Or described differently, Prune will or will not choose to reply to your post. It describes the situation accurately while complete avoiding the question of ability to choose differently from what is observed.
Why is the assumption made that choice = free will? What is a choice but one observed action out of multiple distinct alternatives? When you flip a coin it does not choose to land heads or tails, it just does. The outcome is based on the starting state (which side facing up, height above the ground, relative humidity, etc) and the force applied to a particular place on the coin.
Oh, but a coin is not a conscious being (that we can tell). Okay, how about shining a flashlight into your eyes. Do you have a choice in whether or not you see the light? I'm talking about the action of seeing the light itself, not the choice of whether or not to close your eyes. Ah, but that is a simple sensory perception, which we have very little control over.
Here's one for you: Are you able to choose whether or not you think of a purple dinosaur right now? Did you have control over how your brain would respond to the symbols you just read?
Are you exercising free will in choosing to read this sentence right now? Or is it a foregone conclusion that you would be reading this sentence, based on your brain's physical state at the start of this paragraph combined with your sensory input that more information was available to obtain. Input + Brain State = Brain State change + activation of muscle control neurons to move the eyes to the next words. I predict with 100% confidence that you are reading this sentence right now. If you had some free choice not to be reading this right now, upon what would that be based if not your prior brain state combined with current input?
If your preferences, urges, and predilections are not bound up in the current configuration of your gray matter, are you suggesting they somehow arise from this mysterious quantum indeterminacy? Even if they were, it would still be a probability distribution determining a choice, not an independent action of a free will. Additionally, you would have to find a way to explain how previous physical experience and activity shapes this quantum indeterminacy, since these preferences and urges change over time.
To address your previous post:
It's of less importance than "What's for dinner" insofar as one has not the slightest sense of obligation to behave consistently with their worldview, sure.
My worldview does not keep decisions from being made by me. I don't have an obligation to detail the rationale for each decision down to the atomic level any more than I need to explain oxygenation of hydrocarbons in order to drive my car.
Are you giving an indication by such a question (and a few hundred others each day) that there was a free choice made by someone as to what to make, and you have a free choice as to whether or not you want to join them?
No, I am merely asking what is, not why it is what it is.
The premise is there by implication in most everything we do.
No, it isn't. I can asking if it is raining outside without having to understand what is causing it to rain.
Personally, if I consistently imply something daily, I like to have the integrity to actually agree with my implication, and the basic philosophical coherence to reference what in reality justifies that position.
I'm not implying that a "free choice" has been made, only that a choice has been made; one option has been selected from those available.
"What do you want to have for dinner" isn't the same thing as "What does our conditioning determine we are going to say we want to have for dinner".
Pragmatically, it is, if it is my position that someone's wants and actions are determined by that person's conditioning.
In reality, you are no longer meaningfully able to answer the simplest questions about your behavior--e.g. "Why did you do that?" Any answer you give would be tentative and incomplete, and, likely, simply wrong.
I respectfully disagree. If I answer, "Because I wanted to," my answer is just as correct and complete, regardless of my use of consciousness or a cascade of causal factors as the primary explanation. The answer has as much or as little meaning either way; I don't have to explain what I mean by "I wanted" in order to convey the meaning.
If, in fact, you are claiming you have no free will, you are not a moral agent.
So do you believe that free will is a requirement of "good" and "bad" behavior? I suggest doing some research on altruistic behavior in animals and the concept of reproductive fitness. Or perhaps you believe that insects like wasps and bees, who exhibit eusocial behavior, also have consciousness and free will.
It is entirely possible to explain actions labeled "good" and "bad" without having to involve choice. Ideally (but not in reality), we don't punish the mentally ill for criminal behavior. We say it is because they couldn't choose between right and wrong, but the real reasons are because it won't change the behavior of the mentally ill person, and it won't deter other mentally ill people from similar behavior.
When we hold a sane person "responsible" for his or her behavior, we are assuming the person could have chosen otherwise, and so we punish that person to deter repetition of the behavior in both that person and others. Whether the person actually could have chosen otherwise is irrelevant because the goal of the punishment is the same. This is why the "I had a bad childhood" defense isn't particularly helpful to society. If you allow it, you are basically saying anyone who has a bad childhood won't be punished for criminal behavior, so you lose the deterrent effect. If you refuse to convict someone who is using this defense, then how do you address this person's recidivism?
Your argument about a hypothetical rebuttal consisting of killing me and claiming that the person was predetermined to do so is specious at best. Any society where this type of behavior was generally accepted would not last, which is why it remains hypothetical. You can use math and population genetics to see why this is true, and also to understand why we still have a small population of sociopaths that we will likely never completely eliminate (akin to recessive genes).
While I understand the supposed ethical stalemate your hypothetical situation presents, it is pragmatically useless. "What if you were forced to kill one member of your family or all of them would be killed? Which person would you choose?" "What if you could go back in time and kill Hitler when he was applying to art school? Would you do it?" If one uses the "What if?" game to determine his or her ethical coherence, I think there are more important issues to investigate than determining the ultimate causality of one's actions.
tl;dr: Not believing in free will doesn't make one incapable of making choices consistent with one's worldview, absolve one of personal responsibility, or inherently predict or require the breakdown of moral society.