The issue is the searchable record generated from a interconnected network. There's been proven middle ground in many other places where there's a set of records that require a warrant to look up. Just like the phone company makes a record of calls for billing, but a warrant is needed there.

The non-digital analog is pretty clear where no one would think it an invasion of privacy to see your neighbor at the grocery store. But it'd be pretty creepy if you posted a mass of people around the whole country that wrote down everywhere they went in a searchable database.

Everyone else found new attacks on the low hanging fruit of Anthropic's writing skills.

Legal definitions are different than layman definitions. And even then that's starting to get into the sovereign citizen level of philosophical chicanery.

Theoretically the border search exception doesn't change an individual having an reasonable expectation to privacy under the 4th, but that what's considered reasonable is different when crossing the border.

It has to be reconciled with other searches like making cure someone isn't bringing in diseased produce, like looking for a smuggled kiwi in a carry on versus looking for a banana under the seat during a traffic stop.

The big problem is that searching phones doesn't pass the Katz test to a reasonable expectation to privacy because it doesn't take a genius to know that pictures of the church potluck or text conversations with your proctologist are things that society would consider private and not something should be part of a reasonable routine search at the border.

It will go over just as well as "I didn't shoot the person, I just made a booby trap."

The CBP in this case are claiming that he was being investigated for CSAM and that there was individualized reasonable suspicion for a federal crime.

The AC is right that due to the border exception that probable cause and a warrant aren't required and not even reasonable suspicion is required for "routine searches". There's some legal disagreement between circuits on whether cell phone searches are routine and manual vs forensic searches, but regardless CBP policy current requires individualized reasonable suspicion.

They are, however, very incorrect that in general "smartphones having incriminating communications" is individualized reasonable suspicion.

The EFF has a great breakdown about the Border Search Exception and the current state of the legal landscape there.

Those are just as against the rules, but it's a lot harder to hide the existence of very recognizable glasses on your face in order to skirt the rules here.

And literally the summary states that they ban that too, saying that they "prohibit capturing the image of anyone, except on-stage speakers". So they are dying on the whole mountain range.

TOTP and passkeys also have the huge disadvantage of being useless when you don't have access to the saved secret. So they need to solve the case of dead device needing to be replaced.

Multiple devices with a wallet/password vault outside their ecosystem that can save TOTP/passkeys is a more secure solution.

However since they want to make a solution within their system and isn't reasonable to require multiple devices, there are not many good solutions outside of the auth factor being something that proves who you are rather than something that you have.

If they don't specify, then they can hold themselves blameless for the privacy violations. It's those evil companies that just implemented it wrong.

Whole point of DLP tools is to lock in and control data, but not in the way you are proposing. And also it's not increasingly being used that this manner way, but that's the entire point with these tools have been around for decades for SharePoint and local file servers. The policies are set a platform level rather than stored in the file.

So organizations can just turn off their Purview policies anytime they want and if they switch platforms. And of course during a migration they'd need to deal with organization policies, including coming up with policies on the new platform like G Suite which also has DLP.

But the tools are also have some pretty non-nefarious business cases like not letting somebody in finance copy/paste or screenshot to skim Credit Card numbers or not letting Word docs with stored in the XYZ super secret health information folder be emailed outside of the organization. So LibreOffice not being able to block your SSN number from being leaked or unable to prevent a government official from editing/delete documents on legal hold may be good things in your mind. But the downside to those tools is they do lock you into the walled garden of tools that can enforce those policies when the organization has those policies. But it's not being permanently trapped, an organization can migrate to another walled garden with DLP tooling or migrate to open tooling as they please. But if they needed DLP in the first place, they probably can't switch because the open tooling can't do what's needed, but because of some conspiracy in wanting to vendor lock-in.

The second time that the headline has missed the important distinction that it's the first of it's kind, not the first "Room-Temperature Quantum Material" in general.

Specifically, it's the "first class of room-temperature quantum materials that are intrinsically sensitive to the quantum statistical properties defining all forms of light."