortured with electric shock, forced to take drugs held for 3x years with no outside communication allowed before he was finally allowed to talk to a defense lawyer and the Chinese government finally publicly acknowledge that he was no longer "missing" and that they had actually been holding him for "subverting state power" and then sentenced to 4.5 years in jail. That wasn't something from decades ago, he was sentenced *this year* in January.

It would appear that if they would simply provide the same guarantees that the Chinese government would not block/tap into the traffic. This implies that they are unwilling to do that and it ultimately is meant to be a Chinese state controlled connection no matter what "private" company is fronting it. It'd be one thing to have a private to point link, but this being a general internet traffic link, it is guaranteed to have traffic not destined to for "the great Chinese firewall" flowing through it; it is a very real concern especially with all the BGP "mistakes" that have occurred directing public traffic between other countries accidentally to China.

Maybe my dictionary is out of date, but I never have thought that a court ordered subpoena is a "spying" activity. If they broke in to twitter and trolled through data that would be spying.

Looking at the website it's coming from... maybe I understand now why they think a subpoena is "spying". They say the Bradley Manning is currently being tortured by US jailers, and insinuate the subpoena is a front to cover the trail of supposedly confirmed NSA wiretaps 2x blocks from Twitter HQ. Sure sounds like level headed, unbiased facts abound there.

http://www.thinq.co.uk/2011/1/8/us-wants-read-wikileakers-twitter-accounts/

Even 3rd graders should understand that concept. I get the source code license for MS Windows from a public site I make an Apple app for it, just because I got it from a location that was publicly available doesn't mean it's unencumbered. I get the internal financial documents for Redhat that someone copied and put onto a public website, I make an Apple app for it, again using data I didn't have rights to. You have to be a complete moron to not understand the legality of content you don't have rights to.

Actually I'd say that one of two things should happen... Google is allowed to do this but they have to hand over the all end result data to the US government for it's free use by any other individual/organization in the US after a 2-3 year exclusive embargo; or the US government should fund doing this and again allow anybody in the US to use the results.

http://www.windows-now.com/blogs/robert/weighing-in-on-the-visual-studio-express-eula-debacle.aspx

This is the only thing I can find about the EULA and VS having any contraversy. Basically the primary issue was around some bits in the license which MS said was there to prevent you from using it to work around restrictions. i.e. timebomb shareware / limited functionality software that you need pay for, etc. VS had/has different levels and a guy had written some things to extend the cheap limited version of VS to basically give it the functionality of the full version.

I've not been able to find anything anywhere relative to your acusation...