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When You Really, Really Want to Upgrade a Tiny Notebook 104

Benz145 writes "The famous Sony VAIO UX UMPC may have been cancelled a few years back by Sony, but the community at Micro PC Talk won't let it die. Modder Anh has carefully removed the relatively slow 1.33Ghz Core Solo CPU and installed a much faster Intel Core 2 Duo U7700 (a process which involves reballing the entire CPU). On top of this, he managed to install an incredibly small 4-port USB hub into the unit which allowed for the further instillation of a Huawei E172 modem for 3G data/voice/SMS, a GPS receiver, and a Pinnacle HD TV receiver. All of this was done without modifying the device's tiny external case. Great high-res pictures of the motherboard with the modded hardware can be seen through the link."

Comment Re:you're wrong. (Score 1) 406

An interesting idea, though there are a few complications.

The version where the voter selects which receipt will be displayed before leaving the site does a nice job of handling external coercion, but it also means that the system knows which voters will never be able to verify their vote *before* the votes are counted. If it isn't possible to decide to check any individual vote after the election, then there's still an opportunity for tampering. There are steps you could take to make tampering less likely - say, recording the "use A/B" choice and the "display A/B" choice on separate hardware and combining them only after the vote count - but none are foolproof against someone with access to all the hardware and software being used.

Second, and to my mind, most important - as a voter, I don't particularly care whether my individual vote is counted correctly. In elections where outcomes are often decided by a few percent of votes, an absolute minimum requirement is that every single vote *could* be verified. But, to really be effective, a system really ought to insure that a significant fraction of votes will be verified. If only a small fraction of people do check their receipts - and, if someone is sufficiently clever about incorporating demographic information into vote-rigging and is willing to accept a small but non-zero number of accusations of receipt errors - then fraud is still quite viable.

Not a bad idea to play with, but on the whole it sounds like a very complicated fix, compared to something much simpler and likely cheaper, such as a paper receipt that every voter can look at in real time and which then gets placed into a lock-box which can be independently observed with as much scrutiny as we're willing to pay for.

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