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Comment Re:Never going to work... (Score 1) 143

To be fair, alarms and cameras act as deterrents to break ins - at least to some criminals. It's not naive to think so, it's basic human nature. Criminals are generally looking for easy targets and don't want to be caught. Alarms blaring are contrary to that goal, as are the chances of being seen in real time or ID'd later by cameras. Again, not every criminal will be deterred by the same things, but using layers of security is the right approach.

Comment Re:top security (Score 0) 371

Also, the rest of the federal government has terrible IT infrastructure, and the previous Secretaries also had many problems, so we can't really fault the current Department of State with malfeasance. No, best to just move on and pretend nothing happened.

From the report cover: "As is the case throughout the Federal Government, management weaknesses at the Department have contributed to the loss or removal of email records, particularly records created by the Office of the Secretary. These weaknesses include a limited ability to retrieve email records, inaccessibility of electronic files, failure to comply with requirements for departing employees, and a general lack of oversight.

OIG’s ability to evaluate the Office of the Secretary’s compliance with policies regarding records preservation and use of non-Departmental communications systems was, at times, hampered by these weaknesses. However, based on its review of records, questionnaires, and interviews, OIG determined that email usage and preservation practices varied across the tenures of the five most recent Secretaries and that, accordingly, compliance with statutory, regulatory, and internal requirements varied as well."

Comment Re:Anti-gun nutcase (Score 1) 629

To avoid a de-facto national gun registry, though, the checks need to be destroyed after the sale completes. They were originally destroyed immediately after the sale finalized, but Janet Reno changed the rules to retain the checks for 6 months, ostensibly for two reasons: to police the government (so that unauthorized checks against random non gun-purchasers by corrupt officials could be caught) and to guard against gun purchases made under stolen identities.

Garland’s opinion was that if the law required the records destroyed immediately, Congress would have specified a timeframe. Given the ambiguity of the law, had Garland imposed a timeframe on the government he would have been legislating from the bench.

Not completely true. Brady Bill Sec 3 (3) (i) says: "Prohibitions Relating to Establishment of Registration Systems With Respect to Firearms.--No department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States may...(2) use the establish any system for the registration of firearms, firearm owners, or firearm transactions or dispositions, except with respect to persons prohibited...from receiving a firearm."

You may want to argue that the 180 day rule written by Reno to "guard against gun purchases made under stolen identities" used by prohibited persons, but this kind of registry necessarily ensnares all allowed persons - thus violating the intent of the law. The registration of prohibited persons is specifically covered under 28 CFR 25.9 and is limited to only creating a log of denied transactions.

Comment Backdoor ONLY applicable on older phones (Score 1) 400

"...the FBI wants Apple to create a special version of iOS that only works on the one iPhone they have recovered. This customized version of iOS (*ahem* FBiOS) will ignore passcode entry delays, will not erase the device after any number of incorrect attempts, and will allow the FBI to hook up an external device to facilitate guessing the passcode. The FBI will send Apple the recovered iPhone so that this customized version of iOS never physically leaves the Apple campus." "Even with a customized version of iOS, the FBI has another obstacle in their path: the Secure Enclave (SE)...a separate computer inside the iPhone that brokers access to encryption keys for services like the Data Protection API (aka file encryption)..." "...the recovered iPhone is a 5C. The 5C model iPhone lacks TouchID and, therefore, lacks the single most important security feature produced by Apple: the Secure Enclave." Source:

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