September 13, not September 15 (Score 2, Informative)

Since this was dated September 17, make that four days ago, not two.

Check the date on the xsec.org page referred to, daxctle2.c. milw0rm 2358 was a re-publication of this, also posted up on 09/13/2006. Republication happened at other exploit advisory sites as well, such as the SecuriTeam(TM) site, where, for some strange reason, the exploit was published twice, redundantly.

The formal vulnerability advisories SA21910 and FrSIRT/ADV-2006-3593, from Secunia and FrSIRT respectively, posted on 09/14/2006, confirmed and extended this, since both groups developed internal versions of daxctle2.c which were reliably effective in compromising fully patched instances of IE6.0 on WXPSP2.

However, both these advisories made it clear that the root cause flaw was in the ActiveX component that was so successfully and famously attacked by HD Moore in July.

Friday's MS advisory, Microsoft Security Advisory (925444), both clarified matters and proposed two workarounds that might be of more use than shutting down ActiveX or fervent prayer, namely:

1. Disable just the DirectAnimation Path ActiveX Control in the Registry, or
2. Modify the ACL of the actual file Daxctle.ocx to be more restrictive.

Assuming, of course, that one considers it wise to use MSIE at all, given a choice. But PHBs from coast to coast have left many millions of cube inmates with exactly that: no choice.