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Comment: Deniability of OTR (Score 2) 114

by leto (#37458364) Attached to: Ask Jennifer Granick About Computer Crime Defense

Many people use an IM add-on called Off-the-Record. On top of encryption, it also provides deniability by not proving any digital signatures for the other party to present to a court, and the procol ensures everyone can make false messages in the past. How strong do you this technical protection would be from a legal perspective if one of the two parties has a logfile with all messages?

Comment: GKG and InternetX support DNSSEC (Score 3, Informative) 70

by leto (#36655296) Attached to: Ask Slashdot: Which Registrars Support DNSSEC?

I strongly recommend using GKG.net, as they have the best (automated) XML interface that I know of. See their documentation

InternetX also has a good interface, but it is a little more complex to get going.

Those, as well as GoDaddy, which you can only process using ugly web scraping with BeautifulSoup and Mechanize, were the first ones we supported in our DNSSEC Signer product.

Paul Wouters, DNSSEC Evangelist at Xelerance

Comment: powerdns was vulnerable, but differently (Score 2, Insightful) 237

by leto (#29518643) Attached to: Nominum Calls Open Source DNS 'A Recipe For Problems'

Powerdns was vulnerable to the Kaminsky attack, but in a different way. It was actually easier to spoof the server due to its more actively dropping certain DNS packets. So while it did perform source port randomization, it was not totally immune to the attack either.

http://doc.powerdns.com/security-policy.html itself states:

All versions of PowerDNS before 2.9.21.1 do not respond to certain queries. This in itself is not a problem, but since the discovery by Dan Kaminsky of a new spoofing technique, this silence for queries PowerDNS considers invalid, within a valid domain, allows attackers more chances to feed *other* resolvers bad data.

Though it is phrased as "someone elses problem", in the DNS word of course nothing is "someone elses problem". DNS servers are chained in hierachies and one problem somewhere leads to problems elsewhere. DNS is all about protocol compliance to ensure interoperability. With the "someone elses problem" approach, we would have had no "reflection attack" and "amplification attack" problems either, it being "someone elses problem". Despite the nice phrasing, powerdns caused cache poisoning problems as a result of the Kaminsky attack that needed to be addressed.

In general, I have a problem with bug reports and changelogs writing things as "improved error handling", "made more robust" or "add security to" which are too often used to hide the real security impact of certain bugs. DJB's policy of "it is not my bug to fix, because it is an operating system bug" is also completely bogus from a system administrator point of view who still ends up with a security problem.

Security

+ - SecTor conference starts of with DNS(SEC) talks

Submitted by leto
leto (8058) writes "Dan Kaminsky and Paul Wouters both presented DNS security talks at the new Canadian security conference SecTor in Toronto. Kaminsky showed a DNS binding attack using javascript and flash, allowing him to penetrate any firewall and start scanning the internal network of any user that visited his website. Wouters gave a presentation on the Theory and current worldwide operational experiences of DNSSEC that included a fancy google map overlay showing all TLD's deploying or testing DNSSEC. For those not convinced about the need for DNSSEC, he showed "15 ways of using the DNS to capture your clicks". Other speakers included Rohit Sethi and Nish Bhalla demonstrating their new Opensource Exploit-Me series of Firefox plugins to perform automated penetration testing, Johnny Long with a hilarious talk on Hacking Hollywood, and the mandatory presentations about wifi and bluetooth insecurities. No presentors were denied entry into Canada."

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