Comment Re:This was bound to happen. (Score 1) 112
Columbia's demise was based on something that most folks figured would not ever happen
I think a more accurate statement would be that foam shedding and damage to the orbiter improperly became a normal and accepted consequence of flight prior to both the Challenger and Columbia accidents, just like the O-ring erosion and failure-to-seal issues were known to be a problem as far back as 1977 but weren't considered a big enough deal by management to halt the program until the new joints could be implemented. In both cases, concerns with the possibility of the failure modes eventually observed were brought to management and dismissed.
A couple of years after the accident, Charlie Bolden said, "I spent fourteen years in the space program flying, thinking that I had this huge mass that was about five or six inches thick on the leading edge of the wing. And, to find after Columbia that it was fractions of an inch thick, and that it wasn't as strong as the Fiberglas on your Corvette, that was an eye-opener, and I think for all of us ... the best minds that I know of, in and outside of NASA, never envisioned that as a failure mode."
Really? Was there really no one in the entire organization involved with safety that knew how the damned thing was built?
I think a more accurate statement would be that foam shedding and damage to the orbiter improperly became a normal and accepted consequence of flight prior to both the Challenger and Columbia accidents, just like the O-ring erosion and failure-to-seal issues were known to be a problem as far back as 1977 but weren't considered a big enough deal by management to halt the program until the new joints could be implemented. In both cases, concerns with the possibility of the failure modes eventually observed were brought to management and dismissed.
A couple of years after the accident, Charlie Bolden said, "I spent fourteen years in the space program flying, thinking that I had this huge mass that was about five or six inches thick on the leading edge of the wing. And, to find after Columbia that it was fractions of an inch thick, and that it wasn't as strong as the Fiberglas on your Corvette, that was an eye-opener, and I think for all of us
Really? Was there really no one in the entire organization involved with safety that knew how the damned thing was built?