Slight mistake when I tried applying 90% to the $0.56 kWh... should have divided, hit multiply instead and didn't notice. Number should be $0.62 per kWh converted to motion in a BEV. which actually favors the Hybrids even more.

The chemical energy in a gallon of gas can be converted to kWh. Specifically 1 gallon of gas contains ~33.4 kWh of energy, at $3.36 thats ~$0.10 per kWh in gasoline, that's your best average case of Colorado gas prices AAA provided.

Even with the 40% efficient engines that's $0.25 per kWh converted to motion. About half the price of $0.56 ($0.504 at 90% efficiency) that a BEV uses if you're relying on public DCFC.

Of course in California the higher cost of gas will favor BEVs more. $4.79/gallon gas is $0.1434 per kWh, or $0.3585 per kWh converted to motion. It's still cheaper to drive the prius hybrid purely on a cost of refueling/recharging basis.

If they extend it to allow the shared screen content to not be a mirror of the source screen, but a virtual second display instead, then this this would be something I'm interested in... It'd basically be providing the important functionality of a dock - Keyboard, Mouse, Networking, Display/Audio, Storage (including USB drives), and possibly power delivery all in a single cable.

That's a use case I would use regularly for my work laptop when I need to use it at home. It wouldn't be particularly energy efficient since it means my personal desktop would stay on the entire time, but probably still cheaper than buying a dedicated USB-C or Thunderbolt dock.

They don't need to get into amazon's servers though. They just need to have a rogue DHCP server on your local network that manages to respond first (or to control the actual DHCP server on a malicious network). With that they can redirect your Amazon traffic so it never goes through your VPN tunnel at all, and instead gets sent straight to a transparent-proxy to packet capture it for later offline attack. This attack both bypasses the VPN and guarantees a compromised device gets to be between you and the site.

www.unprotectedcompany.com doesn't even need the offline attack since they didn't have any protection outside of your VPN in the first place.

I would point out that it also compromises some network topology information like which internal IPs are hosting services based on what specific host IPs your computer is trying to send traffic to. That traffic will get sent to an untrusted device which can still record the destination IP and ports from the packet.

Except it's not the guys at Wikipedia that can cause this redirect, it's the guy running a rogue DHCP server on the local network, possibly even a hostile network admin, that gets to say "The next hop for the IP address of Wikipedia is still [default gateway]. Ignore the VPN." This would result in wikipedia traffic staying outside the VPN tunnel and just being routed like normal. They also could have said the next-hop is [transparent-proxy] which would allow them to see all the traffic with one less layer of encryption (no VPN) over it, still protected by native encryption like HTTPS though in the case of Wikipedia.

Now replace wikipedia with your-bank.com, or important-government-service.gov, scandalous-site.com
For a lot of traffic you'll still be protected by encryption in the underlying protocol even though your VPN has been bypassed; you'll only have lost a little privacy regarding who you're talking to. But some traffic could have other known compromises that were previously mitigated by the VPN and you should assume an attacker would selectively redirect IPs for servers hosting stuff they already have a compromise for; whether that's a working Man-in-the-Middle attack for the protocol or a set of compromised private keys for a specific web-site doesn't really matter.

Existing copyright law already differentiates between corporations as people and individuals as people, there is no reason to assume that would stop when adjusting term duration.

Maybe Iâ(TM)m reading it wrong? My understanding is this is a first time use only requirement, so itâ(TM)s more of a right to repair issue when the drive fails and the servers have been shutdown (assuming you can replace the drive and go through the pairing process again, if itâ(TM)s something that can only be done once ever then this is even worse), not a continual online requirement to play physical games with an already paired drive.

It's for Sony's security. Signed content on the 'disc' only proves to them that the developer of the game agreed to the right licenses and paid the needed fees to develop and release the software, it doesn't prove that the disc isn't actually just a file on an SD card connected to an FPGA connected to the disc drive connector pretending to be a legit disc.

While we don't really like the restriction because it interferes with what we want to do (or just offends your sensibilities as to what we should be allowed to do with hardware you bought and paid for) this is at least a solution that is protecting Sony from a real attack vector that has been used to run bootleg copies of games in previous generations (Nintendo's Gamecube has a disc drive replacement hardware mod for instance). I'm hoping this isn't sufficient and we eventually get a hardware-based disc image loader, although without the ability to sign or otherwise execute homebrew code it would have to have some probably clunky out-of-band way to switch between what image is loaded.

So what if it remains illegal to make a 3rd party tool that can re-marry paired parts due to the DMCA. If a company HAS a software or hardware tool that is authorized to re-marry parts in a repair context they are required to license it out due to the wording below.

(c) Except as necessary to comply with this section, this section does not require a manufacturer to divulge a trade secret or license any intellectual property, including copyrights or patents.

The contrapositive then is "As necessary to comply with this section, this section DOES require a manufacture to... license any intellectual property..."

Because they're required to *license* the use of the tools this is no longer a TPM* bypass but instead a completely legitimate way to interface and interact with the TPM; it doesn't automatically violate the DMCA to possess or distribute. This is essentially same as why a manufacturer adding the necessary software and keys to a DVD or Blu-Ray player to allow playback is not bypassing the TPM because it's part of the intended function of the TPM, similarly the manufacturing equipment to load this software/keys isn't illegal because it's also authorized to do so.

*TPM = Techological Protection Measures. This is the acronym used in the DMCA section 1201, DRM is a more specific application of a TPM.

Leaving the cable behind is not apples fault. Using a proprietary cable, which is what turned this from a minor inconvenience into an actual problem, is Appleâ(TM)s fault.

Honestly I would have been fine paying for YouTube premium a while ago, except that other than my cellphone and laptop I don't really want to be logging into the same account as my all important Gmail and Drive. Some devices like a smart TV using the dedicated app can be logged into with a system that I assume is generating a YouTube-only token, but there is at least one laptop I would like to be logged in with that I don't want to have access to my personal email at all.

Give me the ability to have a YouTube-only login/password on my account for any device/browser that I don't explicitly trust enough to give access to my email, but would trust with my viewing habits.

Haha, I'm now picturing an ad-swap program instead of adblock. With the purpose of providing 5-30 second clips of entertainment while it waits for the real ad to 'play'

Woah there, donâ(TM)t you go shame-shaming people!

No impact to FOSS. First, those were signed with a different key to begin with. Second, I doubt theyâ(TM)re revoking the signing key itself, theyâ(TM)re revoking the hash of the specific vulnerable boot manager file.

If they revoked the key and started using a new one there would be the additional impact that future boot media would not boot on old systems running secure boot without knowing about the new key.