Really?
Consider the consequences of this happening ... again:

Last week we discovered that some Fedora servers were illegally accessed. The intrusion into the servers was quickly discovered, and the servers were taken offline.
...
One of the compromised Fedora servers was a system used for signing Fedora packages. However, based on our efforts, we have high confidence that the intruder was not able to capture the passphrase used to secure the Fedora package signing key.

Now imagine an admin had performed a dist-style upgrade from Fedora 11 to 12 (install the F12 "release" RPM, then "yum update"), without knowing about this default change to his systems' security, because it would never have occurred to him that Fedora/RH could make such an incredible policy decision. A few days later the Fedora/RH servers are hacked (again), but this time they're not so lucky. Meanwhile, user "blogs" on the admin's network is told (by PackageKit) there are important security updates available, so he decides (without any malice) to go ahead and apply the updates. Thanks to this new "security" policy, he is able to do so, but unknown to him, he's just rooted the system, thanks to the injection of a modified (and re-signed) malicious package on the hacked Fedora/RH server. This malicious package begins by deactivating SELinux (root privileges), then proceeds to delivering it's malware payload across the entire system, and (depending on what's visible to the host) the rest of the network (perhaps also by E-mail).

Now you might think this would have happened anyway, even if it had been the admin who'd performed the update, but there are a few important differences:

• The system(s) are supposed to be the admin's responsibility. This is a crucial point, even in a "home" network. Someone has to be delegated to take responsibility for the system(s), because otherwise the result is conflict and chaos. So if the admin screws up, then he only has himself to blame, and users who screw up, should not affect any other account, or the system at large
• The admin has the ability to perform full system backups prior to deploying updates, so if things go wrong, then he has the ability to put them right. Users with selectively elevated privileges do not, and this is a potentially fatal combination
• There needs to a clear separation of privileged from unprivileged access on a computer system, so that incident like the above don't happen. User "root" doesn't run X11, doesn't run a Web browser, doesn't play games, in fact doesn't do anything other than essential maintenance, and thus is not susceptible to certain attack vectors like social engineering. Unprivileged users are, but this doesn't matter because they are (or should be) unable to make any system-wide changes

Even on a single-user system, Fedora's new Windows-style (in)security policy is dangerous, counter-productive, and frankly insane.

This is definitely not a good thing.

... you could make a fortune using it as a slave "homeworker", sending out pyramid-scheme letters.

1. Print -> Fold -> Lick -> Stamp
2. Goto 1.

A small step for robotics, a giant leap for Snail-mail spamming :)