This is the one thing QubesOS could use to improve its security-by-isolation approach: Detection and repair in VMs. Even if you assume the hypervisor stays safe (and therefore, your trusted VMs stay safe), you're still relying on VMs to get everything done and the VMs doing the risky tasks are vulnerable to attack. It would be nice if those less-trusted VMs could get automatically restored after a successful attack.

Turn in your /. memberships! The both of you!

No that would be Gladia Solaria in The Naked Sun and Robots Of Dawn.

Then write someone else in... Anyone else who would make a statement.

There are no privileged routers (or 'guard' nodes) on I2P, and from the perspective of "relays" I2P has many times the number Tor has.

Its way better than Tor when you're looking mainly to communicate with other anon sites/users. Comes with bittorrent and an option for decentralized (serverless) securemail.

There is such a thing as a protest vote, "dumbass".

Showing up to vote is critically important. At the very least it ensures the authorities will have to do the dirty, dirty work of physically turning people away if they have been purged from the rolls.

I see... No 'large infrastructure' projects within the hive.

Read these Linus quotes: http://linux.slashdot.org/stor...

He is absolutely correct.

As a (primarily desktop) Linux user since 1998, the unfolding of this debacle is starting to look like an example of why Linux distros in general lack appeal in the desktop space. Desktop/laptop users can't 'make do' with server architecture; there isn't enough veritcal integration of the powerful features we need. When layers represented by systemd and wayland must be considered swappable, the more talented users turn off to the possiblity of building stable user-facing applications on that platform.

One bit of advice is, don't be such primadonnas. Like the laptop users, you'll have to explain to the world which workflows and features are getting broken by these recent changes. OTOH, if all that's getting 'broken' is your philosophy then you might want to take a step back and consider that a better (if larger) one may have replaced it.

An answer a couple of replies down... http://it.slashdot.org/comment...

Actually, there is the very important context of who is transmitting to whom, and when, which IPSec is giving away. Each user, therefore, might as well be the subject of a pen register.

With I2P, all they see is a stream of encrypted packets to random points and even the 'when' is obscurred (I2P users onion-route traffic for other users by default and expectation, so you can think of this protocol as marrying ideas from IPSec, Tor and Bittorrent).

Speaking of DNS lookups: Why make your addressing dependant on centralized, establishment-controlled scheme? If PKI can be subverted to let them eavesdrop, then IP addresses and DNS certainly can be as well. Addresses that operate like public keys are much better.

Its already there on your TAILS disc... try it out. ;)

Its also worth noting that the I2P layer under I2P-Bote is general purpose: You can browse and even torrent with it, anonymously and securely.

Why make the focus so piecemeal??? We have experts going around saying the answer to mass surveillance is to make application-level crypo ubiquitous. I'm sorry, but that sounds like an unnecessary hassle that begs people to "just turn the crypto thingie off". Its better to have one tool that can provide security and anonymity for a large array of applications.

I respect the EFF's work, but I think their technical vision is very tiny and may meet up with the blind alley it deserves.