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Government

Journal Journal: Decepticrats & Republitrons - Congressional Power Cubes

The people in a given state don't always agree with their legislators. Nor do the state legislatures agree with the majority of people within their states. The United States was created with this in mind when they created both houses within Congress. One elected by the people, the other by the legislatures of each state. When the U.S. Constitution was created, only the essential powers necessary to carry out its reason for existing were granted to each branch of the Federal Government How is it that Congress can violate the Constitution? Good Question. I'm still trying to figure out when accepting a bribe became legal when in all other cases, conflict of interest is greatly frowned upon. But here is some information as to why an encroachment of YOUR Sovereign rights have been breached.

During the Conventions of 1787, many wise and noble men were appointed by each state in order to amend the Articles of Confederation. Upon review of the Articles, it was found that in order to accomodate the objective before them, they would need to make drastic changes. These changes, in order to be binding, would need the approval of the same body that approved the Articles of Confederation, though there had been no provision for this method of handling.

The Preamble of the Constitution begins with "We the people of the United States" and continues to state the intentions of the Constitution. Justice, domestic Tranquility, providing common defense, promote the general welfare, secure liberty, to ourselves and future generations. Expressing the individual reasons for creating the U.S. Constitution establishes intention, or motive, and gives affect to what follows. In Contract Law, (a constitution is merely a contract between two parties, in this case, the contract is created for the establishment of a Federal Government by the people amongst the several states.) the parties who formed the agreement, or are formed by the agreement, are obligated to fulfill the obligations therefor mentioned. In order to make changes to a contract, the parties affected by such change must give consent. As an example, the Bill of Rights were passed by the legislatures of the states. By ratifying the amendments, they agreed to honor them in accordance with the Preamble.

Article V. of the Constitution allows for 2 modes of ratifying amendments. I have broken down the paragraph to show logic to its purpose. It is mentioned that form is important, but not as important as the substance itself.

The Congress shall call a convention for proposing Amendments.
        a. whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary.
        b. on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states.
In either case: shall be valid to all intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution
        a. when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several states
        b. by Conventions in three fourths of the several states
as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
Provided that no state shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.

It is important to think about how much power had been granted by the "People" of the United States to the Federal Government. First, are the acts of the Legislative, Executive. or Judicial branches meeting the purpose the Constitution was created for?

Within the jurisdiction, does the act provide:
        a. Justice - the exercise of authority in vindication of right by assigning reward or punishment.
        b. domestic Tranquility - Do you feel at ease with such acts?
        c. providing common defense - Do these acts ward off attacks or protect the common people and their rights?
        d. promote the general welfare - Do these acts further growth or progress of the people as a whole?
        e. secure liberty - do these acts secure the liberties of the people?

When establishing the constitution, certain powers were specifically denied to the federal government by the "People" and can only be granted by the same through a state convention. States were only allowed Direct Taxation of the people if their Constitutions (which were also formed by the people of the settlements) allowed for such. Forming a Corporation is done under similar principles, which create laws and bylaws, often consists of an 'Executive Sfaff' and a Board whose supposed interest is suppose to be relative to the common shareholders. While the executives may have relatively free reign, certain circumstances require votes in order to change any corporate bylaws or other circumstances that may affect the value of the company. In a sense, Tax Payers invest in the U.S. Government when they pay taxes, though Unconstitutional, and besides funding the general expenses of the Federal Government, other appropriations of Federal funds must meet the standards set forth above.

In the Federalist No. 85, Paragraph 11 refers to the amendment process through until the end of that publication. Hamilton wrote, "By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "On the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States, which at present time amount to nine, to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by convention in three fourths thereof. The words of this article are peremptory. The Congress 'shall call a convention." Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in air." He goes on to ask, "Can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people? We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority." So what happens now?

Not only have our rights been violated, the rights of people worldwide have been violated. We the people have no right to spread democracy. Democracy is what the U.S. Constitution replaced. It was found that Total Democracy continually failed time after time. Since the start of the Great War, Government has used tax-payer money to spread patriotic propaganda. Seems the Germans picked up on this. They supposedly used the same techniques in World War II. Part of the American Declaration of Rights sent to the Crown in England to express grievances. If you read up on it, you'll realize that American Independance was fought for the same reasons we're seeing now. The only reason I can conclude we actually got involved in WW I, was that the U.S. had been the primary source for weapons and supplies, and ultimately the only reason they weren't conquered for so long. But when they began to lose, it was realized that they would never be paid for much of the supplies which were on the Credit of those soon to have been conquered.

Everything I have stated is information available to anyone who looks for it. I highly recommend if you care about your future, look it up before dismissing my statements as false. The most alarming part of my research is that most of Congressman have law degrees. I firmly believe that a person with a degree in law should have been able to recognize of these encroachments. Instead, the federal government speaks of what it is doing for the people, and give tax breaks, etc, etc... but what they are really doing is keeping your mind off of what you might disapprove of. Everything said by a Presidential candidate is malarky. The President can suggest laws to Congress. But Congress is the true holder of any power. We've already let the government get out of control. We can't let it continue until nobody is left. If the Government is empowered solely by the people, then the people are responsible for the actions of the government. Continuing on as we are, we are only welcoming another attack.

Government

Journal Journal: What constitutes a constitution?

Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. How much are you willing to fight for it?

If we were to assume as human beings tend to derive our morality by those of whom are given the honor to serve in public office of this country by the sovereigns they were elected to represent. It would explain why marriage doesn't last, why killers don't seem remorseful for a death they were directly responsible for, and the complete and utter disrespect that seems to linger about amongst both the young and old.

The United States government no longer exists under any Constitution. A friend once told me that much occurred in Congress that the people will always be oblivious to and before long, people might never have heard of our U.S. Constitution, Liberty, or the pursuit of happiness. Happiness consists of being able to eat at least one meal a day, and staying warm through the Winter months. Though people may consider that my posting is just another one of those "Consipiracy Theories" that seems to come along more and more often, I assure you this is information I have read several times from many websites, most of which were .gov sites.

I have always enjoyed learning, but that in which no interest exists, wastes precisouls brain drive space. Legal documents are difficult to read through because it has always been the intention of law-makers to ensure their private sector counterparts remain employed so that contributions to their campains continue to grow in order to secure the services of the Nations best Marketing Firms. When was the last time you had faith in how this country was being run? Do you actually know what is going on in the world?

First, let me refer you to our Founding Fathers who discussed the ratification process in "The Federalist Papers" so that an educated and well thought out determination could prevail. In Paper No. 85, Hamilton wrote the following:
------------------------------------

It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine2 in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adoption of an entire system.

This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original formation, very different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one question, may become the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of particulars and the number of parties.

But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for management or ompromise, in relation to any other point no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.

In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing thirteen States at any rate, independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged ``on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States, which at present amount to nine, to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.'' The words of this article are peremptory. (leaving no opportunity for denial or refusal; mperative: a peremptory command.)

The Congress ``shall call a convention. "Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.

If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own object.

The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid and ingenious: ``To balance a large state or society Usays hee, whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must guide their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they INEVITABLY fall into in their first trials and experiments.''3 These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but from time and experience. It may be in me a defect of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A nation, without a national government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.

The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy, to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new attempts, because I know that powerful individuals, in this and in other States, are enemies to a general national government in every possible shape.

PUBLIUS.
1 Entitled ``An Address to the People of the State of New York.''
2 It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on foot the measure, three fourths must ratify.
3 Hume's ``Essays,'' vol. i., page 128: ``The Rise of Arts and Sciences.''
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Section 9 of Article I states: No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto laws. How Congress can consciously violate the constitution and there be no news anywhere on this important issue is unfathomable. But I do believe this brings light to the fact that the News Media has intentionally neglected to inform the people of the United States of America that the proposed law to be passed is nothing more than a violation of constitutional law. And if it be true that the lack is due to ignorance, it should additionally cause alarm to the American people. But I do believe that there is more occuring behind the scenes. Any person who has voted to approve the law, or voted against, and switched votes while at the same time receivng money to their campaign should be removed from office and tried for treason.

If people don't start looking into what has been happening, then you are only welcoming additional 'terrorist attacks'.

Democrats

Journal Journal: U.S. agrees personal rights overrated

Here we are in the 21st Century. It didn't take long at all for the American people to waive their liberties. It's ashame, very few people are escaping to America because there is nothing to escape to.

Recently, the Governor of New York stepped down because of allegations he was involved in a prostitution ring. The leading witnesses defending the ring mysteriously committed suicide. But what hasn't been mentioned is the federal wiretaps what were involved in producing the evidence against the New York Governor. But the federal government wasn't monitoring non-international calls... were they?

The sad truth is... That was the purpose of the legislative action put forth this month. The federal government would have nothing to worry about if the actions they took were related to terrorism. What true american would bring forth a lawsuit against actions that were related to terrorism? Personally, I could care less if the government was listening in on my phone calls. If I were involved in illegal activities, as long as those activities were only related to national security I would have no worries of being served a search warrant.

The ironic part of this entire case is the fact that nobody has covered the real facts in relation to what happened. Spitzer was involved in prosecuting the richest of the rich. Corporate America. And Corporate America used its influence in the federal government to dethrone the New York Governor.

This country, and the media outlets, including this one, are all corrupt. This is an obvious ABC deduction. And how any source of media can actually miss these facts is beyond me. to shame on all of you for protecting your investments. for shame, because your investments should be in the American people, not the continued abuses of the federal government.

It's funny.  Laugh.

Journal Journal: The American People - Silent Approval

The Citizens of the United States are very tolerant of their representatives in Congress. Very little outcry was heard when Congress passed a law that retroactively protects the phone companies from responsibility in the illegal phone tapping they so willingly took part in. Many people would have been outraged for petty reasons they are hardly worth mentioning. First, if the wiretapping of phones were directly related to terrorist activity, then they would already have been protected. However, if they were aware that the phone tapping had been for something other than terrorism or national security, then they were not covered.

Though it is difficult to understand why protection would need to be enacted retroactively, there is no doubt that a great deal of trust is held for the decision making of each and every representative. There are obvious signs since whenever you hear a bill being read, it always ends in "And other purposes" without mention of what 'other purposes' are for. But it couldn't possibly a bad thing, it's not like any representative would actually lie to the people who are responsible for their getting elected. Even more unusual... ex post facto laws are prohibited by the Constitution. So they must have thought of that before voting yes.

The rule makers make their own rules, and surely the people haven't been fooled by those who govern. Such an idea is absurd. Well let's think.

U.S. Constitution:
1. Any laws passed by Congress must be for the General Welfare of the people of the United States.
2. All revenue producing bills must originate in the House of Representatives. (Mind you, everything begins as a bill, regardless of where it gets attached.)
3. No Direct Taxes without apportionment to the representation.
4. The people are guaranteed a Republican form of Government.

First one... well... The rest of the world must be a territory of the United States now, I'm sure there is an act of Congress stating that. Forget the fact that we give money to Israel for weapons, and the people in Louisiana are being loaned money to rebuild their levies at an enormous interest rate, and buy an out of state contractor. I'm sure that even though it's already been 3 years, that attention will be given to these obviously misunderstood intentions.

Second, the people of the United States wrote the constitution empowering each branch of the Federal Government, and applying restrictions as well. Seems odd that a Senate Joint resolution (Originating in the Senate) could get passed and be effective to enforce an income tax that previously was considered unconstitutional. (And technically becomes void since it creates a conflict in the supreme law of the land, and such a supreme law cannot be changed simply by stating the opposite in amendments, but to specifically repeal the clause and state the clause that's to replace it.) Which leads to...

Third.. Though people didn't know any better then, they were being illegally taxed by congress. Income had been taxed prior to the passing of the 16th amendment, though no doubt to the benefit of the people. Israel is just like another state, and should be protected in their rights to bully their neighbors.

Fourth.. Very few people recognize the difference between a Democracy and a Republic. The Confederacy was a Democracy because those who make the laws were elected directly from the people. As opposed to the new Republican form, which half of Congress (House of Reps) are elected by the people, and the other house (Senate) is elected by the other sovereign members of the United States, the states themselves. At least until the 17th amendment. But can the foundation of an established supreme document be amended if such change defeats the purpose? But it passed, so it must have been for the public good. I can hardly wait to see what laws are passed next.
----- Sarcasm aside, why exactly do people seem to accept the fact that elected officials are bribed to the detriment of the people? It used to be that a company was given a license to offer services to people in a state or even the country. Those businsses were restricted on how much they could charge by estimating the cost incurred for providing the services per year, divided by the expected sales of such expected service plus a reasonable profit.

Wasn't greed a sin? But that's another well accepted.
Government

Journal Journal: Democracy vs. Liberty - Who Wins?

Liberty seems to be a word that isn't heard as often as one might expect. Often times we take for granted what we think we have, and have no clue about freedom.

When we invaded Iraq, it wasn't for liberty, but for democracy. These are 2 very different things. The Confederacy was a Democracy that did not provide freedom those who were captured into slavery. So why exactly are we trying to spread democracy? Because the United States turned itself into a Democracy in order to take away your freedoms. The new constitution allowed for the senators to be elected by the State Legislatures instead of by the people. The House of Representatives was created seperately to be elected by the people. Why else would there be two houses within Congress? Election to both houses by the people has locked in Aristocratic Principles in Government.

If you know a little history, you know that most people within a country are manipulated into believing one thing or another about their Kings, Rulers, or Religious Head. God appointed. People as a whole are easier to manipulate when they do not take part in government legislative activity. Keeping the election for Senators in each states legislative branch provides a checks and balances that cannot be changed by amendment. In order to change the principles of the Constitution (including apportionment of direct taxes) you MUST do so by convention. Amendments to be ratified by the states are only those in which no powers are granted or removed. It is a method of clarification to be added to the Constitution.

The Bill of Rights did not change the constitution, it only enumerated those rights that people feared most of losing, and were added as reassurance that their rights could not ever be taken away. And the Federal Government cannot take away any rights or privilidges without calling a convention. And it should be noted that there is no reason to amend the U.S. Constitution in order to make something law in your state. The Federal Government was created in order to act in the best interest of all of the states. Which is why it's powers were restricted to commerce and defending against invasion.

The power is otherwise held by the people, and what the people have allowed in the last century is nothing short from disgraceful and in direct contract to the Constitution. It's up to the Supreme Court of the United States to correct a wrong. And they need to do it now. They are not restricted to cases that they are subjected to, they have a responsibility to the people to ensure the principles of the U.S. Constitution remain intact. Read below about the Judiciary Branch and you may better understand.

WE PROCEED to an examination of the judiciary department.

In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined.
The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several objects: 1st. The mode of appointing the judges. 2d. The tenure by which they are to hold their places. 3d. The partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other.
First. As to the mode of appointing the judges; this is the same with that of appointing the officers of the Union in general, and has been so fully discussed in the two last numbers, that nothing can be said here which would not be useless repetition.
Second. As to the tenure by which the judges are to hold their places; this chiefly concerns their duration in office; the provisions for their support; the precautions for their responsibility.
According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be appointed by the United States are to hold their offices DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR; which is conformable to the most approved of the State constitutions and among the rest, to that of this State. Its propriety having been drawn into question by the adversaries of that plan, is no light symptom of the rage for objection, which disorders their imaginations and judgments. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
The simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; (1) that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and executive. For I agree, that "there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." It proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments; that as all the effects of such an union must ensue from a dependence of the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation; that as from the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed or influenced by its coordinate branches; that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as PERMANENCY IN OFFICE, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution; and, in a great measure, as the CITADEL of the public justice and the public security.
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. By a limited constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such for instance as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenour of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void because contrary to the constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another void must necessarily be superiour to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the grounds on which it rests cannot be unacceptable.
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenour of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore contrary to the constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be recollected from any particular provisions in the constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is in fact and must be regarded by the judges as a fundamental law. It must therefore belong to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular net proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superiour obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; in other words the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute; the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
Nor does the conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superiour to both; and that where the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which are not fundamental.
This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between two contradictory laws, is exemplified in a familiar instance. It not uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes existing at one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other, and neither of them containing any repealing clause or expression. In such a case, it is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation: so far as they can, by any fair construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate that this should be done: where this is impracticable it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one in exclusion of the other. The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining their relative validity is, that the last in order of time shall be preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive law, but from the nature and reason of the thing. It is a role not enjoined upon the courts by the legislative provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the law. They thought it reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an equal authority, that, which was the last indication of its will, should have the preference.
But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority, of an original and derivating power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They teach us, that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter, and disregard the former.
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretence of repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGEMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it proved any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body.
If then the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited constitution, against the legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit of the judges, which must be essential to the faithful performance of a so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the constitution and the rights of individuals, from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the mean time, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. Though I trust the friends of the proposed constitution will never concur with its enemies, in questioning that fundamental principle of republican government, which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the established constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from that principle, that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing constitution, would on that account, be justified in a violation of those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this shape, than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body. Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community.
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a circumstance calculated to have more influence upon the character of our governments, than but few may be aware of. The benefits of the integrity and moderation of the judiciary have already been felt in more States than one; and though they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they may have disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem and applause of all the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate men, of every description, ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts: as no man can be sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day. And every man must now feel, that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of public and private confidence, and to introduce in its stead universal distrust and distress.
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence. If the power of making them was committed either to the Executive or legislature, there would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws.
There is yet a further and a weightier reason for the permanency of the judicial offices, which is deducible from the nature of the qualifications they require. It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. Hence it is, that there can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges. And making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge. These considerations apprise us, that the government can have no great option between fit character; and that a temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it with utility and dignity. In the present circumstances of this country, and in those in which it is likely to be for a long time to come, the disadvantages on this score would be greater than they may at first sight appear; but it must be confessed, that they are far inferior to those which present themselves under the other aspects of the subject.
Upon the whole, there can be no room to doubt that the convention acted wisely in copying from the models of those constitutions which have established GOOD BEHAVIOR as the tenure of their judicial offices, in point of duration; and that so far from being blamable on this account, their plan would have been inexcusably defective, if it had wanted this important feature of good government. The experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on the excellence of the institution.

PUBLIUS.

1 The celebrated Montesquieu, speaking of them, says: ``Of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next to nothing.'' ``Spirit of Laws.'' vol. i., page 186.
2 Idem, page 181.
3 Vide ``Protest of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania,'' Martin's Speech, etc.

User Journal

Journal Journal: Provision For The Support of the Executive

FEDERALIST No. 73

The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power

From the New York Packet.

Friday, March 21, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident that, without proper attention to this article, the separation of the executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could render him as obsequious to their will as they might think proper to make him. They might, in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesse's, to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations. These expressions, taken in all the latitude of the terms, would no doubt convey more than is intended. There are men who could neither be distressed nor won into a sacrifice of their duty; but this stern virtue is the growth of few soils; and in the main it will be found that a power over a man's support is a power over his will. If it were necessary to confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be wanting, even in this country, of the intimidation or seduction of the Executive by the terrors or allurements of the pecuniary arrangements of the legislative body.

It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious attention which has been paid to this subject in the proposed Constitution. It is there provided that "The President of the United States shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected; and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them." It is impossible to imagine any provision which would have been more eligible than this. The legislature, on the appointment of a President, is once for all to declare what shall be the compensation for his services during the time for which he shall have been elected. This done, they will have no power to alter it, either by increase or diminution, till a new period of service by a new election commences. They can neither weaken his fortitude by operating on his necessities, nor corrupt his integrity by appealing to his avarice. Neither the Union, nor any of its members will be at liberty to give, nor will he be at liberty to receive, any other emolument than that which may have been determined by the first act. He can, of course, have no pecuniary inducement to renounce or desert the independence intended for him by the Constitution.

The last of the requisites to energy, which have been enumerated, are competent powers. Let us proceed to consider those which are proposed to be vested in the President of the United States.

The first thing that offers itself to our observation, is the qualified negative of the President upon the acts or resolutions of the two houses of the legislature; or, in other words, his power of returning all bills with objections, to have the effect of preventing their becoming laws, unless they should afterwards be ratified by two thirds of each of the component members of the legislative body.

The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been already suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defense, has been inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the Executive, upon the acts of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the former would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations of the latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us, that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self defense.

But the power in question has a further use. It not only serves as a shield to the Executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.

The propriety of a negative has, upon some occasions, been combated by an observation, that it was not to be presumed a single man would possess more virtue and wisdom than a number of men; and that unless this presumption should be entertained, it would be improper to give the executive magistrate any species of control over the legislative body.

But this observation, when examined, will appear rather specious than solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive, but upon the supposition that the legislature will not be infallible; that the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of other members of the government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflexion, would condemn. The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest. It is far less probable, that culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in relation to the same object, than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them.

It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they happen to be at any given period, as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.

Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the legislative body in a free government, and the hazard to the Executive in a trial of strength with that body, afford a satisfactory security that the negative would generally be employed with great caution; and there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness in the exercise of it. A king of Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes, and with all the influence he draws from a thousand sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the joint resolutions of the two houses of Parliament. He would not fail to exert the utmost resources of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or of risking the displeasure of the nation by an opposition to the sense of the legislative body. Nor is it probable, that he would ultimately venture to exert his prerogatives, but in a case of manifest propriety, or extreme necessity. All well-informed men in that kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. A very considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the crown has been exercised.

If a magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as a British monarch, would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration, how much greater caution may be reasonably expected in a President of the United States, clothed for the short period of four years with the executive authority of a government wholly and purely republican?

It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not using his power when necessary, than of his using it too often, or too much. An argument, indeed, against its expediency, has been drawn from this very source. It has been represented, on this account, as a power odious in appearance, useless in practice. But it will not follow, that because it might be rarely exercised, it would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the Executive, or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of defense, and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In the former supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated by his immediate interest in the power of his office; in the latter, by the probability of the sanction of his constituents, who, though they would naturally incline to the legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly suffer their partiality to delude them in a very plain case. I speak now with an eye to a magistrate possessing only a common share of firmness. There are men who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to do their duty at every hazard.

But the convention have pursued a mean in this business, which will both facilitate the exercise of the power vested in this respect in the executive magistrate, and make its efficacy to depend on the sense of a considerable part of the legislative body. Instead of an absolute negative, it is proposed to give the Executive the qualified negative already described. This is a power which would be much more readily exercised than the other. A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single VETO, might not scruple to return it for reconsideration; subject to being finally rejected only in the event of more than one third of each house concurring in the sufficiency of his objections. He would be encouraged by the reflection, that if his opposition should prevail, it would embark in it a very respectable proportion of the legislative body, whose influence would be united with his in supporting the propriety of his conduct in the public opinion. A direct and categorical negative has something in the appearance of it more harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of argumentative objections to be approved or disapproved by those to whom they are addressed. In proportion as it would be less apt to offend, it would be more apt to be exercised; and for this very reason, it may in practice be found more effectual. It is to be hoped that it will not often happen that improper views will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both branches of the legislature at the same time; and this, too, in spite of the counter posing weight of the Executive. It is at any rate far less probable that this should be the case, than that such views should taint the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. A power of this nature in the Executive, will often have a silent and unperceived, though forcible, operation. When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition, from doing what they would with eagerness rush into, if no such external impediments were to be feared.

This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is in this State vested in a council, consisting of the governor, with the chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them. It has been freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with success. And its utility has become so apparent, that persons who, in compiling the Constitution, were violent opposers of it, have from experience become its declared admirers.[1]

I have in another place remarked, that the convention, in the formation of this part of their plan, had departed from the model of the constitution of this State, in favor of that of Massachusetts. Two strong reasons may be imagined for this preference. One is that the judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might receive an improper bias, from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary capacities; the other is that by being often associated with the Executive, they might be induced to embark too far in the political views of that magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination might by degrees be cemented between the executive and judiciary departments. It is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a situation to be either corrupted or influenced by the Executive.

PUBLIUS

1. Mr. Abraham Yates, a warm opponent of the plan of the convention is of this number.

Government

Journal Journal: Ideal Taxation Plan. What do you think of IT?


The goal would be to limit cost any state would incur applying such a plan. With Online Bill Pay services available and Direct Deposit Services, we could ultimately enlist banks in acquiring income tax payments. In order to relieve yourself from the taxation of necessities, all payments for rent & utilities & Medical Expenses would refund amounts withheld for federal & state income tax. The law would have to provide that all Washington residents could not be denied a bank account. Also, I would suggest the default of no overdraft protection for all accounts, and protection can be added for a monthly fee (regardless of how many times you overdraft the account.) There's no reason to allow withdrawal of money that isn't there. Banks can charge $1 per E-Check. In addition, the ability to set money aside into a personal 401k or retirement/pension fund tax free. Investigation groups (Washing Revenue Assessment Processors) or WRAP's would audit banks to ensure they comply with state regulations.

Any withdrawal made from the account would automatically ensure payment of taxes to state & federal accounts. The positive points this type of banking/taxing combo provides is no more tax returns or paperwork. Employers would have fewer costs, and everyone technically could be taxed at a flat rate of all income, including stock options, stock grants, bonus pay, etc. Any money by a corporation paid out of a corporate account would need to go out by electronic funds transfer, and if immediately categorized & verifiable, limits tax liabilities. Banks that hold corporate funds could ensure accounting accuracy. Cost of being Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs are no longer incurred. Any accounting corrections would be verifiable and WRAP can investigate any major corrections that are made. Only payments made directly with this account would exempt any cost of living necessities.

A taxation system like this could potentially remove all other taxation methods. (Except sales tax, so we can still collect money from purchases made within the state. Any money spent using your Income Account would have a lower taxation, all credit card transactions (or debit/e-checking transaction from out of state) made by merchants in the state would apply a sales tax regardless of where product is being delivered. State Taxes of the State of delivery can be applied. Any money transferred out of the country would also be subject to taxation. (This may be a little much initially) The goal would be to prevent people from purchasing goods from out of state with the intention of evading taxes.

If we were to apply a progressive style taxation to Income, I would suggest locking a rate to the funds in excess of the previous bracket. For example:

A person who makes $512,000/yr would likely be able to exempt $100,000 including all medical/dental costs incurred in a year, so Well say for the first 25,000 above cost of living is taxed at a 10% rate.

$1 to 25,000 10% = Total Maximum Tax Obligation: $2,500

$25,001 to $50,000 12% = Total Maximum Tax Obligation: $5,500

$50,001 to $100,000 15% = Total Maximum Tax Obligation: $13,000

$100,001 to $1,000,000 20% = Total Maximum Tax Obligation: $193,000

$1,000,001+ 40% = $193,000 + (40% of (Income - $1,000,000))

Total Taxation of Income of $512,000: $95,400 (Avoids the taxes due from the end of one bracket to beginning of next bracket jump.)

This is the fairest method of taxation I can think of. Any Employee Incentive Plan would also attach to these accounts. A deal with the investment companies like Charles Schwab, E-Trade, Smith Barney, etc& Have services (with the exception of the taxation plan) including 401k, pension plans, etc. A state medical insurance plan & premium plans would also be made available (if not now, then in the future) and qualify as an exemption. Cash withdrawals would not allow for exemption at a later date. Once the money has either (a) been withdrawn from account, or (b) exists after the last day of a given year; will become reconciled & final payment of the year would be transferred permanently to the Tax Collecting Account. Any benefit for purchasing environmentally beneficial products should be applied to the product prior to purchase. (Personally, I think a higher tax should be placed on the sale of vehicles whose fuel efficiency is above the standard fuel consuming vehicles would be practical.)

For those who are against a state or federal health care plan, employers can still secure the medical insurance, but employees would have the option of choosing plans offered through the state or other insurer that exists within the state. Those employees wishing to purchase and maintain their own medical insurance throughout their life. (perhaps the clinic or doctors office offers a plan for going to that specific medical provider for a less expensive cost.) Improves the Medical professional & Patient Relationship. (My experience in the state of Washington has been poor compared to other states I have lived in, whether or not I have had insurance.)

I think this would be a good start to a fair tax initiative. Ultimately, I would suggest that the state be allowed to collect taxes, and 1/50th of taxes collected at a state level would fund the states obligation to the Union. No more paying federal taxes that end up coming back to help with road repairs. No more Federal Assistance to states from federal funds. Should a disaster occur, all states should pitch in to help the suffering state. (State Assurance Insurance Act.)

Wow& I began on a completely different field, and this is what I came up with. It took me about 4-5 hours of writing and thinking. Any constructive criticism is welcome. Comments related to this post only please.

Thanks.

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