Of all the dire remarks on this I like yours the best. The only way to get the public to trust any electronic system at this point is to decouple the error detection from the software, such that it is impossible for the software or hardware to make an error that is not detected.
The following system design does this. Your opponent could design the software in secret and any tampering or mistakes will still be detected by the voters not the software.
The voting software simply compiles the votes into a Data Base, formats and publishes the data base on the internet. Voter privacy is protected. Only the voter and the registrar of voters know the association between voter and ballot number.
The Data Base format is public, as well as the data. The Data Base is just an ASCII list of ballot numbers and associated votes with checksums. (The simpler the better)
One or more of the check sums contains the election results. This makes it impossible to manipulate the data, or to change the election results without changing at least one checksum.
Each Voter is responsible for verifying their ballot.
Since data is public, anyone with an internet connection can verify their vote and the results. Anyone with an internet connection can write their own independent software to verify results and verify their vote. One could even download the ASCII data base into excel and verify without writing software.
The vote is verified at the precinct level. This keeps each data base small and forces any hacker to hack multiple systems.
The integrity of the election is the responsibility of the voter. To say that this puts the voter at risk of being bought is like saying that you can’t own gold because someone might steal it.
No system can compensate for a legal system that does not work.
ELectronic Verifiable Internet Voting System
ELVIVS www.verifyourvote.org