Comment Re:Meanwhile... (Score 1) 9
It's sort of an interesting mix of goofy hype and actual(but relatively boring) worth-looking-into.
Not so much because of 'quantum' necessarily; it's entirely possible that someone will get an at least somewhat worrisome classical efficiency improvement worked out before the quantum computing types reach anything of useful size; and it's probably worth betting money that particular cryptographic implementations will turn out to be flawed; but because it takes a fair amount of awareness to even have a complete idea of what you are running; and more than that to know the implications of needing to swap it out in some or all locations.
The people selling 'quantum' and 'post-quantum security' are mostly in the business of "forget your boring arduous problems by focusing on our exciting ones!"(good business; bad way to do security); but it's a pretty solid idea to be aware of the boring arduous problem of exactly what ciphers you use, and what implementations, and whether there are any places where you've inadvertently left a compatibility toggle that allows something to be downgraded to some 90s 'export grade' cipher; and have an idea of how hard it would be to change ciphers or update implementations if you needed to for one reason or another.
Shockingly enough, the people with the biggest marketing blitzes and best 'executive whitepapers' with stock photos of shadowed hoodie hackers and chinese quantum AI owning your cyber are not the ones mostly advising that you should do some really boring systems administration and SBoM stuff while waiting for mature industry-standard implementations to become available; so the people selling immature proprietary implementations and dubious silver bullets tend to out-shout the more sensible ones.
Not so much because of 'quantum' necessarily; it's entirely possible that someone will get an at least somewhat worrisome classical efficiency improvement worked out before the quantum computing types reach anything of useful size; and it's probably worth betting money that particular cryptographic implementations will turn out to be flawed; but because it takes a fair amount of awareness to even have a complete idea of what you are running; and more than that to know the implications of needing to swap it out in some or all locations.
The people selling 'quantum' and 'post-quantum security' are mostly in the business of "forget your boring arduous problems by focusing on our exciting ones!"(good business; bad way to do security); but it's a pretty solid idea to be aware of the boring arduous problem of exactly what ciphers you use, and what implementations, and whether there are any places where you've inadvertently left a compatibility toggle that allows something to be downgraded to some 90s 'export grade' cipher; and have an idea of how hard it would be to change ciphers or update implementations if you needed to for one reason or another.
Shockingly enough, the people with the biggest marketing blitzes and best 'executive whitepapers' with stock photos of shadowed hoodie hackers and chinese quantum AI owning your cyber are not the ones mostly advising that you should do some really boring systems administration and SBoM stuff while waiting for mature industry-standard implementations to become available; so the people selling immature proprietary implementations and dubious silver bullets tend to out-shout the more sensible ones.