Not yet. But don't you worry, we're getting there...

Yes, it is. If it's a female (i.e. has the corresponding genitals from birth), then... she is a female. Period.

What's an "unfair advantage"? How about being a 300 pound, 7foot tall hariy-back in heavy-weight boxing? Is that "unfair"? Tough luck. How about being so incredibly fast, that you make the 100m in 9 seconds flat? How about... well, just being a "natural" in whatever sports you're doing? How about having this thing called "talent"? Is that an "unfair advantage", too, if the wrong people win?

The whole point of world championships and olympics is for the best of the best to measure with each other, not for the best of the average. Somebody has an advantage from birth? Well, as long as that's whote Mother Nature gave him (as opposed to 'was engineerd by man, in any way') that advantage... congratulations to him/her/it and good luck with it. And to all the others: get over it. It's not about who trains the hardest, it's about who's the best.

A nokia phone with a more-or-less-debian on it?

Sounds almost too good to be true. And so far, whenever somthing sounded too good to be true, it was. So, right now I'm just burning to see how Nokia's going to cripple this one...

(Posting this to undo accidental moderation, sorry.)

This is so utterly, completely and doubtlessly wrong, even Middle Ages couldn't have done it worse...

They think something along the lines of "The internet must not become a law-free space! We must not allow for villains to be able to do their deeds unhindered in this 'internet'!", and, tragically, they actually believe it.

You see, up until recently, "free speech" was only "free as in law permits". If police was to read your snail mail, they did it -- all it took was tearing the envelope apart. If they wanted to listen to your phone conversation, they did it -- all it took was tapto your line. All they had to do is justify it in front of the law one way or the other...

Now, thanks to advanced digital encryption, if you choose to have a private conversation, it is *truly* private. Simply "ripping the envelope" and justifying it afterwards won't do it anymore... What we have now is truly FreeSpeechByTechnology, not FreeSpeechByLaw.

Now. From your point of view, the change is small: You previously thought you could communicate freely (because law guaranteed you to), now you still think you can communicate freely (because technology guarantees you to).

But from the legislative/executive point of view, the scenario changed dramatically: previously, they could, if they chose to, listen to your conversations. Because laws can be broken, bent, or re-designed, in case that it seems fit. However, now, whatever happens, law enforcement cannot listen to your conversations, because proper encryption cannot be broken.

That's what governments are thinking... But that's not the interesting question.

The interesting question is: You understand why even the most liberal western governemnts react as they do at the perspective of not being able to snoop on your communications. Now, what do you learn from this fact about the way the used to be able to snoop on you prior to you being able to properly defend against that? What does it tell you, that, in whatever extent they used to snoop your communications, it makes them this scary to loose that ability, that they feel the need to pass the legislation they do?

From what I've been told (I am a physics major, but I don't work in quantum cryptography as my main activity), there's a bunch of other weaknesses inherent to quantum encryption methods.

For example, qubits are mostly transfered through some optical medium. At the receiving end, at some point, they are detected in one way or the other. "Detecting" means they alter the state of the detector in a measurable way. And there are some ideas (maybe even implementations?) of attacks that try to measure the alteration of the detector immediately after the detection, for example by probing with a laser pulse that follows the qubit pulse.

Now due to some limitations of the physics of light pulses, this is something that, if implemented, is very difficult to defend against, since the light always goes both ways. It is also a kind of attack that could not be implemented against "classic" information transmission channels...
 
...I really find it interesting that every new technology seems to have its inherent weaknisses at one spot or the other -- kinda feels comfortable to know that "There is no silver bullet" still holds... :-)

"Phonos" are basically "crystal oscillations". Enter the concept of "reciprocal space": it's basically the Fourier transform of the real 3D space, and is very commonly used in solid state physics.

Now as you probably know, a clean frequency (i.e. a sinus wave) in the time domain results to a single peak in the Fourier-Transform (i.e. in the frequency domain). And similar for phonons: a clean crystal oscillation (i.e. a single-frequency sound wave propagating through a medium) in 3D space results in the equivalent of a single, localized "particle" in reciprocal space: a phonon.

(I'm asking out of curiosity, not to troll you :-)

Maybe I'm mistaken, but isn't *any* auditing a check of the state? Even a check of a process (for example an audit checking the change strategy) in fact checks the *state* of the rules to be followed when applying a change. Doesn't it?

Now: what's the job of an auditor? Is he (a) to certify that a certain system/proces/whatever meets a given standard, or (b) is he to certify that a system/proces/whatever *is* something? (Think: is "unbreakable"...).

I always thought of an "auditor" as of someone who does (a) -- for security reasons, for quality management, etc...

Now, if a given system meets a given standard and is *certified* as meeting that standard, then the auditor is out of trouble -- isn't he? If the standard is good, then "compliance" is probably pretty well defined and should be (relatively) unamiguously clear whether a system is or is not compliant. In this case, the auditor never laid his head on the line for the *quality* of a given system, or it's fitness for a particular purpose. The auditor "only" signs for compliance with a particular standard, and, if he does his job well, everything else is the standard's or the user's fault.

However, if an "auditor" has to do (b), then... he's basically fsck'ed. Same as (a) for a poorly defined standard. ...or where's my thinking error?

Should the auditor be liable for mis-certification? Or for the (correctly) certified system not withstanding attacks?

I think people should *very* hard try to distinguish between the two scenarios:

1) An auditor certifies a system as XY-compliant as of [insert date here]. However, it can be demonstrated that the system was *not* XY-compliant at that date.

2) An auditor certifies a system as XY-compliant as of [insert date here]. However, at a later date, the system breaks for some reason. It can be proven that the system was XY-compliant, but for some reason (stupid user interaction?) is not anymore. Or, even better: it can be proven that the system *still* is XY-compliant, but the XY-standard is unfit to defend [insert attack here].

I think in case (1) the auditor should be held liable, since he obviously certified something that didn't meet the promised standards. However, in case of (2), not the auditor is to blame. If the system breaks despite of the certification, then it's not the auditor's fault -- it's how things work, and making a scapegoat out of the auditor is not going to do anybody any good. Even worse, if the system fails to meet standard XY because a stupid user (or admin, for that matter) interaction *after* the certification, then there's no way an auditor could have prevented that -- it's either the user/admin's fault for interfering with a certified system, or the standard's fault for not defining what a user/admin is allowed to do with the system without interfering with its certified qualities.

Call him and ask him if he can send you a box or two.

Purpose of the game: finding vendors that _actually_ have them on stock and will ship them to you. It took me 60 seconds to find 3 vedors, still upon call, all of them had to inform me that they're sorry, but the items were already sold.

It's not that they're impossible to get. But finding a vendor that will actually have some ready to ship the moment you call them is a matter of luck. And most of the vendors can't tell you when they're going to get more of them -- at some point they will, but it's hard to predict stocks of a discontinued product. If you happen to need those films, you may be lucky and have some within 7 days. Or, you may be less fortunate and have some in 6 months.

Thanks for the link. I had a talk with the people in charge at our lab. The bottom line (should have thought of it earlier, actually): we can't use them.

The problem is that we're using back-scattering x-rays at a crystal, and the photo paper is *on* the beam, between the shutter and the sample. So the beam actually first travels through the photo paper before it hits the sample. Putting a CCD there will basically kill the intensity.

There is a technical sollution involving some kind of combined (electronic?) paper/scanner device, at the cost of 15-20 thousand Euros. At the moment, however, we still hope for a new manufacturer to reliably carry on what Polaroid is not...

(I'm the one vote you -1 flamebait -- sorry, was an accident, slipped on the mouse. Hope me posting in this thread will erase the vote...)

Right now (as in: this very moment) I'm using an x-ray Laue diffraction machine to orient a set of crystals at a given angle. The machine is probably 30 years old, but other than that, it works just great.

This step is crucial in order to permit further experiments I need to do. The problem: I still have approximately about 60 instant-films from Polaroid left ("Type 57" or "Type 53"). But they are discontinued, so when they're gone, there will be none. It's very difficult to get these (actually, it took me more than 6 months of waiting time to get 160 of them), and the only option is to buy another Laue diffraction machine to replace the one we have, which is probably going to cost something with 5 trainling zeros.

Now if somebody was to take over production of "Polaroid Type 57" instant films (they are used for instant photography aswell), that'd solve the problem without us having to spend several hundres of thounsands of euros.

The "normal" polaroid pictures (i.e. those a mere mortal used to take during a holiday) are not exatcly the same as Type 57, but I'll go on a limb here and assert the technology required to manufacture them is similar... so I, for one, welcome our new retro-acting, Polaroid-instant-film-manufacturing overlords :-)

...actually, this ought to work pretty tight:

    - equip the robots with a water tank (say 10-20% of their weight) under high pressure. The water tank should be inside the robot, somewhere central (for equal distribution of weight).

    - make a belt containing 5-10 small orrifices distribuited equally around the robot, that have direct link to the water tank and can be opened/closed electronically somewhere above "waist high" (mayber upper third).

    - equip the robot with gyroscope mechanisms (you can have those actually on a chip, for peanuts) detecting (a) when the robot is falling and (b) in which direction.

    - have 1-2 of the orifices which point from the robot's middle line towards the falling direction "shoot" out small amounts of water with very high pressure. The mass of the pulverized water gushing ouf of the robot at high speed ought to provide a good deal of momentum against the fall direction, breaking the robot's fall.