Comment Re:YouTube Commenters strike again (Score 1) 496
YouTube stupidity
Obligatory XKCD: http://xkcd.com/202/
YouTube stupidity
Obligatory XKCD: http://xkcd.com/202/
Keep the disk spinning at 15K but add heads with their own actuator and everything.
Has been done some time ago (so no 15k/min), see: http://www.tomshardware.com/news/seagate-hdd-harddrive,8279.html
how is X the weak link?
Even if SELinux/AA are able to confine the actions of a pwned firefox or it is running as a different user, firefox can get access to keyboard and mouse actions and possible more via X (try xev).
Full virtulization is useless, if the attack is advanced enough that it can is keylogging a separate user (has root), modifying your Firefox binaries (has root and then some) or modifying what you see (one hell of an exploit somewhere in your xorg stack), then the chances are the attacker can modify your virtualized os when its mounted,
If the virtualization is good, the attacker still cannot break out of the VM. In practice there will be exploits allowing to break out, but at least now there are many barriers: the attacker has to exploit firefox, then possibly break out of SELinux/Apparmor and get root, after that it has to modify the kernel and break out of the VM. And depending on the VM and the exploit the attacker may then still only have access to a userspace part of the virtualization environment, running as a normal user on the host. So this is much better than just a single defense.
And while most users don't have to be this paranoid, the good thing about virtualization is that it's easy: you can get all this security with very little effort - the "cost" is much lower than e.g. configuring Apparmor, and the protection is much better.
Or is there an easy, lightweight (lightweight as in "I don't necessarily want to virtualize a full OS just to run a browser", way to sandbox a browser?
Have a look at the Linux extensions like SELinux or AppArmor. At least the latter one can be set up comparatively easy, and is useful to protect a few selected processes such as FF from doing harm. Certainly not perfect, but it should be able to stop an exploit from taking over the whole account.
However, the weak link will then probably be X and your window environment (KDE/gnome), so full virtualization is still much better. Of course, even that doesn't offer perfect protection.
... it was (obviously) all over the damn front page of kde.org...
Hm, I just can't find it:
http://web.archive.org/web/20080113080143/http://www.kde.org/
And the release announcement only mentions "major improvements", "major new capabilities", "improvements" etc..
http://www.kde.org/announcements/4.0/
Am I missing something?
The announcement for 4.1 on the other hand has been quite clear about this.
No user-servicable parts inside. Refer to qualified service personnel.