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but for example the american A in words like "cat" and "path" is historic, unlike the British pronunciations which match the a in "father"
You make some interesting points, but you clearly have some very strange ideas about British pronunciation
"So being lazy and using improper English is impolite to the extreme."
Motes and beams, people! If you're going to moan about "improper" English, it's best not to make lots of errors yourself: - you started your sentence with "So". The word you ought to have used was "Thus". - you missed out the comma that should have followed the "So" - the expression is "in the extreme", not "to the extreme" - even had you used "in the extreme", it would still have made for an awkward and inelegant sentence, compared to the obvious alternate of "... is extremely impolite."
Do you have a credible source for any of these so-called rules? In particular:
This because it is Linux or the GNU toolchains that has issues with multiple lib versions (the major source of "dependency hell"), it is the package managers.
Actually the package managers can handle it just fine (well, I know RPM can, and I *think* dpkg/apt can too); usually the problem is that the libraries are packaged in a way that doesn't support this. If two versions of a package share no files (e.g. if you provide "libxyz.so.1.0.0" in one package, and "libxyz.so.1.1.0" in another version of the same package, RPM can handle having both versions of the package installed with no problems at all. This is used, for example, to support having multiple kernel versions installed on RedHat-type systems. What becomes a problem is if you have (say) binaries in the same package, with the same name in each version, but different contents: naturally RPM will report a conflict if you try to install both.
Doesn't make any of it "incredible."
I dunno, I find most anti-science hard to believe!
You didn't upgrade systemd. You upgraded the systemd package. You won't actually start using the new version of systemd until you do a reboot.
No, that's completely wrong. The new version will run if the package upgrade script tells the daemon to re-exec itself. Which (at least in the case of RHEL7), it does.
What would you propose as a better alternative to this idiom in a language that lacks exceptions:
I propose this; namely using variables to keep track of the state of resources, and then cleaning up based on the values of those variables. In my experience this is much less error-prone than the "goto" equivalent - for example, reordering the code is much less likely to break the cleanup.
Ethernet packets do not have error correction, just error detection.
Wrong - Gigabit ethernet (over copper) does have a form of error correction.
Adding a registry entry to remap keys is pretty trivial, too.
You need to be an administrator to do that. That makes it pretty non-trivial.
It would, except that users having Admin access is much more common on Windows systems. (Being an Administrator on Windows does not (in theory, at least) have the complete "game over" privileges that "root" traditionally does on Unix-based systems, so there are still further privilege levels to be escalated to.)
is running a different OS which doesn't treat Ctrl+Alt+Del in a special way
Now your suggesting what exactly? That the attacker is going to throw in a linux live CD, boot it, run his 'fake login screen' that looks like the usual windows screen?
Ok... yes I guess that is a theoretically possible attack; although you'd probably get caught as soon as the user isn't actually able to log-in and IT gets called in...
Why would IT get called in? After the user's entered their password, you just display a simulated BSOD and then reboot into the genuine OS; no user will be remotely suprised
Deliberately conflating, but not confused.
It's hard to tell the difference from here
I can trivially run a program to throw up a screen that looks like the login screen on a PC at work. TRIVIALLY.
Adding a registry entry to remap keys is pretty trivial, too... as, for that matter, is running a different OS which doesn't treat Ctrl+Alt+Del in a special way! Thus any extra security provided is minimal. Which is fine - as you say, security doesn't have to be perfect in order to be useful - but in my view overselling the effectiveness of a measure is counterproductive.
Nobody here is arguing ctrl-alt-delete is some magical super thing,
Alas that is exactly what Microsoft claimed for years (possibly still claim?)...
You aren't going to be tampering with or installing of ANY of that from user land.
I think you're confusing the user vs administrator distinction with the userland-vs-kernel-mode distinction... but never mind...
And if you have root... you can just install a keylogger be done with it. Why bother with dorky fake lock screens?
What I'm saying is that the "Ctrl+Alt+Del protects your password" claim is overblown; the suggestions you give only amplify that, as they are even more ways to circumvent it...
I think you possibly mean ad nauseam?
You're tricking yourself into security theater. You can't intercept an actual ctrl-alt-del, but you can read the ctrl and alt keys, and just unlock your fake lock a couple seconds later.
This. Or the fact that there are registry entries that allow remapping of any key to any other, including (as far as I remember) the Ctrl, Alt and Del keys. The "security" of Ctrl+Alt+Del has always been over-hyped
 It could be a macro, but most coding conventions require macros that can't be used as if they were functions to be all-caps.
Or x could be an array... in which case the called function can modify the value of the variable. The point you're making is valid, but C isn't 100% consistent in this regard
IIRC, pascal begin/end are not optional.
If body of the "if" (or "while" etc) is a single (simple) statement, then "begin" and "end" are optional - so you can write either
if cond then
if cond then do_stuff()