>- management's role is to assess the risks presented by the engineers and determine an acceptable curse of action in the face of differing assessments
>The real problem lies with the organization - from the engineers who assess the risks and presented the results to the managers who made the decision to launch
No, it was very well established in the "post mortem" that the decision to launch was made for mostly political reasons, in the direct face of engineer's risk assessments. It was found assessments, if any had very little to do with it. It is not Managements job to re-assess risk. Engineers both quantify and qualify risk. Management ignored these risks for political gain.
>Actually, it is both very understandable and important to understand what lead to the decision - understanding is the first step to fixing.
No it is not, it was unmitigated risk taking by NASA management. I don't know what the hell you're off about on understanding what happened. Of COURSE. You seem to be the only person on the planet who DOES NOT understand what happened, why it happened, or what risks were identified prior to launch.
>The real problem, IMHO, is that no one was able to clearly quantify the risk in a manner that made people understand the real risk and take the right action, which lead to the loss of the vehicle and the crew.
Really? because this dead fellow we're discussing was very much able to quantify the risk of shuttle failure (Not just due to frozen brittle gaskets) to something like 1 in 50 launches. Hey, a few dozen launches later....