Comment Hacking v. Jacking: where's the money? (Score 1) 21
Most of the discussion targets devices that are randomly-hijacked because they are built on garbage.
AFAIK, no one has hacked a device to get it to harm a patient or to suck data/code from it.
Some hackers are interested in the personal information in some medical records because it's worth something in the Medicare-fraud business, but that's more of a medical-records systems thing, where one would adopt financial-industry standards (not avionics).
Security is poor in medical devices because there's less risk: No money/power from hacking them means less risk of attack, so half-measures "work".
So the government does what it minimally can get away with. HIPAA et al are relatively low standards (mainly designed to avert medicare fraud). Even for devices requiring FDA premarket approval, the FDA only checks that you seem to have followed a procedure that you defined per their vague heuristics; in most cases the FDA won't even verify that your risk-tracing is complete. They simply don't have the bandwidth for validation, no less a security audit.
My guess is that until the secret sauce is in the software (i.e., not in drug molecules that are hard to manufacture correctly, or strongly tied to unreplicable sensors in something like an MRI), medical devices will remain a security backwater. Currently most DNA analysis is based on open-source software or at least published algorithms, with proprietary code only for performance optimizations, but who knows what next-generation sequencing will bring.
Unless hackers already are already in Bethesda hospital devices, waiting for the President's annual checkup...
AFAIK, no one has hacked a device to get it to harm a patient or to suck data/code from it.
Some hackers are interested in the personal information in some medical records because it's worth something in the Medicare-fraud business, but that's more of a medical-records systems thing, where one would adopt financial-industry standards (not avionics).
Security is poor in medical devices because there's less risk: No money/power from hacking them means less risk of attack, so half-measures "work".
So the government does what it minimally can get away with. HIPAA et al are relatively low standards (mainly designed to avert medicare fraud). Even for devices requiring FDA premarket approval, the FDA only checks that you seem to have followed a procedure that you defined per their vague heuristics; in most cases the FDA won't even verify that your risk-tracing is complete. They simply don't have the bandwidth for validation, no less a security audit.
My guess is that until the secret sauce is in the software (i.e., not in drug molecules that are hard to manufacture correctly, or strongly tied to unreplicable sensors in something like an MRI), medical devices will remain a security backwater. Currently most DNA analysis is based on open-source software or at least published algorithms, with proprietary code only for performance optimizations, but who knows what next-generation sequencing will bring.
Unless hackers already are already in Bethesda hospital devices, waiting for the President's annual checkup...