Not only that, they seem to think there is no difference between block and file storage. This is an HTTP only NAS system backed by JFS. That would not be my first choice for many applications. I couldn't use this for most of my data center even if it did have a support infrastructure.

One of the most important concepts here is that to store or retrieve data with a Backblaze Storage Pod, it is always through HTTPS. There is no iSCSI, no NFS, no SQL, no Fibre Channel. None of those technologies scales as cheaply, reliably, goes as big, nor can be managed as easily as stand-alone pods with their own IP address waiting for requests on HTTPS.

That's why I drive a personal SU-37.

Recordinghero would work too.

Precisely correct. The whole point of my original post was that the VVS was no match for the USAF. Too small, too poorly maintained and most of all too little time in the air due to budget restraints. I think the avionics have greatly improved in recent years but it means little since they don't have the budget to procure any of it, or fly it once they do. I still believe the russians make the best airframes though. The Mig-29 is some kind of miracle. Inherently stable airframes are not supposed to be able to perform those kind of aerobatics. It doesn't mean much in practice, but from a gear-head perspective it is one amazing piece of engineering. The engine issue goes all the way back to the 1930s. For some reason, they never placed the same emphasis on powerplant design that they did on airframes. The Klimov VK-1 and its derivatives, big improvements over the RR Nene upon which they were based, being the exception that proves the rule.

One testament to the quality of Russian airframes is the still active market for third party upgraded Mig-21s. With modern Israeli avionics and weapons, this 50 year old airframe is still a viable interceptor for the budget conscious air force. Hard to believe.

My apologies. In the post to which you replied I did repeatedly typo SU-27 when I meant SU-37. In my original post I got that right. My bad. At any rate, I meant the SU-37. Although honestly, you can probably get six SU-27s for the price of an F-22 and end up with greater combat effectiveness by wide margin, especially if you used reliable american engines.

"Curse you Red Baron!"

My favorite aviation era is the "golden age" between the wars. Can't beat that Art Deco industrial design. That said, if you are ever in central New York, do not miss Old Rhinebeck. I loved it when I was a kid.

Precisely. The Japanese were still fighting that war tactically.

Boom and zoom was tough in a fighter which was likely to shed its top wing in a dive, as would so many WWI aircraft. The best WWI fighters were generally turn fighters. Have you ever read any of Leo Opdyke's publications? He is an old friend of my dad's. Builds and flies stringbags out of here.

The stealth criticisms I leveled are basic physics issues. To use the physical absorption against ten meter wavelength radar you would need a ten meter thick absorption materials. It would be nice if those materials survived a little rain too, but on the F-22 they don't.

You are restating my original point about the pilots. Did you read my post?

I didn't say anything about the SU-27. I mentioned the SU-37, which has vectored thrust, among other innovations. I know of no maneuvers the F-22 can perform which the SU-37 couldn't execute long before the F-22 went into production. And even those they can perform that other aircraft can't are of only theoretical combat value. Despite the insistence of Russian pilots, the efficacy of super-maneuverability in combat is still open to debate. You'll never get an F-15 pilot to admit it has value. Admittedly, some of their argument derive from their love of BVR, which is also debatable, but they do have a point. It isn't clear that doing backflips in combat is helpful. That said, Russian weapons seem better suited to such tactics if they are valid.

Sorry, I should have been more specific. I meant passive radar guided missiles. Although we didn't develop medium range infra-red missiles either, which the Soviets did. Our only passive seekers were on the short range Sidewinder, which of course was out best performing missile by a wide margin.

The other big tactical innovation was the boom and zoom. Americans tried to only attack from above in a diving slash. Then they would continue straight on at high speed, disengaging. One of the few advantages the early war American fighters had over the Japanese Zeros and Oscars was speed and control in a dive. By making the fight vertical they forced it on their terms. They couldn't climb with the Japanese, so they typically just broke off after the first attack, regrouped and tried to regain that altitude (and therefore potential energy) advantage. Claire Chenault developed this tactic in China even before the US entered the war.

That certainly helps.

Stealth is a way overhyped technology. It can be marginally effective against microwave active systems, but does nothing against long wave active rigs. The cost of defeating stealth is a fraction of the cost of implementing it. There is really only one kind of stealth that is effective in the real world and that is not radiating and having good passive systems. The Russians excel at this. Their passive sensors are powerful and their passive missiles are the best in the world. Until recently NATO didn't even try to develop passive air to air missiles. The SU-27 has 90% of the F-22's flight capabilities at a fraction of the operating and capital cost. Three SU-27s, especially with American engines and avionics, would be several times more effective than a single F-22. The most important qualities in an air-superiority fighter have always been range, speed and weapons delivery. The SU-27 is faster than the F-22, has a greater combat radius and except for Beyond Visual Range, is a better weapons platform. BVR has only recently become at all useful in environments where we enjoy total air superiority and perfect information. In a full on war with a relatively numerous and organized enemy like Russia, it would revert back to a hypothetical combat mode. And once you are in visual range, those faster SUs can catch you and deploy those amazing dogfight missiles of theirs.

The exact same thing happens except in both directions. As the weave crosses, each pursued plane presses the attack on his partner's pursuer, forcing him to disengage pursuit. That is what made it so effective. It transforms a tactical disadvantage into an advantage. Basically in a two on two the defenders are setting a double pick. The Weave was about timing, not numbers.

We did eventually overwhelm the Japanese with numbers as well. By that time we also had better planes for the most part. And unlike any of the Axis forces we had 100 octane avgas. The best Japanese fighters outperformed our Mustangs, Hellcats and even Corsairs, when we ran captured examples on our fuel. But in Japanese service they were castrated by low octane fuel. We also trained our pilots better. The Japanese started the war with lots of experienced pilots, but their replacements had no more than 20 hours in the air. Our own replacements were very well trained. The great Japanese Ace Sakai Saburo used to say the Japanese Navy viewed pilots as consumables. He also had this to say about American tactics,

I don't think they were as skilled in individual combat as the Japanese were. But the boom-and-zoom tactics they developed to take advantage of the Zero's inability to dive well were very effective.

I am confident that Japanese pilots were superior on a one-on-one basis. But the ability to work as a team both offensively and defensively that the Americans had was very impressive. Perhaps this comes from the team spirit and thinking they developed playing American football. This hit us particularly hard in the air engagements from the middle war onwards (teamwork and search patterns).

That second quote referred to the Thach Weave, which BTW does not rely on superior numbers. It is a method for forcing double teams. Boom n' zoom refers to restricting your engagements to situations where you possess superior energy. Basically it means attacking in a dive and breaking off immediately, only re-engaging when you have regained your altitude advantage.

There were a lot of other factors too, such as the Japanese lack of usable radios.