Admittedly, that was actually pretty funny.
Spam filtering not a solution. E-mail has a monopoly on a lot of functions today. Getting accounts on most websites, getting receipts and confirmations from online purchases, recovering passwords, and countless other functions of the Internet. One thing they all have in common is that not only are they E-mail, but they are also unencrypted and can be spoofed with minimal effort.
A free market solution would be to offer more options. Automatic, universal encryption or digital signatures applied to everything genuine would be a legitimate solution to spam, and everything else gets dropped by your server. There are some minor obstacles, but if every mail server also serves the keys for the accounts it holds, it would be a simple matter to verify what current keys to accept at the recieving end.
Your post advocates a
( x ) technical ( ) legislative ( x ) market-based ( ) vigilante
approach to fighting spam. Your idea will not work. Here is why it won't work. (One or more of the following may apply to your particular idea, and it may have other flaws which used to vary from state to state before a bad federal law was passed.)
( ) Spammers can easily use it to harvest email addresses
( ) Mailing lists and other legitimate email uses would be affected
( ) No one will be able to find the guy or collect the money
( ) It is defenseless against brute force attacks
( ) It will stop spam for two weeks and then we'll be stuck with it
( ) Users of email will not put up with it
( ) Microsoft will not put up with it
( ) The police will not put up with it
( ) Requires too much cooperation from spammers
( x ) Requires immediate total cooperation from everybody at once
( x ) Many email users cannot afford to lose business or alienate potential employers
( ) Spammers don't care about invalid addresses in their lists
( ) Anyone could anonymously destroy anyone else's career or business
Specifically, your plan fails to account for
( ) Laws expressly prohibiting it
( x ) Lack of centrally controlling authority for email
( ) Open relays in foreign countries
( ) Ease of searching tiny alphanumeric address space of all email addresses
( x ) Asshats
( ) Jurisdictional problems
( ) Unpopularity of weird new taxes
( ) Public reluctance to accept weird new forms of money
( x ) Huge existing software investment in SMTP
( ) Susceptibility of protocols other than SMTP to attack
( ) Willingness of users to install OS patches received by email
( ) Armies of worm riddled broadband-connected Windows boxes
( ) Eternal arms race involved in all filtering approaches
( ) Extreme profitability of spam
( ) Joe jobs and/or identity theft
( ) Technically illiterate politicians
( ) Extreme stupidity on the part of people who do business with spammers
( ) Dishonesty on the part of spammers themselves
( ) Bandwidth costs that are unaffected by client filtering
( x ) Outlook
and the following philosophical objections may also apply:
( x ) Ideas similar to yours are easy to come up with, yet none have ever
been shown practical
( ) Any scheme based on opt-out is unacceptable
( ) SMTP headers should not be the subject of legislation
( x ) Blacklists suck
( x ) Whitelists suck
( ) We should be able to talk about Viagra without being censored
( ) Countermeasures should not involve wire fraud or credit card fraud
( ) Countermeasures should not involve sabotage of public networks
( x ) Countermeasures must work if phased in gradually
( ) Sending email should be free
( ) Why should we have to trust you and your servers?
( ) Incompatiblity with open source or open source licenses
( ) Feel-good measures do nothing to solve the problem
( ) Temporary/one-time email addresses are cumbersome
( ) I don't want the government reading my email
( ) Killing them that way is not slow and painful enough
Furthermore, this is what I think about you:
( x ) Sorry dude, but I don't think it would work.
( ) This is a stupid idea, and you're a stupid person for suggesting it.
( ) Nice try, assh0le! I'm going to find out where you live and burn your
I was wondering if anyone was injured. Since the summary didn't mention it I had to RTFA:
We are still investigating the extent of damage, however there was no human casualty with only one minor injury.
I would think this would be an important part of reporting about a fire.
I'm having trouble figuring out what purpose this is supposed to serve. What is the point of locally storing SHA512 hashes of your passwords for remote systems?
It looks like a more complex much more secure version of:
So this generates a unique password for each site that you use based on a memorable set of information.
Until I figure it out, I'll just leave it alone.
And just to back up my claim... here's a link to their prices... although it says it's a "special"... it's the same price they've been charging since the 1st of the year...
That's a really good price. Normally people change their water pump while they are at it, which increases the price a bit.
The source of the problem on the Yorktown was that bad data was fed into an application running on one of the 16 computers on the LAN. The data contained a zero where it shouldn't have, and when the software attempted to divide by zero, a buffer overrun occurred -- crashing the entire network and causing the ship to lose control of its propulsion system.
Apart from leaving CIDR out of the picture, the second sentence is simply not true. The upper limit of usability is around 30-50 computers / public ip these days, if those computers are using the internet. NAT breaks so many things...
I'm not really sure where you get the idea that you can only use 30-50 computers on a single public IP. I can guarantee if you use enterprise-grade firewalls to do the NAT'ing you have no problem going into the thousands of clients.