Comment My Fantasy Election (Score 1) 155
My Fantasy Election
Place machines in libraries. Use them year-round. When elections come, boot off of a CD to a scaled down version of Linux specifically designed for the one task of processing the election. Close access to the physical box. Leave only the mouse and the monitor. (A touchscreen really isn't all that much easier than a mouse, and there's no point in wasting money.)
When the voter finishes selecting candidates and props at the voter station, a paper receipt with a bar code is printed. In addition to the bar code, written on the receipt is each of the selections for the voter to verify. S/he verifies the selections first at that machine, which immediately stores the vote as a listed but not yet completed vote. (If the voter does not confirm the vote, the vote is dropped.)
From there, the voter proceeds to a verification machine (also running on a scaled down version of Linux) at which s/he scans in the bar code on the receipt. S/he checks the vote again. If it appears correct, the voter confirms it there. To complete the vote, the voter inserts the receipt into a ballot box at that station where it is scanned again as a completed vote (thus generating a paper trail).
The computers all work together by creating multiple-output reporting when it comes time to count the votes. Each voter station machine, verification machine, and ballot box prints its own individual summary of the votes cast at the close of the polls. Each host machine prints a copy of the votes it has scanned in addition to the votes placed at each of the voter station machines it is responsible for counting.
By choosing an open source software, you'll allow countless thousands of programmers to inspect the code and ensure that it is safe. Furthermore, with only access to the mouse, there will be no way to hack into the computers. But, even in the event of compromised security, the voter-verified paper receipts will still be available. If any discrepancies occur, they can simply refer to a count of the paper receipts localized to those machines whose reports did not match up (or of which there is any reason at all to doubt). The final advantage is that rather than having a box that can only be used once every two or four years, you end up with something we need anyway: more computers in local libraries.
Am I dreaming? Is there something wrong with this? Has this already been suggested? I do not claim to be an expert, so I just ask: why not?
Place machines in libraries. Use them year-round. When elections come, boot off of a CD to a scaled down version of Linux specifically designed for the one task of processing the election. Close access to the physical box. Leave only the mouse and the monitor. (A touchscreen really isn't all that much easier than a mouse, and there's no point in wasting money.)
When the voter finishes selecting candidates and props at the voter station, a paper receipt with a bar code is printed. In addition to the bar code, written on the receipt is each of the selections for the voter to verify. S/he verifies the selections first at that machine, which immediately stores the vote as a listed but not yet completed vote. (If the voter does not confirm the vote, the vote is dropped.)
From there, the voter proceeds to a verification machine (also running on a scaled down version of Linux) at which s/he scans in the bar code on the receipt. S/he checks the vote again. If it appears correct, the voter confirms it there. To complete the vote, the voter inserts the receipt into a ballot box at that station where it is scanned again as a completed vote (thus generating a paper trail).
The computers all work together by creating multiple-output reporting when it comes time to count the votes. Each voter station machine, verification machine, and ballot box prints its own individual summary of the votes cast at the close of the polls. Each host machine prints a copy of the votes it has scanned in addition to the votes placed at each of the voter station machines it is responsible for counting.
By choosing an open source software, you'll allow countless thousands of programmers to inspect the code and ensure that it is safe. Furthermore, with only access to the mouse, there will be no way to hack into the computers. But, even in the event of compromised security, the voter-verified paper receipts will still be available. If any discrepancies occur, they can simply refer to a count of the paper receipts localized to those machines whose reports did not match up (or of which there is any reason at all to doubt). The final advantage is that rather than having a box that can only be used once every two or four years, you end up with something we need anyway: more computers in local libraries.
Am I dreaming? Is there something wrong with this? Has this already been suggested? I do not claim to be an expert, so I just ask: why not?
