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Comment Re:That's not the worst part (Score 1) 61

Not sure what exactly they convinced you of, but it apparently means you ended up on the wrong side in gweihir's mind, so tread carefully. Or just ignore the guy. Either way, been there, done that,...

My guess is he read the first half of the first sentence of my response and concluded that I was just repeating what Google says about the issue, that I mindlessly believed the company line.

Never mind that I personally designed and implemented the feature, so if there's any official Google PR on the issue, it's based on what I told "them", not what "they" told me.

Thank you for you explanations and the good work to make Android secure.

Thanks. There were good reasons to move on from Android, but it was pretty cool being able to work to improve the world's most-used operating system. Relatively small impacts get multiplied by a big number.

Comment Re:Good for him! (Score 1) 204

'...agents are "authorized to make such search or seizure"...'

How can they be authorized when they are not on US soil? Who authorizes them?

Atlanta, GA isn't US soil?

But even if this were one of the overseas CBP checkpoints (the ones that do pre-clearance, so you don't have to go through CBP after landing), I think those are considered US soil as well, under an agreement with the host nation.

Comment Re: Plausible deniability is better (Score 2) 204

"I do not consent to any search or seizure. I want my attorney and will not answer any questions without my attorney present. I am invoking my right to reman silent." Then SHUT UP and wait.

Oh... and don't forget to ask: "Am I free to go?" The answer may be "yes."

Comment Re:"dismantle safety protections on Google Play" (Score 1) 68

Could you elaborate? What 24 hour delay?

Could you elaborate on exactly what you did at Google since you apparently have no idea what they are doing Re: sideloading and the security you claim they need to protect users from what google doesn't want them to do?

I was the TL for hardware-backed cryptography and associated bits. No, I didn't always follow every detail of what others on the large (hundreds of engineers by the time I left, though I was #13 on the team when I joined in 2014) team was doing. However, I do quite fully understand the context in which they were doing it. If you'd actually like to understand more about the thinking that likely underlay whatever you're talking about, please elaborate.

I do know about the planned requirement to require all app developers to identify themselves and pay a $25 fee if they want their apps to be installable via any route (sideload, third-party app store), indeed I even explained in my prior post why that benefits anti-malware efforts. I'm not aware of any 24-hour delay associated with it. If you weren't being such a pissy asshole about it, I might go google it, but you've burned pretty much all of my goodwill, so unless you care to actually explain what your problem is, I'm done here.

Comment Re:Plausible deniability is better (Score 1) 204

There should be an option for a password which unlocks the phone in a separate sandbox which is benign.

Of course, if the government has a warrant, even this will get you into trouble.

I think the most plausibly-deniable strategy is to put the phone into a state where it shows the OS setup wizard when powered on, making it look like you wiped it and powered it down just before going through the border checkpoint. Then to reactivate it you have to go through the "setup" process and when you get to the password configuration if you enter the correct password it unlocks and returns to normal. If not, it boots to an apparently freshly-setup state. I think this would be much easier to correctly simulate than an apparently in-use device.

Of course, the safest strategy is to actually wipe it and power it down before going through the border checkpoint, then restore from cloud backup after clearing the checkpoint.

Comment Good for him! (Score 4, Insightful) 204

If he actually did what he is accused of, then good for him! I hope the ACLU steps in to provide for his defense.

I would wish that the court would find "Fuck you, he has the right to privacy" (wishful thinking, I know...)

Even if he wins in the end, they are going to make his life hell.

Comment Leapfrog (Score 4, Insightful) 18

...limits [on access to foreign models] could "stifle competition or drive innovation overseas."

Translation: "They copied from us, and then released an improved version. If you block us from copying from them how will we build our more-improved version to leapfrog them?!?"

Everyone is copying everyone and each release is an improvement on the competing models. Restrictions will only slow down progress.

The government putting its thumb on the scale will not help to make better tools.

Comment Re:That's not the worst part (Score 1) 61

The anti-reset feature (called "Factory Reset Protection") dates back to 2014, but it had some holes, which I fixed in Android 15.

Actually I mostly fixed it in Android 14. The solution architecture was the same as described above, except that TZ's role was played by a low-level userspace daemon instead. This means that "I'm stolen" mode on Android 14 doesn't disable KeyMint, and it opens up more userspace/kernel attack vectors. The reason for doing this is because leaving it in userspace for a year gave me a chance to flush out any corner cases I had missed. Privileged low-level flashing tools could bypass it -- which is not true of the TZ implementation. Given the potential for bricking devices, I thought it wise to leave it outside of TZ for a release.

Still, even without TZ, it's fairly challenging to defeat (barring access to privileged flashing tools -- which actually means access to special signing keys to sign device-unique firmware images).

To defeat it, you need to wipe the secret stored in the persistent data partition, then do the untrusted reset. This persistent data partition is accessible from userspace, but it's highly locked down, same as the copy of the secret in /data. You basically need a kernel compromise. Well, either that or remote code execution in the persistent data block daemon, but that has very little attack surface and is written in Java, making it hard to exploit. The kernel attack surface is bigger and more porous; it's the better target. After you wipe the secret you'd also need to recalculate the persistent data partition hash and write the new value, but that's just a SHA-256 (IIRC) calculation, so no problem.

If anyone wonders whether I shouldn't be sharing this publicly; it's all open source. Anyone can go read the code to see how it works. It's even clean and well-documented code.

Comment Re: AI (Score 1) 133

I asked Claude about your AIX scenario and it was able to fill in the gaps.

The Python `cryptography` library has some Rust dependencies since version 3.4 (because Rust is an exceptionally good choice for writing crypto libs -- which is also what I'm doing), and in the absence of a pre-built copy for AIX, that would have to be built from source, which requires a Rust toolchain. Claude corrected me about the C compiler requirement. The Rust `cargo` build system does use `cc`, not to compile anything, but as an interface to the linker. My own setup uses the Bazel build system (because my employer uses Bazel for everything) and that uses a normal linker, not `cc`, so I didn't realize `cargo` does by default. You can actually change that; you can adjust the `cargo` configuration to use a different linker driver, but out-of-the-box it's going to be looking for `cc`. And if you didn't license IBM's OpenXL compiler for AIX, and didn't install gcc or clang (either of which is free and would provide the necessary executable), then the build would fail.

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