If I were a Comcast or Verizon etc employee, I'd keep the priority cards for myself to use when I have a problem. I doubt they'd give most of their employees enough codes to handle all their comms problems.
Just for the record barrels were probably equally revolutionary in their time. And the ability for a person to roll them before machinery was quite an advantage.
Silk Road did a spinoff where guns were being sold as the primary goods (the Armory) and they closed it because it wasn't profitable enough.
You're probably unaware that the GP specifically used 'HSBC' because they were caught laundering trillions of dollars of drug money and nobody was indicted.
He probably isn't unaware of that. He may well have actually read the indictment itself or a detailed summary of it, which made clear that the US case was very weak to the point of hardly working at all. In particular, not only did they fail to clearly establish that drug money was really moving (their case was "there is so much cash, some of it must be from cartels") but in particular they failed to show intent by HSBC execs to help drug cartels. Actually their case boiled down to HSBC didn't try hard enough, they weren't suspicious enough, etc. (I'm ignoring the Iranian transactions here which gets into issues of international jurisdiction, as you only brought up drugs).
The reason you think the are guilty is twofold. Firstly US anti money laundering laws are unbelievably extreme. The PATRIOT Act removed the need to have intent to be found guilty of money laundering. Bankers can now be found guilty of AML violations even if they genuinely tried hard and had no intent to break the law. Hence the accusations from the DoJ that were of the form "HSBC should have designated Mexico as high risk", etc. Secondly as part of the plea agreement HSBC had to act guilty and accept whatever the DoJ said about them. So you only heard one side of the story, the prosecutions side (except there was no court case). No surprises that you think the whole thing is cut and dried.
It's no crime to be ignorant of such things, but just try not to hold any policy positions on the subject.
Given that there was never any court case and HSBC was never able to defend themselves, pretty much everyone is ignorant in this case because we never heard the full story. But I'm pretty sure if DoJ had emails from HSBC execs that looked like the ones from BitInstant there would indeed have been prosecutions.
If we look at jet aircraft, wear depends on the airframe and the engines, and the airframe seems to be the number of pressurize/depressurize cycles as well as the running hours. Engines get swapped out routinely but when the airframe has enough stress it's time to retire the aircraft lest it suffer catastrophic failure. Rockets are different in scale (much greater stresses) but we can expect the failure points due to age to be those two, with the addition of one main rocket-specific failure point: cryogenic tanks.
How long each will be reliable can be established using ground-based environmental testing. Nobody has the numbers for Falcon 9R yet.
Weight vs. reusable life will become a design decision in rocket design.
Until they stop playing games with hidden and required patents, their talk is just BS. They have shown they have no intent to change that model time and time again, this round is no different. You can open source something that requires a DX call but if you don't open source DX and threaten anyone who does with patent suits, is there a point? It is hollow BS for all the same reasons. Don't buy the PR meant to distract, the underlying mechanics are still the same. They are antagonistic to open source and that won't change at a level deeper than the public messaging.
No but if you got a government request for your keys you'd know about it.
The government "request" would come in form of customised malware and you'd never even know you got hacked.
If google gets such a request you wouldn't know you were compromised.
You aren't gonna know, no matter what.
It isn't like they are sending l33t hackers to break in and get the data.
Schmidt isn't an idiot, despite how the press like to portray him via selective quoting (note that TFA does not provide much context for this quote). When he says Google is the safest place to put your data, he's probably comparing Google to other companies that provide similar services, not some hypothetical fully self hosted system - bearing in mind self hosting of email is rapidly going the way of the dodo even in business situations (it died for home email a long time ago).
Given that Yahoo still have not fully deployed SSL everywhere let alone encrypted their internal datacenter links, and if Microsoft have a similar effort they aren't talking about it, there's some evidence that he might be right. After all, if you get a government warrant for your data you're just as stuck as Google is: not much you can do about it. On the other hand, you are unlikely to secure your infrastructure as well as Google does.
But Google makes money from targeted advertising
Google makes significant sums of dough from paying corporate customers who use Google Apps. These clients can switch off advertising if they like. These are also the places where some of the most sensitive data is stored.
So Google have both the financial means and incentive to solve the end to end crypto problem for such clients. The difficulty is not financial. It's technological. Matching even just the feature set of Gmail with end to end crypto is insanely hard, and that's before you hit the "everything is a web app" problem.
The point of forward secrecy is there are no such keys to seize. The "master keys" are only used for identification, not encryption. So whilst a gov could theoretically seize Google's keys, this does not help them decrypt wire traffic. They'd have to do a large MITM attack, and to get everything? They'd have to decrypt and forward ALL Google's traffic. Not feasible.
Good use of applied cryptography means that realistically the only way for a government to get data out of it means requesting it specifically from the providers. In places where the warrant system has been vapourised (which certainly includes the USA and UK), this might not seem like much, but it does help prevent fishing expeditions.
I remember the days when the highest rated comment on Slashdot would be a nice summary of the salient point of the article with some insightful agreement or disagreement.
Thus spake sexconker, on advertising-supported Slashdot, which he has been reading and posting to for five years.
Well, it wouldn't be the first Sony-signed rootkit...
In practice, a certificate is nothing more than a long password
Fail. A certificate contains a public key. This is nothing like a password. You're thinking of a private key. The whole point of a certificate is that you can prove your identity to someone without sending them your password.
Unlike the password in somebody's head or even on a sticky note behind the monitor, these certificate files can often be stolen remotely!
Double fail. Firstly, nobody actually steals certificates. Certificates are public. When someone says something was signed with a "stolen cert", what they actually mean is "stolen private key the public part of which is contained in a certificate signed by a trusted third party", but that's a mouthful, so we simply and say "stolen cert".
Secondly, private keys can and absolutely should be protected with a password! Or they can be kept in special hardware. However, as you may have noticed, Sony got pwned pretty hard so presumably whatever private key was stolen either had no password, or they were able to just keylog the password when it was used.
These people are a joke.
The joke is on you