Comment Re:You built the better mouse trap. (Score 2) 64
If you were to spoof coherently, you'd need to ensure that you can defend against all (most) of the attacks that attempt to verify your browser. This would require all kinds of astute manipulations to forge a fingerprint that can't be detected by the server, particularly if your running a different browser than the one you say you are (for example, your on FF but say IE).
Complete randomization has it's limits too, particularly if your randomly spoofing attributes. You can exhibit a new fingerprint easily, but is that fingerprint coherent (e.g., user agent is in accord with some other attribute, no Chrome API's in your spoofed Firefox browser)? Some sites probably won't care, most may not even check, but fingerprints could be used as an additional security mechanism (e.g., for banks). If the site doubts that you are who you say you are, then they may decide to deny access or require further authentication. Such mechanisms could be helpful against projects like FraudFox.
In either case, just because the site knows you are spoofing doesn't mean they know the truth nor that they can fingerprint enough attributes to track you over time.
Plug: We worked on a small prototype that, instead of spoofing, randomly assembled components and generated unique environments using Virtualbox, we also have a docker version that is lighter now. Here's our paper. https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01121...
We think it's more flexible than Tor since instead of attempting to construct one fingerprint, a user can have trillions. Also, we don't improse any specific browser or version, giving users more choice. Tor however addresses other concerns too that our small project didn't look at (e.g., IP address).