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Submission + - California Bill Would Require Computer Science for High School Graduation

theodp writes: Flanked by posters holding K-12 computer science education advocacy charts and stats copied verbatim from tech giant backed and led nonprofit Code.org, California Assemblymember Marc Berman (D-Menlo Park) joined State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond at a press conference (Vimeo) last week to announce AB-2097, a bill that, if passed, will require every public high school to teach computer science and establish CS as a high school graduation requirement by the 2030-31 school year. A California Dept. of Education news release also echoed Code.org K-12 CS advocacy factoids.

The announcement came less than two weeks after Code.org CEO Hadi Partovi — whose goal is coincidentally to make CS a HS graduation requirement in all 50 states by 2030 — was a keynote speaker at the Association of California School Administrators Superintendents' Symposium. In an Oct 20 Facebook post, Berman noted he'd partnered with Code.org on legislation in the past and hinted that something big was in the works on the K-12 CS education front for California: "I had the chance to attend Code.org’s 10th anniversary celebration and chat with their founder, Hadi Partovi, as well as CS advocate Aloe Blacc. They’ve done amazing work expanding access to computer science education, especially for women & communities of color, and I’ve been proud to partner with them on legislation to do that in CA. More to come!"

Comment Re:It's not dangerous (Score 1) 660

I carry cash at all times. I have no choice as I frequently work in places where there are no ATMs and where hotels and restaurants don't take plastic. If I'm in Mogadishu or Kabul (both places I have worked this year), the risk of being robbed is invisible compared with the risk of a fast, violent death by other means. So am I afraid of being robbed? No.

In fact, the only place I've ever been robbed was on a train travelling to Geneva Airport in Switzerland. I nodded off and the thief picked a travel wallet from my (unzipped, contributory negligence) cabin bag. Luckily, my passport was in my jacket pocket so my journey could continue. But I was robbed of a fairly substantial amount of cash. Does this make me afraid of being robbed? No.

Since that incident, I am more disciplined about zipping up and securing my personal belongings. I have a wallet that is attached to my person with a chain. I have taken these precautions and am therefore able to travel, without fear, with cash.

All the cash I carry can be traced to the bank account from which I withdrew it, or the cashier at the organizations I'm working for that issues cash for expenses. So I am unafraid of being arrested or have cash confiscated by police. It's a truth that in Switzerland (where I live), people frequently tender very large bills (CHF500 or even CHF1000) to pay for a pint of milk. Nobody raises an eyebrow, never mind calls the cops.

The future involved less, but not zero, cash.

Submission + - DHS may designate "elections" as critical infrastructure - implications?

Demerara writes: I'm fascinated to hear the opinions of Slashdotters on the practical implications of any decision to designate "elections" as critical national infrastructure. Politico has a story here http://www.politico.com/tipshe...
For those of you who have worked on systems that are already under this regime — given that there are just over 90 days to the November elections — what can be achieved with respect to elections — and in particular to electronic voting machines (whether direct recording electronic DRE — touch screen etc — or precinct ballot scanning machines)? What might the designation require of state and county boards (the buyers of these systems) and what would the vendors have to do?

Comment by Candlelight (Score 3, Interesting) 310

I spent some time writing billing data analysis by candlelight. This, of itself, is not unusual in a developing country (where I lived at the time). But since the client was the electricity company and it was their data being analysed, the irony was not lost on my client who insisted that I never mention this fact to anyone... Well, that's all over now!

Comment Re:Not a big problem (Score 1) 378

I don't know a single person - literally not even one - who still uses local mail.

Well now you do - consider the many, many people (such as myself) who are frequently offline or in places where internet connectivity is limited, intermittent and very expensive. Offline email is not an option for me - it's a way of life.

Comment IT's easy... (Score 1) 792

...if they are not named Mitt Romney, then they are all AGAINST Mitt Romney.
If they are named Mitt Romney, they are FOR Mitt Romney.

They are ALL AGAINST Barack Obama.
They are ALL AGAINST tax increases.
They are ALL FOR invading Iran. No, wait, that's not quite right....

It's a Republican primary. Don't expect too much clear blue water between candidates....

Comment A climate of really lousy security... (Score 2) 172

(1) Net Centric Diplomacy database
Appears to have been trivially downloadable. Manning used Wget to automate the capture of cables from this database. Manning had access to secure networks (SIPRNet) and it was this, rather than any technical expertise, that allowed him to pull all the cables.It seems as if the Net Centric Diplomacy database and its interface (presumably a web front end) lacked any functionality to inhibit automated / bulk downloads, to track or log downloads or to alert operators to suspicious or anomalous patterns of access.

Contrast this with the logging that was available in IntelLink (the SIPRnet internal search engine) that helped link incriminating keywords (Assange, Wikileaks etc) to the IP address assigned to Manning's computer. The defense cannot refute that, while they may be able to undermine the (very poorly gathered) computer forensics from Manning's computer.

(2) Microsoft Share Point server
Appears, also, to have been wide open to anyone on SIPRnet and to have permitted automated (scripted) bulk downloading of files. And, like (1), appears to have lacked any functionality to alert operators to suspicious behaviour.

Contrast this, also, with the logging that was available in IntelLink.

(3) Manning is no expert
First, he used the same password for both his operating system (presumably, his Windows username/password) as for his encryption. Second, he claims to have "zero-filled" his hard disk but had not done so. Third, he used his own computer for the IntelLink searches thereby leaving a trail of evidence.

(4) Lack of expertise seems quite widespread...
The computer environment at the FOB where Manning worked was risible. In testimony, an officer described how "soldiers would store movies and music in their shared drive on the SIPRnet. The shared drive, called the “T Drive” by soldiers, was about 11 terabytes in size, and was accessible to all users on SIPRnet who were given permission to access it, in order to store data that they could access from any classified computer." In other words, in practise, no distinction between storage for movies and music and the storage for classified materials. While the officer told soldiers not to use it for music and movies (and used to delete same as well as reporting the abuse), the practise was prevalent. And despite the 11 terabytes (that is 11 thousand Gigabytes) available for music and movies, this officer cites lack of storage as the reason that some logs (that may have contained evidence) were not maintained. This officer, Capt. Thomas Cherepko, received a "letter of admonishment" for the lax enviroment at this base.

Has the buck stopped at the Captain? I believe that points 1, 2 and 3 suggest a culture of information security so poor as to merit serious enquiry in its own right. Manning probably did break several laws in gathering and communicating the cables to WikiLeaks and, if convicted, must face the music. But the ease with which he did this ought to be cause for far more concern than we are seeing in the media. The US Army appears to be throwing Manning under a bus, but only a slap on the wrist for Cherepko. That is unjust. Lets see how this unfolds...

Submission + - UK recruiting codebreakers (canyoucrackit.co.uk)

Demerara writes: "http://www.canyoucrackit.co.uk/ CanYouCrackIt is an array of numbers and a prompt to enter a keyword. The numbers are displayed graphically so you have to manually transcribe (or else do OCR with blue-on-black text) to another application for automated analysis.
BBC reporting (here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-15968878 ) that the people behind the Can You Crack It website are the UK's GCHQ (one of the UK intelligence agencies) and that they're hiring!
So, let's see if the Slashdot effect holds... ;-)"

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