The state change only becomes effective when the results from the two
labs are brought together and are jointly analyzed, which can happen
centuries later. Bohmians like Maudlin tend to confuse such changes in
distributions with a change in the world, because the notions of states
and wave functions are reified, and considered as some real thing out
Note here that locality is maintained by not having any appropriate change in the world until the two labs bring their results together! This is what I take Wiseman to be referring to when he talks about giving up on correlation. In the Nature article I linked earlier:
No, it's not. Werner is talking about the nonlocality of the wavefunction collapse, whereas Wiseman is talking about abandoning Reichenbach's common cause principle.
But one can go further, by recalling that local causality rests on two principles: Einstein’s principle of relativistic causality, and the principle of common cause. Thus Bell’s 1976 theorem can be restated as: either causal influences are not limited to the speed of light, or events can be correlated for no reason.
Those who hold Einstein’s principle to be inviolable (the localists) must conclude that some events are correlated for no reason. A challenge for them is: if correlations do not necessarily imply a cause, when should scientists look for causes, and why?
and from the arxiv.org paper,
In conclusion, for a proper appreciation of the foundational importance of Bell’s
theorem to physics, information science, and the philosophy of causation, one should be
familiar with both the 1964 Bell’s theorem and the 1976 Bell’s theorem, even though
they are logically equivalent. The former proves that quantum phenomena are either
nonlocal (in a “causation by agents” sense) or undetermined, while the latter proves
that quantum phenomena violate local causality (in a “common cause for correlations”
Let me clarify what they are talking about: Bell's theorem follows from local causality. Local causality itself can be derived either from the conjunction of determinism and locality, or from the conjunction of Reichenbach's common cause principle and locality. So, if you want to keep locality, you have to give up determinism (as shown by Bell's first theorem) and Reichenbach's common cause principle (as shown by Bell's second theorem, in a more modern reading). Maybe reading this paper of Wiseman will make things clearer.
While Wiseman, Werner, and Maudlin may be all saying subtly different things, their understanding seems to me largely the same. Maudlin shows (as Bell did), that embracing indeterminism isn't enough. What Wiseman points out is that the choice isn't between locality and indeterminism, but between locality and correlation. What Werner says is that the correlation comes from entirely local events, presumably late occuring: when the labs bringing their results together. You have given up on indeterminism, but that isn't one of the options on the table.
As I said before, if indeterminism is the price to pay for keeping lcality, then we're much better off ditching locality. The same goes if one is referring to giving up on correlation of events. But keep in mind the kind of correlation here one needs to give up: it's the correlation we find in the kind of experiment given in this slashdot article. These are very *strong* correlations. How crazy does a view have to be before we give up locality?
Come on, Werner and Wiseman largely agree, but they are talking about different things. Maudlin is in violent disagreement with everybody else. But I'm repeating myself here. What I'd like to point out is what exactly is meant by "giving up on correlation of events". What one needs to give up is a very specific thing, namely Reichenbach's common cause principle, essentially that probabilities of two distant events will factorize when conditioned on their common cause. The mainstream view is that Reichenbach's principle has been falsified, and that we need to develop a true, quantum version of it. See, for example, this paper.
And to conclude, I'd like to bet that you are not a physicist (probably a philosopher?), if you think it is in any way tenable to abandon locality.