> this means that Firefox on Android with HTTPS Everywhere is now by far the most secure browser
> against dragnet surveillance attacks like those performed by the NSA, GCHQ, and other intelligence agencies.
While I certainly think it is a good idea to encrypt traffic, this statement is highly misleading or naive: Since the CA
system is *flawd by design* and every one of those "authorities" in the long list of built-in CA inside
your browser can, by negligence or choice, supply any of these and other agencies with a valid certificate for
*any hostname in the world*, initiatives like these protect your privacy only from your local sysadmin/ISP, and also
do nothing against traffic analysis.
Should a US person/company trust that "China Internet Network Information Center" isn't going to create a cert for a
US bank or company to perform a MITM attach with? Should a Chinese company trust "Wells Fargo" not to?
Should the Greeks trust "TÜRKTRUST Bilgi letiim ve Biliim Güvenlii Hizmetleri A.. (c) Aralk 2007", or the
Turks "Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority"? What on earth makes you think ALL of these
companies can resists pressures to misbehave? Yet all of them are built-in to your browser and "you" trust them.
Just go to any (Cloudflare, Akamai..)-accelerated site using https and check out the certificate used to see how that works:
They are issued certificates for the customer domains they accelerate, and hence have access to all the traffic.
In essence, they do exactly what a man-in-the-middle attack would do, except on a much grander scale (and with the collusion
of the actual domain holders). The agencies can carry out such attacks from within the ISP's, and your browser would still show "green".
The Cert validation in the browsers leads to a *dangerous false sense of security* at most. This is crypto, a weakest-link business
if ever there was one, folks. It's not ALL, or SOME that need to fail in order for PKI to fail, it's ANY of them.
Surely, we can do better than that: We should get rid of all centralised security illusions. Why aren't we signing contents using our PGP
keys that at least make multiple signers possible and habitual, and, and this is the essential difference, IMHO: That *you* have made a
conscious decision to trust or mistrust, to a certain degree, by reviewing a web of trust, as in informed consent as opposed to blind paternalism
of massivly built-in, pretrusted certificates by distant companies you really have no clue about.