More trollish BS. You make sweeping claims, provide zero technical detail, and push as much FUD as you can.
Signal is implementing secure backups in a way (zero knowledge) that mitigates known attack vectors: no key escrow, no server-side metadata leakage, no linkability to payments, ciphertext padding to resist analysis, and backups that honor disappearing messages. The tradeoffs are intentional: you must safeguard your recovery key, and “secure backups” don’t protect against device-level compromise. But that’s the right line to draw — if they softened it, it would break their privacy model.
I can't think of anything stupider than letting another company handle encrypted data like that.
I can think of something stupider: dismissing a zero-knowledge system without understanding how it works. Signal isn’t “handing over data.” Backups are encrypted on the device with a locally generated recovery key that never leaves the user’s hands. What’s stored is opaque ciphertext, unlinkable to accounts or payments. No one — not Signal, not the host provider — has the means to read it. This is zero knowledge. If a third party wants your data, like law enforcement, or the IRS, they are going to have to come through *you* to get it. This is a win, period.
The entire point of signal and things like it is so that you can communicate securely and destroy those communications as needed so that they can't be used against you in lawsuits and such. It's why cops use it.
That is *not* the "entire point" of Signal. You are so far off-base, it is not even funny. The "point" of Signal is private, secure communication under user control. Let me repeat that for you: user control. Backups are opt-in. If you want ephemerality, don’t enable them. But if you want resilience after device loss, you can — without compromising the core privacy model. Equating “optional backup” with “betrayal of purpose” is just your lame strawman.
If you're going to actually store that data then the risk of the person storing it and then giving access to it to whoever is way too high.
Do you even know what zero knowledge means? Signal doesn’t know which account it belongs to. They don’t know what conversations or media are inside. They don’t know the key material that would ever let them peek.The recovery key never leaves the device. Without it, the encrypted blob is cryptographic noise. Zero-knowledge design means there’s nothing to “hand over.” Again, let me repeat: If some third party wants access to your data, they are going to have to come through you to get it.
Even if they let you control the keys that defeats the purpose.
This statement is fundamentally incorrect. This is textbook false equivalence: user-controlled keys are the entire point of end-to-end encryption, not a contradiction of it. Saying “if you hold the key, what’s the point?” is like saying “if you own the front-door key, what’s the point of a lock?”
If you're going to have to control the keys yourself you might as well just do the encryption yourself and then hire any one of a number of regular cloud backups companies.
That ignores the difference between DIY crypto and an audited, interoperable system built into Signal. Rolling your own scheme is a recipe for data loss and insecure mistakes. Signal’s approach provides verifiable open-source code, zero-knowledge server architecture, and seamless daily rotation -- no CS degree required.
I guess if the data isn't sensitive from a legal standpoint and you're not afraid of the cops getting their hands on it. But then there's tons of other services and they're probably going to be cheaper.
Now we get to you the heart of your FUD: implying that Signal backups are less safe than “tons of other services.” In reality, most consumer backup services either escrow keys or scan content. Signal’s design deliberately severs the link between ciphertext and identity, adds ciphertext padding, and offers no escrow, for a couple of bucks a month. That is a winning combination.