I agree. I can't believe you're seriously and vehemently arguing that people cannot do math in their heads and that without paper or other tools, people could not perform calculations, in spite of the fact that many people do it publicly and sell books about it. You've repeatedly claimed people like this don't exist. And then you call me ignorant?

Frankly, I think most Slashdotters could perform simple sequences of mathematical algorithms in their heads, such as the square root, squares and addition steps required for determining the length of a hypotenuse given lengths of the sides. Frankly, I'm shocked anyone would doubt that this is possible without requiring paper.

Nope, if he was talking to me, then both he and you are wrong and falsely limiting the definition - specifically, under your definition, if a human performs a complex calculation mentally*, they are not a human computer. But, if that same human makes a mark on a piece of paper, then suddenly they are? The paper is a necessary requirement that differentiates a human from a human computer? I disagree, as would anyone who has ever performed a calculation in their head and verbally recited the answer. Paper, as with a slide rule, abacus, calculator, or computer, makes the process easier and faster, but it is not a necessary requirement to produce a calculation, as you incorrectly contend.

In fact, as even your own cited Wiki article states, a human computer is merely "one who computes" or a person performing mathematical calculations. Your article only uses the word "paper" once, merely discussing a format of input ("transcrib[ing] raw data from celluloid film and oscillograph paper"), and not as part of your false definition.

And finally, again as noted by your cited Wiki article, the term human computer is commonly applied to "individuals with prodigious powers of mental arithmetic, also known as mental calculators." As Wiki notes, mental arithmetic is "arithmetical calculations using only the human brain, with no help from calculators, computers, or pen and paper."

Quoth the immortal Bard: "Oh, snap!"

*and how complex? Your definition is built on a vague, subjective "I know it when I see it" standard of triviality, and is therefore invalid for that reason alone.

Thank you. Now, returning to your prior statement, you contended that the derived FSM is obvious if an isomorphic FSM existed previously. But, here, you defined the derived FSM as producing a different output from the same inputs. If that difference is non-trivial, then the derived FSM cannot be obvious, by definition.

I'm not sure what your point is - as the Federal Circuit noted, those patents are "fundamentally unlike the Bilski claim, since [they do] not claim a method of organizing human activity not involving manufactures, machines or the creation of compositions of matter" (emphasis added). Thus, there is evidence on the record that those patents are directed to an apparatus and an article of manufacture, respectively, contrary to your earlier assertion.

In both cases, they are articles of manufacture. The Federal Circuit was wrong in their characterization of the '818 patent, which never once uses the term "apparatus".

Of course, and why should it not? Why should patentability of a nonobvious, novel, and properly described invention depend upon the trivial question of whether it is claimed as implemented in fixed hardware vs. self-reconfiguring hardware, particularly when the hardware itself is not lending it any nonobvious features?

I think you meant to reply to his post, not mine? I'm the one saying that people can perform quite complicated math without requiring mechanical aids.

... yeah, speak for yourself.

Since you are unable to add two numbers, and are unwilling to acknowledge that other people can do that without requiring computational aids, then this conversation really isn't going to go anywhere. Good day.

Then, contrary to your first sentence, the problem is the lack of nonobviousness. Yes, doing something that was done years ago in a slightly different environment is obvious (if it doesn't require any extra, nonobvious steps). Doing something to a new model that you did to a previous model is obvious.
But these have nothing to do with subject matter eligibility. The question in CLS Bank and Bilski and the other 101 cases is whether the most novel, most non-obvious, freakin' revolutionary method ever conceived of is still not patentable, merely because it's software, or merely because it can be done in someone's mind, or merely because it doesn't require a machine. They're two separate questions - something has to be both patent eligible subject matter and nonobvious in order to be patentable - and they shouldn't be conflated into one, no matter how pissed off we get about patents on obvious things.

That's exactly right, and that's why it's patentable. The human doesn't need any hardware to add two numbers, or calculate sums of angles. Theoretically, the human doesn't need any hardware to perform the entire equation and, given the various values encoded in the signals, can calculate the indicated coordinates.

But the human does need hardware to receive and decode those values from the signals. That distinction makes the method no longer merely an "abstract idea" or a mere algorithm, as it now requires specific hardware.

What do you mean by derived as opposed to isomorphic? The two terms are not exclusive.

It might, or it might not, if, for example, logic for causing the computer to paint the screen in blue paisley has been done before.

"Has not been established" or "has been established as not patentable"? Also, again, what do you mean by logic gates vs. sequential imperative instructions, because the two are not necessarily exclusive.

Yes, they do - the patent claims begin with a preamble that states whether they recite a machine or apparatus, or a method. That's presumptively conclusive evidence.

"strongly resemble", "ignoring"... Although useful for a doctoral thesis, glossing over steps is usually not acceptable in a legal conclusion.

Sure, if the algorithm is already done by hand. But what if you come up with some novel, nonobvious algorithm, like a way to calculate interstellar warp coordinates? Then doing it either by hand or on a computer is novel... The question is whether it would still be patent eligible or not.
Under Bilski and CLS and current jurisprudence, a claim just to the algorithm would not be patentable... because someone could do it by hand. But if the claim had enough some additional limitations that specifically recited the computer, such that while you could do the algorithm by hand, you couldn't do the algorithm in the claim by hand, then it would be patentable (e.g. say it included a step of transmitting the data to a cloud service for distributed processing - that particular step may not be novel, but remember that the rest of the claim includes your novel, nonobvious algorithm).

That's currently the rule: computers are known, and if your method is known, then simply doing it on a computer is not patentable.
However, what if you have to do additional steps to make it work on a computer? For example, in the real world, we can look at someone and easily recognize their face as belonging to a friend... but machine vision and facial recognition is really, really difficult. There's a whole bunch of processing that has to be done, because computers don't inherently recognize faces. So, while the broad concept of "recognizing a face, on a computer" wouldn't be patentable, "detecting a first location corresponding to a first eye; identifying a second location corresponding to a second eye; determining an approximate facial width based on the inter-eye distance; identifying a mouth shape in a third location; etc., etc.," would be.

Again, same as above - if the real world item is known, then simply simulating it isn't patentable... unless you have to do other things, or make approximations that don't exist in the real world. For example, the real world has a sky, and clouds, and changes smoothly from dark blue to light blue as you get near the sun... but doing volumetric lighting simulations and simulated Rayleigh and Mie scattering in a way that doesn't kill your GPU is really difficult. Why shouldn't a narrower claim to those be patentable?

And again, that's how it works. You can't get a claim to "transmitting data over a network, wherein the network is wireless" but you can get one directed to some of the steps you have to do with wireless communications that you don't have to do with wired communications, like the additional signal/noise processing, frequency heterodyning, burst interference avoidance, spread spectrum broadcasting, etc.

Or stuff that you only have to do with virtual machines, like dynamically provisioning them based on load, or having dozens of virtual machines sharing a single hardware network interface and single memory bus, and transparently distributing packets to them in such a way that each machine doesn't realize there are others using the card.

Alone, yes, but why not together? Since you acknowledge that the antenna is patentable and the bus is patentable, then why can't I claim a device comprising an antenna that receives a signal, a bus that transports the signal, and a processor that executes an algorithm to convert the signal into geographic coordinates? I'm sure we can all agree that devices are patentable, yes?

Bear in mind also that qualifying as a machine simply distinguishes it from being an abstract idea... it's not enough to make something patentable on its own: it still has to be new and nonobvious, but those are different questions, with different tests - the most revolutionary, novel, nonobvious abstract idea that's ever been invented is still unpatentable, not because it's not new, but because it's not tied to a machine. Software that's tied to a machine only meets that first hurdle - it still needs to jump over the others.

Why not? And no, I'm not asking "which Supreme Court decision said that you can't patent algorithms," I'm asking why they said that. It's not an arbitrary rule - there was reasoning behind it, and it's the reasoning that you need to look at when determining whether a machine executing novel and nonobvious software is patentable or not, not the one sentence of dicta.

No, because, after the first one, the others would likely be obvious in view of the first one. Nonobvious, however, is a separate requirement from whether something is drawn to patent eligible subject matter. And the judge's point here was that a programmed computer is a machine, and machines are patent eligible. They still have to be new and nonobvious and clearly described, but they're not immediately disqualified regardless of how new or nonobvious they are, the way pure software is.

If you came up with a brand new technology, not even 300 ms old, that was just a series of mental steps - say, a method for calculating time travel coordinates, or the like - it could be the newest, most revolutionary technology in the world... and still not be eligible for a patent, because it's just mental steps. But a machine is different. Embody your brand new method in a machine, and it may be patent eligible. That's what the judge was trying to say.

Since I was citing and discussing the statutes involved, any reasonable person would assume that I was using an analogy to simplify the discussion, rather than discussing something unrelated having to do with design patents. And then there's you.

Now, would you like to go back and add something to the discussion, rather than just trying to be condescending and failing?

Yes, that is entirely ignorant of you: you acknowledge that you need a physical antenna to triangulate a signal, but then suggest that a person can do it without using any hardware. You're being inconsistent.

Allow me to help, since the prior post went over your head:
A person or a computer can perform calculations on input values and output processed values.
A person cannot necessarily receive those values directly regardless of form: people don't have antennas, don't have A/D converters, don't have signal amplifiers, etc. Similarly, while a person can output a set of values, without some additional hardware, a person cannot transmit a packet, close a switch, render a frame on a display, etc. That's the distinction - just performing calculations isn't patentable; doing something with them or doing something to get them is.