You are absolutely and ridiculously wrong. There is a prohibition in federal law against use of cellular phones while in flight. You aren't supposed to use them in aircraft" is incorrect only in that you can use them while on the ground, but the context is getting traffic information, and thus "in flight".

And you say my tone is unacceptable?

The FCC "rule" is contained in 47 CFR, which is part 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations -- "federal law". Further, I'm reasonably certain that this requirement comes from an International Telecommunications Union treaty, which the US is a signatory to, which makes it 'federal law' as well. (I'm not going to waste time researching the ITU treaty simply because federal law already covers the situation.) You really don't understand any of this stuff, do you?

No, the FCC isn't "totally cool". The FCC may create rules that allow ON BOARD cell sites (in airmobile allocations) so that cell phones inside the aircraft can use airmobile frequencies to make cell calls. This is NOT the same as blanket permission to use landmobile frequencies to make cell calls. In your ignorance, you don't understand that fact. And your ignorance makes you think that every pilot will have the benefit of the airborne cell micro-site to make such calls legal.

Had you bothered to read the CNN article (not an FCC notice of proposed rulemaking) you would have seen that it would take a hundred pounds of equipment on the aircraft to implement this change, which makes it unlikly to happen on the majority of aircraft, and impossible to implement on a very large number of them. This "totally cool" solution to the "myth" of federal law prohibiting cell phone use inflight isn't a solution after all.

I didn't say it was dangerous, nor did the guy you replied to. He said "you're not supposed to use them", which is what federal law says.

Again. Malicious ignorance. Longstanding federal law is not irrelevant.

Not using two frequencies with data packets that are 120 microseconds long. You know nothing of ADS-B and therefore make stupid statements like this.

Sigh. It doesn't matter who knows whose keys (except for the problem of knowing the keys so the data could be encrypted in the first place -- an impossible task when you don't know who is in the airspace to start with.) The FACT is that every aircraft needs the data, and if all it takes is buying an aircraft radio then your security is "poof". Tracking costs a bit more, but it wouldn't be long before the technology becomes cheap. You may think that buying an aviation radio is impossble except for aircraft owners, but that's just more ignorance.

Our military aircraft operate in an environment where there are existing key management systems, and they don't go flying without nobody knowing they are there. They aren't using ADS-B to track each other, either. Yeah, a completely different system run by completely different people for a completely different purpose works differently. Do'h.

That's right. And now there is ADS-B to help make things even safer. And FAA is heading towards NextGen where ADS-B is a major component of traffic control. Cutting VFR pilots out of the safety-loop is ridiculous.

You call me an asshole and then tell me MY tone and manner is "unpleasant". Your willful ignorance of anything to do with the airspace system is more painful than anything I've said. Please, be "unlikely" to continue demonstrating your ignorance of this technology or why it was put in place. Please.

Just stop making pathetically stupid pronouncements of how easy it would be to encrypt all the ADS-B data so that planes cannot be tracked -- whent the goal of the system is to make tracking aircraft easier. And stop telling us why FCC regulations were enacted and that they are irrelevant when it comes to use of radio systems. And, most of all, stop putting words in my mouth by telling me I said it was dangerous to use a cell phone inflight when the truth is I said it is not allowed.

The facts remain, and they are relatively simple: Every aircraft needs to have the ADS-B data from other aircraft, and every aircraft needs to be able to recieve this data directly. Point-to-point encryption is impossible in such an environment. Point-to-point distribution is just as impossible. Encrypting a broadcast (the 'B' in ADS-B) means that everyone must have the key to decrypt it, and thus you gain nothing from the encryption.

Now, you might try claiming that you meant there should be a different, broadbandwidth, fancy computer-scientist approved system for distribution of such data, but that's not what you said. Even so, with the amount of time it has taken to get this far in implementing ADS-B, and the likley failure to accomplish the task by 2020 just based on the backlog of avionics shop time, it is ridiculous to think that a different, new, worldwide standard will be imposed anytime in the next two decades, much less functional in that timeframe. But ignorance of the facts allows one to make gradious claims about how trivial it would be to implement.

Bullshit. The land mobile allocation of the frequency bands used by many cell systems has nothing to do with aviation safety. It was that way before cell phones became something that you would carry in your pocket and potentially cause problems. (And just because YOU'vE never been in a cockpit and heard the buzz from a GSM cellphone in YOUR avionics doesn't mean it doesn't happen.) You are ignorant on this issue.

The original author said that "you aren't supposed to use them in aircraft." The prohibition comes from FCC regulations, not FAA. FAA regulations have, for a very long time, granted aircraft operators the right to allow electronic devices while inflight, so the prohibition doesn't even come from the FAA, it comes because the operator didn't choose to allow it. And today, most of them do, except for cell phones -- because cell phones are prohibited by FCC, not FAA, regulations.

YOU said that this myth was busted, but the law is not a myth and you are, really, not supposed to use cell phones in aircraft. You lie because of ignorance when you claim it is a myth. And you've been corrected now, so you should know better.

So does every other aircraft in the area.

It doesn't always pass through ATC.

And thus EVERYONE HAS TO HAVE THE KEY. Every aircraft needs that information.

Oh my God. Do you actually believe that every ADS-B position report will be individually encrypted and sent to each and every aircraft individually? So an ADS-B uplink that has 120 aircraft in its viscinity will actually retransmit every ADS-B packet from each aircraft 120 additional times? And that there will somewhere be a database of all aircraft and their key so that FAA can encrypt each packet correctly? And that FAA will magically know the identities of the 20 VFR aircraft in the area so it can correctly encrypt the ADS-B data for them, too?

And you would deliberately exclude every aircraft that has only "ADS-B in" capablility, because they just don't need to know any of this data? The lives of the pilots and passengers of those aircraft just aren't important enough to you? Do you even realize that there IS "ADS-B in" as part of the system? We'll create a marvelous NextGen aviation system that improves safety and convenience for all aircraft, except the ones that 'mi' doesn't think are worth helping?

You understand nothing of the system other than "OMG, it should be encrypted". Really. Your ignorance, and your refusal to listen, are overwhelming.

The only problem here is your deliberate and willful ignorance, and it appears to be an insoluble problem.

It is FEDERAL LAW. Of course it is not irrelevant. Why do you think you are now allowed to use personal electronic devices while inflight but still not allowed to use cell phones? Because it is the law, not a myth.

You don't need to understand what ADS-B is designed to do before you yammer on and on about how it should be encrypted point-to-point? Yes, the needs of aviation are different than the needs of computer scientists. They don't fit into a one-to-one "Alice sends a message to Bob" scenarios.

You clearly do not understand the needs of aviation or how it operates. Please stop making stupid statements like this. ATC makes use of ADS-B data, they don't generate it. For the vast majority of their flights, most aircraft are not dealing with towers, at least not when flying outside the east coast area, and certainly not even then when they are in the enroute airspace. Your 'tower' is irrelevant until it comes time to take off or land.

And if I'm out of range of 'your tower' and you can't hear my request? The authority of 'your tower' extends, for the vast majority of cases, about 5 miles from your airport. I'm six miles away and need to know if any of your depatures are going to be in my vicinity. But I can't because I'm not talking to 'your tower' and can't ask "pretty please" let me have public data.

You understand nothing. ATC needs to know who is who because they have to control them if they are on an IFR flight plan. Here's just a simple scenario to demonstrate the problem. A is flying IFR along a specified airway. B is VFR on a different one. The targets merge over the VOR where those two routes intersect. (Targets merging is a big no-no to ATC, but ATC has called A, told him about B, and A reports "traffic in sight". It is now A's responsibility to keep from running into B.) B turns to follow the airway departing the VOR that A was supposed to turn onto, but A missed the turn and is heading off the wrong way. ATC sees an unidentified ADS-B target departing the VOR that looks like A, and it is doing what A is supposed to do. All is well. ATC doesn't care about B, B is VFR and hasn't asked for flight following. ATC has no responsibility for, or even any way of communicating with, B.

Time passes. B turns off the airway. Oops, thinks ATC, A is making a mistake. ATC calls A. A has flown out of range of that ATC facility. ATC can't contact B to find out it is B, so is B actually A with a radio failure? All of this is solved by having the identification of the aircraft sent with the ADS-B data. (And, of course, pilots will know that the identification WILL be sent using the standard transponder -- A will have a discrete 4096 code and B will be sqwaking 1200. But identifying aircraft isn't necessary you say, so we will assume that they are unidentified.)

The pilots need to know where they are, what speed they are going, what altitude they are at, just so they can know where they are and predict conflicts. The pilots need to know what model and identity they are so they can be sure that they've identified the correct target when they do make visual contact. They need to know if they are looking for a United 747 or a Delta 727 or just a Cessna 182. This information is important for situational awareness. Yes, today, they have to rely on ATC traffic advisories to tell them "traffic 12 o'clock, opposite direction, a United 747", but the VFR people not talking to ATC deserve that same information.

I don't know WHY you ARE so bothered by the fact that people on the ground can track an airplane, but you seem to be quite upset about that fact. What I do I know is that you have no understanding of aviation or aircraft operations or the environment in which they operate.

As a pilot, I certainly do need to see that information. ADSB data is an extension of the "see and avoid" concept, where the pilot has a responsibility for situational awareness and is the ultimate controller of his aircraft.

It's nice when ATC issues traffic advisories, but is required to do so only for IFR traffic. VFR traffic can ask for "flight following", but that service is "workload permitting" for the controller, and VFR traffic without flight following get NO traffic advisories except the ADSB data (or TAS in some airspaces.)

The general aviation fleet and suppliers are so far behind the curve on meeting the 2020 deadline that it would be impossible for FAA to suddenly change the technical specifications for ADSB. There are so many aircraft owners and operators who are waiting for the suppliers to come up with reasonable solutions (especially for ADSB-out) that it may wind up being impossible to meet the existing deadline with existing standards anyway. Just the number of aircraft that will require avionics work will mean that the backlog will extend past the deadline.

A point-to-point communication that needs to be heard by every pilot in the area? That's not point-to-point, that's broadcast, and every receiver would need the decryption key. Where's the security, again?

Better choice for what? Reducing situational awareness for everyone in the air and creating a headache as pilots have to dial a ten digit or more phone number to get to ATC instead of dialing in a five digit frequency (which in modern cockpits is part of the glass and can be entered just by pointing at the airport and pushing a button.)

At a MINIMUM, the position, heading, speed, altitude, and aircraft type need to be broadcast, which is because the goal of the ADSB system is to allow everyone to track other aircraft. To prevent falsing, the id is also required. (Two aircraft come close enough their targets merge, then two aircraft reappear. Which one is which? You cannot control what you don't know.) The GOAL of ADSB is to allow tracking, so thinking you can cut out information that allows tracking is, well, nonsense.

Uhh, yeah, since everyone in the air needs to know the information, you do need to give the keys to everyone.

No, it hasn't. The "myth" that the frequencies for many of the cellular bands are in a LAND mobile allocation has never been "busted". It's a fact.

ADS-B out is not "sent to a tower", it is sent to ground recievers all over the place, AND TO OTHER AIRCRAFT. Every aircraft ADS-B-in will have to have the encrytion keys so it can decrypt the data.

You really don't understand what the NextGen concept, with ADSB, is, do you?

No, they wouldn't. Whatever these "air-dispatchers" are, they don't dispatch fire equipment, except perhaps the special purpose equipment at the airport itself. Did you mean "ATC"? As in "air traffic controllers"? "Dispatchers" are the people who work for the airlines that handle getting the airline flights arranged.

No, I think "the origin of the issue" here is a complete lack of understanding of the goals of ADSB and collision avoidance.That would be yours.

Other pilots need to know the data, because a complete reliance on ground-based air traffic controllers to keep airplanes apart has proven to be a failure. The system works better when everyone know where everyone else is, even when the "other guy" is a VFR pilot who isn't talking to ATC at all.

"Healing" implies there has been an injury -- which hasn't happened. Big deal if someone on the ground can track aircraft just like ATC and all the other aircraft in the air can. If you decide that ADSB data has to be encrypted, then you add a bit of cost to the receiver -- FOR ALL AIRCRAFT who will be required to have ADSB installed by 2020, which is a good chunk of change in total, and still a good chunk for individual aircraft -- but add nothing to security.