Hmm, NO.
You must at minimum configure the memory controller out of spec. The actual research was done with a custom memory controller implemented in an FPGA.
The research did use an FPGA, BUT . . .
p.2 bottom of 1st column
"We demonstrate that a user-level program can induce RowPress bitflips in a real DDR4-based system that already employs RowHammer protection.
The program accesses multiple different columns of the aggressor DRAM row so that the memory controller keeps the aggressor row open for a longer period of time . . ."
There are very few applications where root exists but is not permitted to examine user process memory at will on real hardware. None of those work on anything POSIX like.
POSIX may require guard space, but not always. The point is that a process/thread can use these techniques to flip adjacent memory regardless of software security. (Memory randomization can help, but it is not a cure.)
Even if this required root access, it could still be stealthy and very dangerous. Remember PEEK and POKE?