Comment Re:A Negative Negative (Score 0) 482
A better idea for those who still want the electronic whiz-bang shinyness, but want a verifiable paper trail.
Keep the well-known serialized scantron ballots. "They just work"(tm).
Have the voting machine fill in the dots, add a voting machine serial number, precinct, etc, and timestamp.
The voting machine shall not retain any vote information. The only thing it shall retain is a log of tamper attempts, and generate an alarm on that event.
Make a vote reader machine available, made by a different manufacturer with absoultly no connection with the voting machine manufacturer.
Place it over the slot of the sealed collection box. It reads the scantron, displays the results to the voter and asks "is this how you voted?" Y/N. If Yes, it kicks it into the sealed box. If No, it returns it to the voter, sounds an signal so poll workers can issue a replacement ballot. The invalid ballot is marked as invalid and placed in another sealed box for review.
Alternatively, a "check for accuracy" machine with the same manufacturer conditions, could be placed next to the voting machine in the booth. The accuracy check would be voluntary, but recommended.
The vote verify machine will not retain any data except tamper logs.
When all ballots are counted at a central location, analysis of the timestamps, serial numbers, precincts, etc. can point out fraud attempts. Timestamps on particular machines too close or too regular, serial numbers not matching with precincts, etc.
Make the non-changing info difficult to forge. Engraved serial number stamps, for example.
Engineer any seals on the voting and check machines such that tampering stops the machine, but make the seals difficult to access to prevent malicious damaging of the machines.
Feel free to blow holes in this, I'm just rambling.
Keep the well-known serialized scantron ballots. "They just work"(tm).
Have the voting machine fill in the dots, add a voting machine serial number, precinct, etc, and timestamp.
The voting machine shall not retain any vote information. The only thing it shall retain is a log of tamper attempts, and generate an alarm on that event.
Make a vote reader machine available, made by a different manufacturer with absoultly no connection with the voting machine manufacturer.
Place it over the slot of the sealed collection box. It reads the scantron, displays the results to the voter and asks "is this how you voted?" Y/N. If Yes, it kicks it into the sealed box. If No, it returns it to the voter, sounds an signal so poll workers can issue a replacement ballot. The invalid ballot is marked as invalid and placed in another sealed box for review.
Alternatively, a "check for accuracy" machine with the same manufacturer conditions, could be placed next to the voting machine in the booth. The accuracy check would be voluntary, but recommended.
The vote verify machine will not retain any data except tamper logs.
When all ballots are counted at a central location, analysis of the timestamps, serial numbers, precincts, etc. can point out fraud attempts. Timestamps on particular machines too close or too regular, serial numbers not matching with precincts, etc.
Make the non-changing info difficult to forge. Engraved serial number stamps, for example.
Engineer any seals on the voting and check machines such that tampering stops the machine, but make the seals difficult to access to prevent malicious damaging of the machines.
Feel free to blow holes in this, I'm just rambling.
