I think you're conflating the fact that no security measure is infallible with the idea that security measures are therefore largely pointless.
The Binance incident is a good example of why security needs to be layered. Yes, multiple signers approved a malicious transaction because they were all relying on the same compromised signing interface. That's a common-mode failure, not evidence that multi-party authorisation is inherently ineffective. Independent transaction verification and a separate trusted signing path could have made a substantial difference.
Now look at Binance's own report.
The attackers compromised an employee's development machine, leveraged an internal AI tool to gain access to other employees, obtained access to a container deployment permission token on a Wallet DevOps engineer's machine, and ultimately used stolen credentials to deploy a container that reached wallet-signing operations.
Doesn't that raise some fairly fundamental questions about privilege separation, endpoint security, credential management and production deployment controls?
Why could compromising a development environment create a route into such a sensitive production environment in the first place?
There are companies operating infrastructure at an enormous scale that take these boundaries extremely seriously. Google is a particularly good example. Its published production security architecture describes restricted production access, temporary privileges, safe proxies, multi-party authorization, and verifiable builds from peer-reviewed code.
These aren't theoretical concepts. They're established security engineering practices operating at enormous scale.
The point is that security isn't an on/off switch. It's about layers, compartmentalisation, reducing privileges, limiting blast radius and detecting suspicious behaviour.
A compromised developer workstation shouldn't automatically mean a compromised production environment. A compromised employee account shouldn't automatically mean access to deployment credentials. A successful deployment shouldn't automatically mean the ability to perform arbitrary wallet operations.
Sandboxes, isolated development environments, strict application controls, EDR, behavioural monitoring, independently verified deployment artefacts and properly configured audit logging all contribute to that separation.
None of these measures is infallible. A sufficiently sophisticated attacker might eventually circumvent some of them. But that's not an argument for ignoring them.
It's precisely why we implement multiple independent controls: so that defeating one doesn't grant an attacker the keys to the kingdom.
Saying that a nation-state could eventually find another way in is not a security strategy. It's an argument for giving up.