Explained in the YPM episode "Power to the People" by Sir Arnold and Sir Humphrey. It follows the following scheme: "Something must be done. This is something, therefore we must do it.". But doing nothing is better than doing the wrong thing.
Also, iirc MD5 and SHA-1 give different length hashes so some additional mungeing will be needed to come up with a uniform length hash.
The attack primarily affects some digital signature applications, including timestamping and certificate signing operations, where one party prepares a message for the generation of a digital signature by a second party, and third parties then verify the signature.
There's an easy solution here as mentioned in Applied Cryptography (2nd edition). To paraphrase, when given a document to sign using a hash-based digital signature protocol, make sure to make some trivial edits to the document first. Otherwise, you run the risk that the person asking you to sign the document has already calculated a hash collision for that document, meaning that at a later date they can use your signature as "proof" that you signed some more nefarious document which has the same hash. Funnily enough, I think SHA-1 was mentioned somewhere in that same section...
The VCR didn't have any copy protection built in, so there would be no "circumvention" to trip the DMCA.
Since I don't know anything about this software, I don't know if it decrypts the disc or not. But it is possible to make a perfect copy of a disc without decrypting it. That, and the fact that CSS (Content Scrambling System) is no longer a trade secret, should be enough to show how groundless this suit is.
The first rule of intelligent tinkering is to save all the parts. -- Paul Erlich