I'll stick with, I meant what I said and I said what I meant. It is meant to disadvantage governments that discourage free expression; regardless of their allegiances.
Except its made by the government in charge of the world's largest prison system, and by far the largest per-capita incarceration rate. Irony being duly noted. Despite what you think, the US Government does not tollerate dissent.
Nor is the US Government populist, and rarely do they sponser populist regimes overseas unless they are wealthy enough to buy senators. They are notorious for astro-turfing revolutions for gain though.
I do agree, there are many benefits to TOR. However much of the code should be double checked, and because of the US Government's closeness to the TOR development team, all of which most likely have their personal information documented, heavily, it really wouldn't be hard to manipulate them.
It also would not be hard to put pressure on tor exit node operators to co-operate with the federal government. Many of them are already run by MITM attacks, many of them are suspected to be NSA already. Not only could the feds get foreign citizens to use TOR to beat their own surivallence, it could set up its own survialence on the same citizens via owning the exit nodes. It could then create profiles and find who it can be best manipulated/used to create an astro-turfed revolution.
Of course there are work arounds for this, but before the first wave of "pedophile" busts, Freedom hosting also included a hidden site called inspecTOR, which simply looked for, and reported on bad nodes. visitors could generate code to copypasta into their torrc to keep from using them. Among the ban list was a node named NSAFortMeade. Most likely a simple troll, but its odd behavior had intrigued many. This site with the rest of "Freedom Hosting" went down and never came back, and was never re-implemented. Also, things like canada's "pedo bust" last week, was really a indiscriminate TOR server raid. The government had no idea how much, if any of the data they collected actually had kiddie porn if you actually read the article. They did know that they were running TOR. Thats all it really took for Canadian authorities to simply sieze the servers, and then label the event as a "pedophile bust".
Also, serveral weaknesses in TOR make it vulernble to attack by government. Attack might not always mean "shutdown", but "forced compliance":
1. Tor Traffic, by design is meant to look like TOR traffic, its only supposed to be indistiguishable from other TOR traffic. Its easy to spot nodes and bridges. Support for anonymizing the "first hop" with a dedicated bridge exists. You also need to have information on the bridge. So it only protects people in target countries that exist outside the bulk of TOR infrastructure. You also need specific information given to you from someone in a reigon accross the globe. Random citizens do not generally share this information with other random citizens, that speak diffrent languages in two countries with hostile to eachother governments. Publicly publishing such data would result in authorities finding and blocking the public nodes. Its only real practicle application is with spies, and those with help on the outside, i.e. recruited assets of an intellegency agency.
2. Because all casual, non-spy TOR users are already flagged as users, if push came to shove they can all be arrested if need be. Given the fact that pedophiles exist on TOR it would not be unbelievable to anyone that everyone arrested was a pedophile. They would not have to arrest everyone, just enough to scare the rest off, weakening the network further by lack of mainstream usage. Further driving it to the fringes makes it even easier to target, because it will be increasingly run by the people most people don't give a fuck about, and of course, government agents running the fastest nodes, which of course don't get busted. Remember, this is the USA with the highest incarceation rate in the world, and more than enough prison cells, and a population that for the most part accepts the government's word, and a press that would more or less report exactly what the government releases in a press confrence.
3. Exit nodes are even more vulernble, because less shady work needs to be done on behalf of the government. There are also far fewer of them, giving less protection in numbers. Because of the way TOR works, the government could specify an exit node, and pump kiddie porn through it, with no trace on the governments end, and then arrest the entity running for the kiddie porn(or terrorism). More likely they'll use this as leverage(read coverage of barret brown/jermey hammond trials) to get the operators to co-operate with the government and run a government backdoor on the exit nodes. The mere threat of a trial will get most people to fold because of the shear expense, and the fact that it will be a slam dunk case with the non-technical jurors, because there is dirrect proof that kiddie porn would have gone through the router. The instant you say "kiddie porn", in most jurisdictions the law mandates removes all legal framework for mitigating circumstances, and it pushes an emotional button which will get a "guilty just because" in most people.
4. Directory servers are a central point of attack, and could be used to gather information. It might be able to redirrect traffic at the request of the government(unknown). An attack on a directory server might lead to the government having the ability to redirect targets through their own exit nodes.
5. .onions hidden sites are fairly weak, with a keypair of only 1024 bits, agreed by most experts not to be strong enough to protect against state sponsered actors with a large volume of compute power. (i.e. hijack attack by brute forcing private key for the .onion domain). No plans for 4096 bit onions.
This is in no way set up for "freedom". It is set up by the US government to help spies communicate. The fact that criminals, especially drug smugglers are co-operating with the US government, is nothing new.