Actually they've already mitigated it with one of the Firefox documented methods. If an Umbrella user queries use-application-dns.net the DNS they'll get "This record is blocked by cicso" and for the time being that's one of the signals Firefox will use to disable DOH in an enterprise environment. Enterprises can also enforce policy on Firefox, and a few other mitigations.

So close and yet you didn't bring home.
I for one welcome our new bacterial overlords.
Just goes to show, in Soviet Russia Bacteria run you!
We can move along now.

Maybe the wireless era brings a different breed of installer. But when I watched the guys put wired sensors in where I thought impossible, I found them to be freaking wizards. I'd also recommend the 2gig stuff to DIY'ers. The documentation is generally readily available, and I've even attended no cost online dealer/installer webinars from them.

This is likely location dependant. I used to subscribe to the theory that the yard sign and stickers were the best deterrent. Our recent breakin seems to indicate an end to that era. The attending police indicated that more often than not people put up the signs without having a system. So the thief likely didn't believe my signs. Also I'm no longer an ADT/Brinks or Chubb customer. My signs were from a local independent reselling the 2gig/alarm.com combo. Again no deterrent of uncertainty. The police response was hard and fast. Not fast enough to catch him (until a subsequent breakin wich I had the satisfaction of seeing when driving home and seeing a nearby block surrounded) but fast enough to eliminate loss in our case. I've also experienced that the system and monitoring company make a police response difference. This is likely due to false positive rates. Our previous system and monitoring company didn't guarantee response. Our current system has had only one false alarm (a misentered duress code too similar to a real code). But the demonstrated police response to exactly the things I'd hope they would was hard and fast.

Not always so. In our case the same burglar had been hitting multiple houses in the neighbourhood. From the block watch reports, our house with an alarm.com 2gig panel was the only one not to have a loss. But though they thought they knew the guy involved, they didn't have proof. They did eventually catch him in the act some weeks later. But this is what caused me to buy a 2gig image sensor for $100 on eBay and add it to my 2gig/alarm.com system to cover the corridor used in our breakin. It's wireless and runs on battery for a year. It's a passive IR system that takes multiple still images, trigger by movement if the alarm panel is armed, based on rules I create on the panel, or manually on demand from the app on my phone. Images go to the panel and the panel uploads them by cellular radio to alarm.com. It's pretty painless to setup and use, not bandwidth expensive since it's multiple still images, so the usage is already covered by my monthly alarm.com plan.

Depends where you live I suppose. In the greater vancouver area (Canada), I use US based Alarm.com The system is great and convenient with lots of system features, zwave stuff, automated locks etc. A few months ago our house was broken into. I was about 10 minutes away. I raced back and was greeted by 3 RCMP cars blocking my driveway, they were already inside sweeping the house. We lost nothing. The guy broke in via a rear window and sensor logs show he raced around the lower floor, missed easy pickings, pulled the knob off our stereo cabinet door, dropped it and exited via the rear patio door in under 2 minutes, and got away (until a couple weeks later a few blocks away). Earlier, my wife entered the unlock code on the door incorrectly, and inadvertently entered the duress code. I got a push notification on my alarm .com app, checked the sensor log and felt it was likely a false alarm. I called my wife to check in, she hadn't realised from the symptoms that she'd triggered the duress but it made sense to her in hindsight. I assured her to expect a knock at the door shortly, and sure enough, again the RCMP were there, insisting a thorough check of ID, an interview, and a tour of the house. I couldn't be happier with the performance of the system and the service. Far better than I had in the past with ADT, Chubb, etc. even in the same house with the same police force, the response was not that good, and in fact before I switched, I got a letter from ADT saying that there would no longer be a police response unless the monitoring company was able to connect to the home owner and the home owner requested it. On the other hand, no Neighbors, heard, noticed, or responded.

Nuclear power does not take into account the storage and reclamation costs. Recall that spent fuel that contains Plutonium-239, has a half-life of 24,000 years. After 240,000 years (10 half lives) only 0.1% will remain. After 720,000 years (30 half-lives) it should be fairly safe. We have yet to even solve that storage problem. And assuming you have, how much would *you* charge for 720,000 years of anything never mind radioactive storage? Then there's the problem just getting it to storage? In the early 2000's the us department of energy looked at the details involved in transferring items to yucca mountain when that was the storage plan. Their public report indicated: "that if 70,000 tons of the existing U.S. waste were shipped to Yucca Mountain, the transfer would require 24 years of dozens of daily rail or truck shipments. Assuming low accident rates and discounting the possibility of terrorist attacks on these lethal shipments, the D.O.E. says this radioactive-waste transport likely would lead to 50 to 310 shipment accidents. According to the D.O.E., each of these accidents could contaminate 42 square miles, and each could require a 462-day cleanup that would cost $620 million, not counting medical expenses."

A little bit knee jerk isn't that? They didn't determine at all WHAT was downloaded, only that an unaccounted for amount of traffic was large enough to have contained user email addresses and the encrypted master passwords. But NOT the actual encrypted blobs containing user data. So all that was really at risk was your Master Password if you had chose a weak one. Change that and you're back in the shape you were before the unaccounted for breach if it was one. Now if you had already been using Yubikey, again you wouldn't have been worried about the breach as they'd have been missing another key part of the hash to decrypt (plus your local encrypted blob would have another round of encryption based on the static portion of the Yubikey identifyer). Moreover they did find an asterisk server with excess UDP exposure, further adding murkiness to the origin of the data spike.

That was supposed to be Yubikey and Google Authenticator, presumably.