The article has a number of strange assertions. First, only 3 PINs being generated by the card issuing system. I can see this is possible if you hack the application code itself but the HSMs (hardware security modules) that actually do the cryptographic operations wouldn't do this using Visa, IBM or Diebold PIN offset generation calls. It's possible, but it would be an insider job in one bank NOT the whole banking system.
Second, the description of the scam is that one PIN offset on track 2 can be used with multiple account numbers. Again, all the standard PIN methods explicitly prevent this - the account number (PAN) is part of the input data to the PIN verification call.
Third, the description has the crook shoulder surfing for PINs. Why does he need to do this if any known PIN can be used with any account? He only needs one known PIN and the corresponding card to be able to write as many cards as he likes.
I'm sure there's some truth in the story but the technical detail is unconvincing.