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Comment Nice Hyperbola, (Score 1) 217

It's a drawing, they "plan to build a prototype". Big drawings of big turbines have been done before and failed :)

That square design, how does that draw more energy than other shapes? I hope you know that the available energy depends on the area swept, not the amount of blades (or the amount of coverage).

Even taking such wild claims as 5x energy at face value, that thing looks like it has *much* more than 5x the number of moving parts compared "normal" turbines sweeping the same area. Unless they have magic parts, that means a lot more maintenance, which will suck the economy right out of it very quickly.

The real challenge in turbine design is balancing the 3 targets:

1. Minimize number of parts (and their reliability)
2. Maximize area swept
3. Minimize support structure required

That is why you see scaling of individual turbines to scale 2, but that scales "only" square with blade length, unfortunately 3. scales (roughly) cubed.

That is why you see scaling of parks, as that scale all 3 linearly, at the cost of something like n*log N scale in electrical support.

BTW: Vestas has a smaller scale test like this, with 4 rotors, i encourage you to go looking for the results of that experiment.

Comment Because it does match requirements (Score 1) 433

The first problem with PKI is that it *exactly* prevents anonymity in the voting process (that is it's basic feature).

There are other, very nice, ways to tally votes that allows both total anonymity *and* securely counts the votes.

Don't throw PKI at things that are not about identity. That would be like throwing blockchain at transactions that you don't want to perform in public :)

Comment Re:Breaking: Nothing new (Score 1) 113

There is a big difference between "may have an effect" and "being the reason".

If something is "the reason", it must dominate the other factors, so that they can basically be ignored (or close to that).

That is highly unlikely to be the case with Corona. You cannot pick a single region and interpret a temporal overlap of temperature-change with a reduction in infection-rate as evidence. Assume that the weather dominates, and explain Iran?

Comment Re:Biometrics cannot replace secrets (Score 1) 104

I don't see a fundamental difference. You don't need to fake the brain, only the transmitted "measurements".

My whole argument about biometrics security properties being tightly local is exactly the constraint needed to make an argument that you "would require compromising the target machine".

"The sensors would record the persons brain waves. Just as when registering a fingerprint for an iPhones Touch ID, multiple readings would be needed to collect a complete initial record. Our research has confirmed that a combination of pictures like this would evoke brain wave readings that are unique to a particular person, and consistent from one login attempt to another." -- TFA

This suggest that one would simply need such a "complete initial record" to pose as your brain. That would make sense as attackers and the "real" authenticator would then have the same information. You certainly don't want two different systems authenticating off the "complete initial record".

Maybe some difference in information can be maintained in a secrecy of the images show in the "real" scenario, but it should be quite hard make that difference remain. At least some of it would leek every time you authenticate.

For this to work, I think you would essentially need the brain to work as a cryptographic secure hash-function. Maybe it really does, but I think such a claim requires quite a bit more than "Our research has found that the new brain password would be very hard for attackers to figure out, even if they tried to use the old brainwave readings as an aid" and "demonstrated to provide 100% identification accuracy in a pool of 50 participants"

Comment Biometrics cannot replace secrets (Score 1) 104

Biometrics cannot replace any secrets. They can, at best, be used to authenticate local presence in closed systems.

"Authentication" via remote biometric measurement carries absolutely no guarantee that actual bio was involved and thus does not have any valid security properties.

Such remote usage is *bad* both ways: An attacker can replay biometrics and a non-attacker cannot recover from biometric information copying,... ever!

Think about that every time you show your fingerprint to random scanners. You are effectively giving away your (lifetime) biometric to the scanner so it can simulate it to the authentication software. It could choose to store and forward to others and pretend that your finger is there at will. You are effectively trusting *every* scanner not to do this.

Comment Only correlation shown? (Score 1) 300

I've read through the paper (draft) now, and it seems like they really only show correlation between a group they call Harbingers and "Failure" of products.The group of Harbingers is characterized by purchasing at a discount. soooo,

I would lean more towards a conclusion like: "Stores that experience low sales apparently place products on discount and there is individual price elasticity".

The figure on page 38 shows that "Avg. Profit relative to existing Products in the Category" has a strong bias against "products that flopped" already at *Week1* relative to "Products that survived". That is *right* away, there is a systematic bias that seems constant so if I were to look at data after that I would be *highly* suspicious about directions of causality.

In addition, most of the article is vast amounts of bread-text that seem to support circular reasoning.

Can anyone find a place where they actually come up a direction of causality?

Proving the direction of causality being *from* the "harbingers"-group picking loosers could be supported by

  • 1. Define the set of Harbingers
  • 2. Introduce a number of new products.
  • 2a. in half the shops at fixed prices
  • 2b. in half the shops let the shop set the price
  • 3. Show that the Harbingers from step1 purchase the same relative amount of the products in scenarios 2a and 2b.

Note, Separating the two parts without interference may be hard :)

Comment Links to the actual study? (Score 4, Insightful) 300

An online summary of a newspaper pay-walled newspaper reporting on an article... quoting the original with sentences like "At least, according to a group of researchers ..." and "n a study published in the Journal of Marketing Research, researchers ...". Anyone have an actual link to the actual paper? I have a nagging suspicion that this may actually be an artifact of how the analysis is done.

Comment Adequate security (Score 1) 130

Perhaps the security is adequate if that is the best plan.

Security is not about making absolutely sure, it's about:

1. Lowering likelyhood: Making it reasonably hard to break, so that the bad guys will go somehere else.
2. Spend wisely: Not spending more to defend that the likelyhood of loss times (value lost + value bad guys gain) (in general terms)

BTW:

a. Round up the likelyhood, the bad guys are better than you at getting ideas.
b. Destroy sensitive and remove generally valuable parts to reduce the bad guys value
c. The value lost is *not* the money spent on the lost property. Perhaps you wasted a small bit of effort making it? pehaps you can recreate new and better cheaper?

I think the value of the space-shuttle is mainly sentimental and image-loss on theft, so you should probably not spend more than a simple escort -- mainly to prevent traffic-problems.

Comment Re:Every 6 months Ubuntu tries to get me to switch (Score 1) 341

Im guessing you have a diNovo edge? Run the following as root:


# fix hiddev to hidraw in BT rules and put it where updates dont overwrite
for x in /lib/udev/rules.d/*-bluetooth-hid2hci.rules;
    do sed -e 's/KERNEL=="hiddev/KERNEL="hidraw/' \
                <"$x" >/etc/udev.d/rules.d/$(basename "$x");
done
# restart udev
service udev restart

It even work if "they" change the numbering again :) (like from 62 to 97 :)

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