Because a specific device may be patentable subject matter, while the algorithm itself is not, and the combination of an algorithm with a general purpose computer is an obvious application of the general purpose computer as soon as the algorithm is known.

Seriously, how does that not make perfect sense?

"Sure, the general purpose computer is known, but if the algorithm is not, and the patent claims the computer performing that algorithm, then it's not blindingly obvious." That's right, the algorithm itself may not be obvious, but algorithms are not patentable! That's settled law.

The patent attorneys try to get around that by patenting a "method" or a "device" instead, which just happens to embody the algorith. But when you read carefully there is no method (other than hiring a coder to program the algorithm into the computer) and no device (other than a general purpose computer doing exactly what it was designed to do.

If they would actually write an application for a special purpose machine that only implements this one algorithm (instead of any algorithm you want to hand it) and that machine itself incorporated innovations, then those should probably be patentable. But that would require actual R&D expenditures, and risks, and still would not be the gold mine that a patent on the simple idea of using a ubiquitous general purpose computer to execute a known algorithm could be.

Are you seriously asking what an abstract concept is?

It's something that doesn't exist in the real world.

If the justices could not come up with a definition, they're disturbingly ignorant.

Mathematics is entirely dependent on your choice of axioms. You can accept Euclid's fifth postulate, and discover a composite truth of Euclidean geometry, or reject it and describe some aspect of non-Euclidean geometry. Both are equally valid (though not at the same time) and both describe the real world to some degree. They are however solely logical concepts which do not exist in any real sense. Empirical facts, (e.g. "fire burns things") are true based on observations about the real world, and are only true to the limits of our observational abilities. Mathematical truths are true regardless of observations; they are true in all possible universes, whether those universes include observers.

To quote Phillip K. Dick, "reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away." Math is not real. Asserting ownership rights over a non-real concept is a popular delusion, but one which should not be tolerated. The cynic in me would suggest that the reason for the Court's confusion in these matters is that they are making an analogy to the concept of justice, which is also both abstract and widely sold.

"But, if you claim a computer configured to perform certain new and non-obvious functions, it can't be implemented wholly in algorithmic terms. It's a device, not the blueprints..."

And that argument fails on the additional grounds of the novelty requirement.

Using a general purpose computer to execute an algorithm can only be described as blindingly obvious, since this is the one and only function of a general purpose computer.

Described, yes. Software patents (and business method patents, etc.) are the ones which can be implemented wholly in algorithmic terms. You can describe a new manufacturing process with math, but you can't actually manufacture anything until you apply that math by rearranging matter and energy in the real world. It's the application that the patent covers, not the description. The device, not the blueprints.

This ruling simply states what should be obvious, that adding "on a computer" to an abstract concept does not magically transform it into a patent-eligible invention. The patent is still really about the abstract concept, despite the "on a computer" gimmick, and thus remains ineligible.

A claim should fail 101 if it claims something that isn't one of the above.
The were not claiming to invent a machine (the computer)
They were not claiming to invent the process (hedging)

Instead their claim was using a machine to solve a problem. That doesn't fall under 101 unless it falls under a patentable process.

SCOTUS said that the 2 step process of (take exising process) and (apply it on a computer) is just a drafting trick to get a patent on old things. If you remove the drafting trick then you have a process with no steps. So they rejected it under 101.

Ah, then we agree. And I think you'd agree with this as well:

The goal of an ordinary modern appellate (or supreme court) judge is to confuse the issue enough so he appears clever and important! If the resolution of an issue is too simple, then the judge gets no accolades from the legal community and no invitations to award ceremonies where he can wear black robes. :-)

You've almost got this right, Theaetetus:

Because the district court hearing the case invalidated the patent under section 101, the appeal was limited on those grounds. Neither the appellate court nor the Supreme Court could turn to section 103 (obviousness) to invalidate the patent, because there was no ruling on those grounds at the lower court level for them to review. Now if the respondent had made arguments under section 103 and the district court had ruled the patent to be invalid for obviousness, then the Supreme Court could have affirmed on those grounds.

What we really need is judges at the district court level that can distinguish reasonings based upon section 101 from 103. By continuing this "abstract idea" line of decisions, the Supreme Court has only clouded the issue further.

Isn't the definition that you have to be able to give a patent to a developer skilled in the specific art and he/she can implement exactly the device described by the patent without inventing anything new? If that's not possible, the patent is supposed to be invalid because it's an abstract idea instead of a concrete implementation.

It was invalidated because the process it describes is super super old. They only thing they added to the old process was using a computer. So if you invent something actually new. Then you can patent that. But "old idea + computer" is not patentable.

I'm part "Native American", enough to join the tribe if I wanted. But I refuse to be associated with a people who are so thin-skinned that they get offended at the drop of a hat. Yes, "redskin" WAS a term of derision, but it's been turned into a better word, a word to be proud of, a word of honor.

Try reading what I wrote, I am cherokee, however I live in ny amung the Onondaga. I didnt claim to be Onondaga

The onodaga tribe in NY is where I live. Not one person here that I know is offended by the name the redskins.

A few of [the plaintiffs claiming they're offended] are from where I live and guess what, they are not in good standing in the area any longer because they are being paid to pretend to be outraged right now.

From Washington Post: Native Americans have won at this stage before, in 1999. But the team and the NFL won an appeal to federal court in 2009. The court did not rule on the merits of the case, however, but threw it out, saying that the plaintiffs didnâ(TM)t have standing to file it.

Specifically a free speech issue, in a way that "money is speech" doesn't even come close to.

A department of the US government has denied equal protection to an entity incorporated in the US on the basis of the political implications of what they want to say. Short of "free speech zones", you don't get a much more solid 1st amendment issue.

And they have history on their side - They won on appeal for exactly that reason last time. And they will win again this time.

Personally, I consider this whole issue much ado about nothing - The indians lost to the white demons; if a sports team wants to name themselves after history's losers, hey, their call.