BSL-4 is a standard that only applies to laboratories, the same standards aren't necessarily applied to clinical environments, and in the case of Ebola are major overkill.
I mostly agree, but I'd still expect strict precautions to be taken to prevent the mixing of
clean and contaminated environments. That includes not taking contaminated objects (suits,
gloves, whatever) out of the containment area.
Ebola can't travel through the air, so positive pressure suits aren't appropriate, and they still have to be taken on and off, and that's when health workers seem to get infected.
So WhyTF are they taking off undecontaminated gear?
People who "test positive" for Ebola are not contagious, only people who have symptoms are, and they can only pass the disease through contact with bodily fluids -- this usually implies touch, since hemorrhagic fevers cause people to give off all kinds of gross effluent, but it's just not like a "virus" one gets from casual contact, like, say, rubella.
And still somebody got infected. Somebody who knew they were dealing with an
and lethal disease. This should never have happened. You're not making me feel better about the
competence of those involved.
The fact is, Ebola isn't that contagious -- HIV is more virulent, and these two are nothing compared to the influenza or SARS. It's bad that health workers can get it, but this is still one person, so on a completely epidemiological basis it's really not a big deal. Characterizing a single case as somehow indicative of the safety of these procedures is sensationalism.
Well, yes and no. I'm not really concerned about it "getting out". And while it's obviously not enough
for proper statistics, it's more than enough for concern for the health workers: How many people were
treating this patient? 10-20?
That makes for a 5-10% infection rate amongst people who knew what they were dealing with, in a supposedly
first-rate facility in a highly developed country. And the infection happened despite Ebola "not being that contagious".