Encrypted data cannot be effectively compressed. Storage device-level compression's big shortcoming is that it's fundamentally incompatible with encryption (except for storage device-level encryption). In other words, to get any benefit from compression you have to make sure that whatever you're sending to the storage device is UNencrypted. Do you really want to shut off all or most higher level encryption? To disable dm-crypt/LUKS2, FileVault, BitLocker, and PGP, as examples?
If you want to see where computing's future lies (sometimes far future), then it's often helpful to look at today's mainframes. Mainframes are now compressing and encrypting (and decrypting and uncompressing) everything, often more than once ("multi-layered" encryption), "at rest" and "in flight," using specialized compression and encryption accelerators directly on their main CPU cores backed with uniquely strong Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to protect keys, and with full software support up and down the stack that avoids burdening application programmers with all the responsibility. Mainframe storage devices then only ever deal with storing and retrieving encrypted data -- or at least that's what they're designed to do if implemented per "best practices." (IBM calls this "Pervasive Encryption.")
This sort of arrangement is really the only way to compress/encrypt (and decrypt/uncompress) if you care about security at all. If encryption is solely or predominantly the province of a storage device, then there are all sorts of inherent security risks.