GeoTrust sells low assurance SSL certificates. The only thing they validate is that you "control" the domain (which usually means that they just send you "confirmation" email to whois address. Anyone with stolen credit card can register a domain, and get the certificate, while staying untracable.
Most other CA sell High Assurance certificates, that require validation of
entity ownership of the domain
the fact that person ordering ssl for the domain has the right to do so.
This is done via checking bunch of details, such as departement of state database, whois record, company records, etc, etc, etc. You have to be officer of the company or have notirized permission from the officer of the company to request ssl certificate for the domain. The whois record for the domain must match details from the state database.
When taken all thouse checks together - it alows to prevent fraudster in most cases (you cannot prevent them all the time, not in real time).
GeoTrust "pioneered" low assurance certificates (and basically destroyed credibility of padlock), that bypass all thouse checks and go after domain control only. It created this mess. The "give away" that certificate is low assurance is that "Organization" field of the certificate holds domain name instead of company name. No real bank would go for that.
This is one of the reasons opera displays the company from the certificate field right next to the URL.
This is also the reason microsoft plans to differentiate between "high assurance" and "low assurance" certificates
http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2005/11/21/495507 .aspx