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I just hate bullies even more.
To argue that any element of the government is operating suboptimally is often not a difficult argument to make. To say that they (any element of government) should be eliminated or neutered altogether is something else entirely, and I feel like that should be approached with great caution.
To address your other point: I think that, if there is evidence that industrial espionage against the US has been facilitated by NSA backdoors, then the backdoors pose a greater risk than benefit to national security (assuming that the loss from such espionage is, again, greater than intelligence gained). This is all risk/benefit -- that's their job. I would be totally fine with Coke losing their formula to China if that means that they are also able to interdict intelligence that prevents a major attuU.S. (or foreign, if sufficiently significant) soil.
But, to be clear, you are right that part of this equation was the assumption that the U.S. was far superior to all other states in their ability to detect and utilize such backdoors. This has become far less true in recent years, and these policies by their risky nature do require careful constant re-evaluation. Furthermore, there is also something to be said for the inability to "revert" the changes in many of these backdoors, such as in hardware -- so if you later decide that these pose more risk to industry than benefit to national security, you're just SOL on existing backdoors. That makes it crucial that the element of longitudinal uncertainty be taken into account in the initial decisionmaking; hopefully it is, but admittedly foresight is often not government's strong suit...
The idea is that, if they *do* overstep their boundaries, then that should be handled appropriately (and that is a valid point of criticism with more domestic recent events). But to claim that the intelligence community, whose job is to move about undetected, should be telling people, "you know, these floors make it easy for someone to sneak in undetected. You should replace them with these other floors, where no one would be able to sneak in at all," would be exactly the opposite of their intended job.
They are the intelligence community, not our national cybersecurity consulting firm, and they only ought to be notifying the public if the risk to national security involved in leaving the vulnerability open is greater than the risk to national security involved in losing the intelligence that could be gained from it.
It is without question that, at times, the intelligence community must have overstepped its bounds, as any entity with that much power would on occasion. Maybe in their case that happens far more often than it should. But does that really mean they should have no real power at all?
Trust me, most of us (at least those that take insurance) don't get paid much for sitting there trying to figure out what diagnosis someone has (even though some of us, myself included, still enjoy the human side to that interaction and wish it were still present in more of medicine); for many, it would be much easier if we could do like the internists, send you to get an MRI, and get a diagnosis faxed back to us. Tons of researchers are spending tons of money to try to get us to those biomarkers. Jumping the gun and throwing out the current system without a remotely valid one to replace it, however, is not the answer.
Obviously, all of this is coming out of my ass, but like I said, I don't think it's entirely illogical (though I also think that, for its own purpose, the phone's layout is equally logical, and emulating the calculator on a dialpad would have made the phone look ridiculous when it was released).