Comment Re:Backups or nothing. (Score 1) 20
The negotiating for the decryption key has often been the only way organizations have been able to recover from ransomware. Ideally, people have backups, but the standard ransomware threat actor playbook includes the step of destroying all the backups prior to pushing out the ransomware. I will cross-post one of my relevant comments on last week's ransomware story:
Backups have been a sore spot with ransomware recovery the last several years. Most people have some sort of backups, but generally, one or more of these things happens:
1. Backups were connected to the Active Directory domain (which was compromised), alternatively, password reuse
2. Backups were then destroyed or encrypted (including backup solutions claiming to have "immutable backups")
3. Not all servers were being backed up as people thought they were
4. Backups failed at some point and no one realized it
5. Last good backup was much older than expected
6. The legitimate at-rest key for the backup solution was encrypted
7. The infrastructure, particularly network bandwidth to remote sites, especially manufacturing, can't support timely mass restoration over the network/from the cloud