Exactly - in fact, Nasa sent the crew an email saying something like "so small we wouldn't really mention it, but just in case the press ask when you return... a bit of foam fell off the fuel tank during launch - our engineers have looked at it, there's nothing to worry about". I'm not sure they even believed an alternative was worth considering - it simply wasn't needed.
I seriously doubt this guy could have done anything about anything. At that time, Nasa culture was not so hot, and there was far too much internal confidence based solely on "it's worked up to now, so it'll work again". Some very senior engineers and others *did* raise the alarm inside Nasa, and got told "don't worry, it's fine". They didn't try to get any spy satellite photos, because they had previously not been very useful, and they didn't really think there was a need.
If anything, the investigation showed that a similar sized piece of foam travelling at that speed could make a very convincing hole in the carbon wing edges. In some sense, it's remarkable that the shuttle made it as far into the atmosphere as it did - the problem almost occurred in slow motion, with ground control watching temperature alerts in the affected wing going off while they were still talking to the crew, and then some time later losing the craft.
The whole story is a cautionary tail of engineering and management failures. It's interesting because things were engineered to a high standard, and that lead to over-confidence in some areas. That over-confidence became somewhat ingrained and so there was no redesign or tweak, there were few real checks after the fact and that high quality engineering showed exactly what the problem was and how it manifested itself during re-entry when the disaster occurred.