Re:READ! (Score 2, Informative)

From TFA:

Lindner said the real problem -- a vulnerability in the way Blackberry servers handle portable network graphics (PNG) images, was not disclosed by either RIM or the US-CERT advisory.

From the top of the CERT advisory:

By causing the service to render a specially crafted TIFF file, an attacker could execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service.

Should an exploit be developed, this arbitrary code would run inside the corporate firewall on a windows system, possibly with administrator privileges, and possibly with access to the SQL server containing the encryption keys.

From the advisory:

To disable the image attachment distiller 1. On the desktop, click Start > Programs > BlackBerry Enterprise Server > BlackBerry Enterprise Server Configuration. 2. On the Attachment Server tab, select Attachment Server from the Configuration Option drop-down list. 3. In the Distiller Settings section of the window, clear the Enabled check box for Image Attachments. 4. Click Apply, then click OK. 5. In Microsoft Windows® Administrative Tools, double-click Services. 6. Right-click BlackBerry Attachment Service, then click Stop. 7. Right-click BlackBerry Attachment Service, then click Start. 8. Close the Services window.

Note that they disable all image attachments, not just all TIFF attachments, although they do claim they only need to disable TIFF.

In summary, the CERT advisory says it might be possible to execute arbitrary code on the server. The Blackberry advisory recommends disabling all image attachment processing on the server. No one has proved that an exploit exists to take advantage of this, but how can you know there isn't an exploit. In cases like this, the burden of proof lies with the one who claims it's safe to continue processing image attachments. Maybe there isn't a serious problem. Would you leave the attachment service running with without disabling the image attachments?