Comment Embarassingly amateur (Score 1) 630
It's as if neither Kuhn or Peirce had never written a word, this book. You could only have written it if you wilfully ignored all philosophers of science except Feyerabend. What about Lakatos, Musgrave, Hempel, Hanson, Popper, Latour, Laudan, Thagard? Just to name the A-List. And been completely in the dark about the division of induction/deduction/abduction pioneered by Peirce and followed through by many logicians since. And it leaves out the roles of Bayesian reasoning or model logics (non-standard logics in general). Or the Feyerabend of induction, Taleb. It's cringeworthy in it's bootstrapping approach to history of science and reasoning.
Given that this is slashdot there is no need to talk about NSLs, BBNs, black swans etc as they are frequent topics, but most people don't care about philosophy of science, so here goes
The big mystery in philosophy of science is how measurements and small theories continues to work through periods of high level conceptual change. Since the pioneering work on conceptual modelling in science by Karl Pearson, there has been an understanding that scientists model a simplified version of the world (because experiment taking in everything is impossible, the working scientist chooses what is important, and therefore ignores the rest). Grammar of Science by Pearson is at archive.org and still worth reading after a century. The formation of these conceptual model of the world play a vital role in any scientific work, and the rules by which they are constructed, and verified, are paramount even in the "soft" sciences such as history or sociology. Information science works with a conceptual model of the world that is pretty shaky and periodically revised - google Design Science for the "problems at the core of IS" stuff.
The problem (completely missed in this Randroid text) is that these models are constructed within an epistemological worldview, and that there are periods where there is a disconnect between models formed by participants in the worldview and experimental evidence goes against the groundwork of the model-forming. That's what's going on in all of the historical moment that this book brings up. And while collecting data (which is pretty much what they are talking about when they use the word induction) these conflicts are noticed.
Thomas Kuhn brought the historical treatment of scientific method to the fore in philosophy of science, and began with a detailed examination as to what actually happened at periods of time when such events happened, in particular the Copernican Revolution. You can read the scholarly debate in Isis if you have a JSTOR subscription where you work. This caused a lot of flurry as he was seen to be implying that the role science took for itself as absolute arbiter of truth was rocky (he wasn't), People created rejoinders to his work one way or another, and Feyerabend's writing and teaching (which was more or less continued in a pragmatist fashion by Laudan) can be seen as an extension of that kind of questioning - e.g. if science is so progressive, why was the ether taught in physics books?
Kuhn's work has been carried on in the direction he took by Paul Thagard who realised that there are such conceptual revolutions going on in everyone's life all the time. Studies on how children (and adults in some cases) learn about astronomy show that in many ways the history of science is recapitulated in the mind of the individual. His book Conceptual Revolutions revisits some of Kuhn's cases and looks at how the recreation of the conceptual framework is done in a way that permits the work of science to continue.
Given that Feyerabend stopped teaching in the late 1980s it shows the currency of this work. And turning from the renowned anarchic epistemologist to the Randian philosophical little-leaguer Peikoff beggars belief.